South Africa after Apartheid

Policies and Challenges of the Democratic Transition

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"A luta continua!" Democracy, Elections and Governance in South Africa, 1994–2014

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Twenty years after the first inclusive democratic elections in South Africa, opinion about the achievements of post-apartheid governance and the quality of the country's democracy is diverging considerably. The spectrum of assessments ranges from careful appreciation to outright disapproval of the African National Congress' (ANC) government record. The former position would highlight, in a historicizing perspective, that – given the country's past – in 1994 most observers did not expect a rather peaceful consolidation of the protracted transition to a post-apartheid order and the subsequent attempts to make South Africa a more inclusive society (see, for instance, Booysen 2014). In contrast, the latter would stress that the government has consistently failed to deliver on its promise of "A Better Life for All" (which was the ANC's campaign slogan in 1994), but rather established a "comrade's republic" that primarily is serving the interests of a new African political class and their cronies (often referred to as "tenderpreneurs") – particularly under the presidency of Jacob G. Zuma who is ... in office since 2009 (see, for instance, Boraine 2014; Lodge 2014; Mashele and Qobo 2014; Southall 2013; Zapiro 2013).

To provide some orientation in this debate, this chapter concentrates on one specific area of post-apartheid reform politics: the field of democracy, governance and elections. This choice is inspired by the *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance* (African Union 2007) that describes at great length a universal understanding of democracy and respect for human rights that is based on the notion of "human security". The African Union's Charter is designed "to promote and strengthen good governance through the institutionalization of transparency, accountability and participatory democracy" (African Union 2007: 1).[2] However, even within the political sub-field of democracy, governance and elections, the concrete empirical areas that can

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1 This article was originally written in November 2014 and revised on the basis of comments by two anonymous reviewers in February 2016.

2 The African Charter was adopted in January 2007 (see Kane 2008), but only entered into force in February 2012 after the necessary minimum of 15 AU member states had ratified it and

be reviewed in a single chapter on South Africa's "Unfinished Business" have to be further narrowed down. For this purpose reference is made to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process in South Africa. The APRM is a voluntary self-monitoring mechanism that was launched in 2003 and by now has been integrated into the structures of the African Union (see Mangu 2014; APRM 2014; NEPAD 2014). It focuses on four areas: (1) democratic and political governance, (2) economic governance, (3) corporate governance, and (4) socio-economic development. In this chapter the focus is one the first area only. As the chairman of the APR Forum, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, has stressed: "[The APRM] should ... be viewed as an instrument for improving governance and building consensus amongst all stakeholders for development within a State, while sharing best practices and problem-solving techniques across States" (APRM 2007: n.p.). South Africa acceded to the APRM in March 2003. The first Country Review Mission was conducted on 9–25 July 2006. The subsequent Peer Review was formally carried out by the Heads of State and Government at the APR Forum held in Accra (Ghana) on 1 July 2007. In the following three reports on implementation progress of the National Programme of Action have been presented by South Africa's government at the APR Forum (RSA Government 2009, 2011, 2014). Currently it prepares to embark on a second peer review process.

Making reference to the African Charter and the APRM process does not mean that this chapter is attempting to reconstruct the related debates within South Africa (on the latter see Turiansky 2010, 2014). Nor does this chapter aim at another theoretical contribution to the political science-based literature on procedural democracies and democratic regimes, and its application to South Africa. Rather the APRM Report will be used to identify some very few core areas of "democracy, governance and elections" that will shed light on the question where South Africa stands 20 years after the end of apartheid and what kind of "unfinished business" still has to be addressed in this respect. Thus, the APRM Report 2007 will serve to highlight, within the field of "democracy, governance and elections", four core issues of praise and/or concern: elections, violence, xenophobia and corruption. Cross-cutting issues that would merit further attention, but for obvious reasons cannot be dealt with in this short chapter, include unemployment, service delivery, inequality, the HIV/Aids pandemic, land reform, crime, racism and affirmative action (see APRM 2007: 273–287).

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deposited the legal instruments. South Africa had signed the Charter on 1 February 2010, ratified it on 24 December the same year, and deposited the legal instruments on 24 January 2011.

Elections

No doubt, the country has made huge progress towards establishing an inclusive democracy. Based on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which was finally adopted in 1996 (see APRM 2007: 57), national and provincial elections are held every five years (on the latest elections held on 7 May 2014 see Engel 2014; Melber 2014a). Local government elections have been held since 1999, and the next round is planned for August 2016. Against this background the 2007 APRM Report (2007: §4) summarises that:

> In 13 short years, South Africans have managed to leap across the deep divide of an oppressive racist state to become a modern constitutional democracy. Since 1994, the country has made undeniable progress in a number of critical areas. On the political front, democratic institutions are well established (see also §129).

At the same time the report acknowledges that South Africa is still a deeply divided society when it comes to live chances and inequality (see ... Terreblanche 2002), and that there are a number of huge challenges – South Africa is "a democracy under severe socio-economic stress" (APRM Report 2007: §6).

In the academic literature there is little controversy about the nature of the South Africa's democracy: Most observers would agree that the country is a "dominant party regime" (Giliomee 1998; Giliomee and Simkins 1999; Southall 2005), i.e. a state that – despite of regularly held elections – is governed by a single party (the ANC; see Lodge 2004; Lotshwao 2009; Booysen 2011; Suttner 2012) – without any alternation. A look at five consecutive parliamentary elections confirms this assessment (see table 1.1). Despite regular criticism raised against the ANC tripartite alliance – also comprising the South African Communist Party (SACP, see Thomas 2007) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) – it has governed the country since April 1994 with a comfortable percentage of the valid votes cast of always above 60 per cent, until 1997 in a Government of National Unity (GNU) with the National Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) as junior coalition partners. While the NP – which had left the GNU already in 1996 and was renamed New National Party in 1997 – finally dissolved in 2005 and most of its members joined the ANC, the IFP increasingly has been reduced to a party with only a regional status (and even that was lost in the 2014 elections, see below). These days the official opposition in the 400-seat National Assembly is led by the Democratic Alliance (DA, see Southern 2011). For many years the chairperson of this party has been Helen Zille who also is the Premier of the Western Cape (since

TABLE 1.1   *South African parliamentary elections, 1994–2014*

Year	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
ANC	62.65 (252)	66.35 (266)	69.68 (279)	65.90 (264)	62.15 (249)
DA	1.73 (7)	9.56 (38)	12.37 (50)	16.66 (67)	22.23 (89)
NP/New NP	20.39 (82)	6.87 (28)	1.65 (7)	–	–
EEF	–	–	–	–	6.35 (25)
IFP	10.54 (43)	8.58 (34)	6.97 (28)	4.55 (18)	2.40 (10)
UDM	–	3.42 (14)	2.28 (9)	0.85 (4)	1.00 (4)
FF Plus	2.17 (9)	0.80 (3)	0.89 (4)	0.83 (4)	0.90 (4)
COPE	–	–	–	7.42 (30)	0.67 (3)

Note: Percentage of votes casted; in brackets number of seats (out of a total of 400). In addition, there ... There are also other, smaller parties represented in the National Assembly.
SOURCE: IEC (2014).

2015 the chair is Mmusi Maimane) – the only province not governed by the ANC (see below). An election pact between the DA and the newly established Agang (Nguni for "to build") South Africa party of former anti-apartheid activist Mamphela Ramphele – which many observers thought would change the game – failed in January 2014. Outside Western Cape the DA has strongholds in some of the metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng (including Johannesburg and Tshwane, formerly Pretoria). Breakaway parties from the ANC rallied less support then most observers initially were expecting: Both the Congress of the People (COPE, established in 2008) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF, 2013), the latter led ... led by former ANC Youth League leader Julius S. Malema, scored less then seven per cent of the vote; the United Democratic Movement (UDM, 1997) – the only merger of prominent former African and European party politicians – only once got 3.42 per cent of the vote (1999) and ever since is declining in popularity. The Afrikaaner, far-right party Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus, 1994) is still represented in parliament, though only on the margins.

A look at election results from the provinces indicates three important dynamics (here and in the following IEC 2014; see also Ndletyana and Maserumule 2015). First, and despite of the ANC's overall dominance, two provinces remain contested. In recent elections, in Gauteng the ANC's share of the total valid votes was reduced from 64.04 per cent (2009) to 53.59 per cent (2014), while at the same time the DA's share increased from 21.66 to 30.78 per cent; and although in the Western Cape the ANC managed to slightly increase its share (2009 to 2014 by 1.34 percentage points), the DA increased its lead by 7.92 percentage points (from 51.46 to 59.38%). Second, in KwaZulu/Natal, that used

to be heavily contested in the 1994 and 1999 elections, the ANC scored 64.52 in 2014 (+1.57 percentage points) while the IFP, which led the province from 1994 to 2004, has been reduced to the status of a minor party (with decrease in support from 22.40% in 2009 to 12.76% in 2014). And, third, the DA has increased its share of the vote in all provinces, mainly at the expense of other opposition parties (among others with an increase between 2009 and 2014 of 11.32 percentage points in Northern Cape and 6.21 in Eastern Cape). At ... the same time there was a decline of voter turnout in some provinces where the DA made inroads (for instance in Eastern Cape from 76,69% in 2009 to 70,32% in 2014).[3]

However, opposition, parliament and provinces remain weak counterparts to the ANC's national government. The dominance of the ANC in the National Assembly was further amplified through two 15-days "crossing the floor" periods which, in 2005 and 2007, allowed members of parliament to change their party affiliation without losing their seat – by the end of 2007 the ANC held 297 out of 400 seats (Booysen and Masterson 2009: 443; APRM 2007: §§79, 135, 152). Until the late 1990s the tripartite alliance of ANC, SACP and COSATU managed rather well to integrate divergent positions. In a sort of division of labour COSATU succeeded in portraying itself as the "real opposition" to the ANC government. However, this has changed with the rise to power of Zuma at the ANC's national elective conference in Polokwane in December 2007 and later also the factional conflict between Zuma and his then-vice president, Kgalema P. Motlanthe, who competed for the chairmanship of the ANC in 2012 (see Calland 2013; Booysen 2015). And in the run-up to the elections in early 2014 COSATU was struggling with one of its biggest affiliates, the National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA), which called on COSATU to break its ties with the ruling party (Mail & Guardian 2014). Meanwhile NUMSA has been expelled from COSATU.

In general, the quality of elections in South Africa is widely accepted. Apart from the 27 April 1994 national and provincial elections which were marred by non-transparency of the actual counting process and political negotiations behind the scenes (see IEC 1994; Commonwealth Secretariat 1994; UN Secretary-General 1994; Engel 1994), most elections that followed received quite good marks from international election observer missions, though at times falling short of the label "free and fair". For instance, on the 7 May 2014 elections the Commonwealth Observer Mission noted:

> Despite some shortcomings in a number of areas which we have highlighted in our report, they are largely technical in nature and we believe that this did not have any impact on the overall integrity of the electoral process. The exemplary conduct of all political parties in accepting the

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3 I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this point.

outcome of the results bears testimony to the maturity of democracy in South Africa. The technical efficiency of the IEC [Independent Electoral Commission], the conduct of political parties, robust media and above all, the large turnout of enthusiastic voters all contributed to a well-managed, transparent and largely violence-free election. The electoral process fully met international and regional democratic standards to which South Africa has committed itself, and we therefore attest to the credibility of these elections, which, in our view, were credible.

> COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT 2014: 19

Earlier the APRM Report (2007: §92) had observed, that

Although there have been sporadic expressions of dissatisfaction, as well as isolated election-related violence, stakeholders have generally accepted the legitimacy and integrity of the electoral processes and results. Thus, unlike in some other African countries, the performance of the governance system is not likely to be a source of conflict in South Africa.

And the South African government, in its 3rd APRM implementation report, holds that the country's "commitment to a people-centred democracy through public participation is demonstrating cumulative improvement" (RSA Government 2014: 32).

Generally speaking, and contradicting some of the expectations with regard to the size of the non-ANC vote nurtured in the run-up to the last two general elections, South African citizens in fact have a fairly good opinion of the state of democracy in their country (see Mattes 2007). To illustrate this point, data will be drawn from Afrobarometer, an independent research project that conducts polls in 35 African countries. Research on South Africa started in 2000; the fifth round of surveys was conducted in 2011 (round 6 surveys begun in March 2014). Three questions from the Afrobarometer sample will be used (on … the … following see Afrobarometer 2008: 29, 2011: 31). On the question "In your opinion how much of a democracy is South Africa today?" in the 2008 survey 2 per cent of respondents answered that the country was not a democracy and 18 per cent stated that South Africa was a democracy, but with "major problems". Three years later (this is the last survey available), the combined percentage of respondents sceptical about the quality of South Africa's democracy was down to 11 per cent. The percentage of people who regarded South Africa a democracy with only "minor problems" was stable at 28 per cent. At the same time the number of people who thought that the country was a "full democracy" had increased from 36 to 41 per cent. Likewise, on the question "Overall, how

satisfied are you with the way democracy works in with Africa" the percentage of respondents who stated that they were "not at all satisfied" decreased from 18 to 11 per cent while the percentage of people who were "fairly satisfied" increased from 36 to 41 per cent, and those who were "very satisfied" from 13 to 19 per cent. Thus, according to these figures, and at least up to 2011, overall acceptance of and satisfaction with the South African democracy has increased – despite all critical debate in the media and academic journals.[4] Although there are regional differences: It seems that South African citizens in Gauteng and Northern Cape on average are far more satisfied with the quality of South African democracy then their fellows in KwaZulu/Natal or Western Cape.

Generally, these findings are supported by Du Toit and Kotzé (2011) who, based on the "World Value Surveys" series, claim that although "little headway has been made in narrowing the racial gap in perceptions about the state as far as confidence levels are concerned", there has been a rising confidence in civic institutions (such as the churches, charitable organizations, but also the Constitutional Court or the National Assembly), "particularly [among] those that operate in the social space between the individual and the state" (Du Toit and Kotzé 2011: 68). At the same time they observe a gap between elite and public opinion: "For the public, basic economic or 'bread and butter' issues receive higher priority" (ibid.). Basically, similar claims have been made in a study conducted by Susan Booysen on behalf of Freedom House that is based on focus group interviews. It concludes that:

> While there is strong disappointment with the government and its leaders, South Africans retain their faith in the democratic system and do not transfer their discontent to the African National Congress … .
> BOOYSEN 2014: 1

Indeed, frustration over non-delivery and other issues has so far not translated into a considerable higher share of the vote for opposition parties. Rather it is expressed by not voting at all. Over the years the percentage of eligible voters who are not participating in the general elections has risen considerably – by now this group of the electorate even outnumbers those who vote for the ruling party (see table 1.2). While the non-voters only made up 14.47 per cent of the electorate in 1994, when mobilisation levels obviously were very high, their

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4 Developing a sophisticated "quality of democracy" set of indicators, Graham for instance, describes South Africa as a "medium quality democracy" (2015: 364). See also Misra-Dexter and February (2010).

TABLE 1.2   *Voter turnout 1994–2014*[5]

	As of registered voters (%)	As of eligible voters (%)	ANC (as % of eligible voters)	Non-voters (as % of eligible voters)
1994	86.87	85.53	53.01	14.47
1999	89.28	62.87	41.72	37.13
2004	76.73	55.77	38.87	44.23
2009	77.30	59.29	38.55	40.71
2014	73.43	59.34	36.39	40.66

SOURCE: MCKINLEY (2014).

share has increased to 40.66 per cent in 2014. In 2014 registration rates were particularly low among the "born free" generation, i.e. those who were born after the end of apartheid in 1994 and were eligible to participate in elections for the first time that year (see Newman and De Lannoy 2014; ... Norgaard 2015). Of an estimated 1.9 million eligible people in this group, just some 646,313 have registered – approximately 34 per cent (Reuters 2014).

The overall percentages for the ANC would be even lower if the most recent estimate of the voting age population (VAP) was taken into account. According to Faull (2014), the IEC's figures are based on the 2011 population census. Based on 2013 census estimates, the VAP meanwhile has grown to 32.7 million. Adjusted figures would show that the ANC had in fact lost 10.41 per cent of its 2009 votes, and the DA had gained 26.77 per cent (Faull 2014: 23, 26; see Schulz-Herzenberg 2014a, 2014b). Internationally, these figures compare positively to Nigeria (2011 with a VAP turnout of 25.80 per cent) and are similar to India (2009 at 56.45 per cent), but compare negatively to countries such as Brazil (2010 at 80.62 per cent; see IDEA 2014).[6]

Violence

Although the human rights situation in South Africa has greatly improved after the end of apartheid, according to the APRM Report (APRM 2007) violence still

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5   For the years 1994 to 2009, these figures deviate slightly from the database provided by the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA 2016).

6   This paragraph is reproduced from Engel (2014: 85).

TABLE 1.3   *Freedom House ratings, 1990–2014*

1990		1994		1999		2004		2009		2014	
PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL	PR	CL
5	4	2	3	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2
partly free		free		free		free		free		free	

Note: PR = political rights, CL = civil liberties (on a scale from 1 to 7).
SOURCE: FREEDOM HOUSE (2016).

constitutes a serious problem – though changing in nature and intensity. In very general terms, human rights can be translated into "political rights" and "civil liberties" as, for instance, measured by the Freedom House Index (FHI).[7] Accordingly South Africa's rating has, and that is not big surprise, improved immediately after the end of apartheid and remained at excellent levels ever since – though the assessment of political rights has gone down slightly after the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008; see table 1.3).

There are no *systematic* human rights violations by state organs. However, police violations of civil rights have been frequently reported by human rights organizations, in particular with regard to detention, in prisons and during demonstrations (Amnesty International 2016). Often the rights of foreign refugees, undocumented migrants and asylum seekers are not sufficiently respected. Despite of the extremely liberal constitution (Melber 2014b) citizens that identify with non-hetero sexuality (LGBT) face serious difficulties; sexual violence against women and children is rampant. In this respect, the APRM Report (2007: §112) warned of a "deteriorating moral and social fabric within the South African society" (but see also RSA Government 2014: 38f.).

In general, the country is characterised by quite alarming levels of systematic violence in three areas: isolated incidents of political violence, acts of violence against migrants – see below – and violence against farmers (but see also Landau 2012). There is a deeply ingrained culture of violence (see, for instance, von Holdt 2013) that has its roots in extreme social inequality and mass poverty. In addition, the collective memory of all population groups is fundamentally shaped by the legacy of colonial conquest, colonial "border wars", segregation during the 20th century, apartheid from 1948 to 1994, related new

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7   Founded in 1971, Freedom House is an independent, though not unbiased watchdog on human rights, with offices in Washington DC and New York.

"border wars" in the Southern African region as well as liberations struggles since the 1960s. Basically, the population is deeply traumatized, as Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu has described it (Tutu 1999; see also Krogh 2000; Du Bois-Pedain 2007).

During the transition (1989–1994) various forms of political violence have occurred, often linked to political infighting or economic competition – the borders between politics and organized crime often were blurred. Although this trend has declined since, it seems to be rising again during the last years. In KwaZulu/Natal in particular, politically motivated killings linked to the violent competition between the ANC and the IFP continued after the end of apartheid, causing more than 2,000 casualties in the years 1994 to 2000 (Taylor 2002; TRC 1999). However, numbers went down considerably in the 2000s – but recently have gone up again. These incidents seem to be linked to the establishment of the National Freedom Party (NFP), that was founded by the former IFP chairperson Zanele kaMagwaza-Msibi, which is seen as a viable competitor to the declining IFP (in the local elections 2011 this party immediately managed to get 10.4% of the vote). However this form of violence somewhat is decoupled from dynamics at the national level. All in all, the confrontation between ANC or IFP self-defence units and related warlords during the 1990s has faded away (for this conflict see Jeffery 1997).

Forms of state violence do occur periodically, the most recent example obviously being the "Marikana massacre": On 16 August 2012 police shot 34 wild-cat mine worker strikers in North–West province east of Rustenburg; in total the conflict cost some 44 lives (see Alexander 2013; Bond and Mottiar 2013; Botiveau 2014). However, at the time of writing the report of the Commission of Inquiry chaired by Judge Ian G. Farlam is still pending. Legal strikes regularly go hand in hand with habitualized forms of violence (Petrus and Isaacs-Martin 2011).

Violence against famers, in many cases European ones (ca. 61% of all cases), constitutes a special case. According to the Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU) between January 1990 and September 2014 some 1,734 farmers have been killed (TAU 2014). The debate on farm assaults is ethnically loaded, as "European" farmers are unilaterally singled out in public debate. Typically, violent acts are carried out by young male Africans. According to a police investigation (2001–2003), most of the researched cases in the period 1998–2001 were related to robbery. Only in two per cent of the incidents a political motive could be found or violence was related to labour conditions and wage disputes (Special Committee of Inquiry 2003; see also HRW 2001; Burger 2012).

Xenophobia

Violence against African migrants and refugees has increased since the end of apartheid. Already in 2007, the APRM Report (2007: §103) argued that perceptions of illegal immigrants

> have prompted social tension and the eruption of violence and crime which, if not properly managed, may convert into major sources of internal strife and, possibly, sources of inter-state conflict. An atmosphere of xenophobia, particularly against black African people coming from other African countries, seems to be emerging.

Indeed, mass evictions, targeted murder and pogrom-like excesses have peaked in the metropolitan areas of Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban in May 2008, with ca. 62 victims and some 100,000 displaced persons (Worby, Hassim and Kupe 2008; Zondi 2008; Desai 2010; Landau 2011; Matssinhe 2011). Though figures have declined since, xenophobic violence remains a serious issue – the most recent incidents occurred in December 2015 (Mail & Guardian 2015). Xenophobic violence is rooted in economic competition in townships, and alleged threats to South African masculinity (Hayem 2013; Crush, Chikanda and Skinner 2015). Historically South Africa has always been a centre of labour migration from neighbouring countries, especially in the mining sector, but also with regard to "domestic" workers (Trimikliniotis and Zondo 2008). With the end of apartheid borders have become more permeable and migration also from areas that were drawn into the orbit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) increased considerably, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition the continuing crisis in Zimbabwe not only has driven political refugees to South Africa (as of 15 June 2015, the UNHCR had registered some 75,333 Zimbabwean refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa; UNHCR 2016), but also – depending on the source – some 1.3 to 3 million people who have fled their country because of poverty and economic reasons.

South African human rights organizations indirectly blame the government for the poor legal protection of migrants and the xenophobic atmosphere in the country. While on the one hand the government is propagating an "open" South Africa, on the other is has institutionalised a strict asylum and migration regime (APRM 2007: §§269, 271) – though this is not efficiently implemented. Non-documented migrants are partly deported in masses. The pogroms of 2008 and subsequent smaller incidents have only been addressed lukewarm

by the government. A recent Afrobarometer poll indicates that xenophobic attitudes among the population have increased since (Mataure 2013; see also Du Toit and Kotzé 2011: 159–171).

Corruption

According to Transparency International, a Berlin-based international advocacy group favouring a live free of corruption, South Africa has over the years consistently slipped on the issue of corruption (see table 1.4). On a scale from 0 ("highly corrupt") to 1 ("very clean"), the country's score has deteriorated from 0.56 in 1995 to 0.44 in 2014; in relative terms, and in global comparison, South Africa's rank has dropped.

Although the Country Self-Assessment Report in preparation for the APRM Report argues that "the perception of corruption in the country is actually worse than the reality on the ground" (APRM 2007: §234), Afrobarometer surveys on the evaluation of corruption in South Africa show a different picture (see also APRM Report 2007: §241). Comparing three administrations – Mbeki (1999–2008), Motlanthe (2008–2009) and Zuma (since 2009), 40 per cent of the respondents state that during Mbeki's realm "some" of the people around the president and his office were corrupt (see also Southall 2008). This figure decreased for Motlanthe's brief reign (23%), but increased significantly for Zuma's tenure (51%) (Afrobarometer 2008: 37, 2011: 48). This assessment also has affected the reputation of the National Assembly. On the question "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?" in 2008 15 per cent stated "none". This figure went down to 6 per cent in 2011. At the same time the number of people seen to be involved in corruption increased from 40 to 48 per cent ("some of them") and 21 to

TABLE 1.4   *Corruption index for South Africa, 1995–2014*

	1995	1999	2004	2009	2014
Score	0.56	0.50	0.46	0.47	0.44
Rank	21 (41)	34 (99)	44 (146)	55 (180)	67 (175)

Note: Rank among total number of countries (in brackets) reviewed.
SOURCE: TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2016).

32 per cent ("most of them"), respectively (Afrobarometer 2011: 48, 2008: 37). The same is true of the public perception of local councillors. In 2008 15 per cent of respondents regarded them not to be corrupt – this figure decreased to 6 per cent in 2011. At the same time 37 per cent felt that "most of them" were corrupt – as opposed to only 25 per cent in 2008 (while the percentage of respondents who thought that "all of them" were corrupt increased from 10 to 14%; Afrobarometer 2011: 48, 2008: 37).

However, the legal framework for fighting corruption is in place, some ten different institutions are concerned with it (Naidoo 2013; see also RSA Government 2014: 46–49). A Special investigating Unit (SIU) has examined more than 31,000 cases and prosecuted some 3,800 of them for fraud. In ... particular in executive positions corruption or the mixing of private and public office and interests seems to be increasing. And, as the APRM Report (2007: §240) observed, there was no regulation in place "requiring the disclosure of sources of private funding for political parties". The dissolution in 2008 of a special unit of prosecution, the Scorpions, i.e. the Directorate of Special Operations of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), has been seen as an indicator of the government's intention to procrastinate procedures against President Zuma who has been implied in various cases of corruption and misspending of public funds (from the so-called arms deal in 1999 to the recent saga around the "security upgrade" of his family home in Nkandla; see Feinstein 2007, 2010; Holden 2008; Public Protector 2012; Mail & Guardian 2016).

First results from the Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey (2014–2015) indicate that this has repercussions on the general respect for President Zuma:

> Approval of President Zuma's performance almost halved between 2011 (64%) and 2015 (36%) and is now well below the presidential average since 2000 (55%). This is the first time that a majority of South Africans have expressed outright disapproval of a president's performance (62%) since the initial Afrobarometer survey in 2000.
>
> LEKALAKE 2015: 2

Seen from an ANC perspective even worse may be the fact that the distrust against the country's and party's president also translates into dissatisfaction with the ruling party itself: "more than half (53%) of survey respondents 'agree' or 'strongly agree'" that the country "needs a new labour/workers' party to defend working-class interests" (Nkomo 2016: 1). In the industrial heartland of South Africa, in Gauteng province, support for the idea of such a new worker's party is as high as 63 per cent (ibid.: 2). Finally, the decreasing public trust

in the president and the ruling party ... has also consequences for the general support of democracy by South Africans: It has declined from 72 per cent in 2011 to 64 per cent in 2015. And despite this still majoritarian "stated support for democracy, six in 10 citizens (61%) would be willing to give up regular elections in favour of a non-elected government that could deliver basic services" (Lekalake 2016: 2).

Conclusions

Twenty years after the end of apartheid South Africa has come a long way in overcoming the legacy of apartheid and colonial oppression. The peaceful transition and the building of strong democratic institutions after 1994 have been widely acclaimed. Yet despite some economic growth,[8] various social interventions and the introduction of reform policies, the high levels of social inequality have not changed fundamentally. South Africa is still a deeply divided society, with high levels of structural inequality with regard to access to education, health and labour. For a considerable time popular discontent with the ruling party has not translated into major political changes. To the contrary, even in the 2014 elections the ANC still enjoyed substantial electoral support – only the number of voters no longer participating in elections has grown significantly, even outnumbering the support for the ANC. In the realm of democracy, governance and elections, and within the four areas singled out by the 2007 APRM Report (elections, violence, xenophobia and corruption), voter apathy, a deeply ingrained culture of violence, widespread xenophobic attitudes and related practices of violence as well as high levels of corruption have been identified as the country's core challenges. It is in this respect that the dominant party state still has some "unfinished business" on its plate. Increasingly the expectant mood of the early post-apartheid days has given way to subdued or even grim sentiments. In 2015/2016 the published public opinion was openly opposed to the president – as shown by recent public calls for Zuma's resignation after he had sacked two ministers of finance within just four days ("#ZumaMustFall!", Facebook 2016; Cohen and Mbatha 2015; Reader 2015).

8　According to Statistics South Africa, the country "experienced an average growth rate of approximately 5 per cent in real terms between 2004 and 2007. However, the period 2008 to 2012 only recorded average growth just above 2 per cent; largely a result of the global economic recession". Statistics South Africa 2016.

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