Office of Intelligence and Analysis Analysis and Production Directorate

# Homeland Security Threat Overview


The Overall Classification of this Briefing is:

**UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO** 




#### **DHS Intelligence**

## HITRAC Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis



#### HITRAC

#### **1&A Structure**Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis



#### **I&A Analytic Priorities**

- Terrorist threats and networks
- Border and critical infrastructure security
- Spread of pandemic diseases
- CBRNE proliferation
- Growth and spread of extremist ideologies



#### Al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad Priorities

- Al-Qa'ida has focused on several key areas of importance to the group to further spread its goal of global jihad
  - Iraq AQ in Iraq is committed to removing US and Coalition troops and returning Iraq to an Islamic state governed with Shari'a law
  - Africa AQ has sought mergers with groups in Africa to further its agenda and has made frequent statements on the importance of Sudan and Somalia as fronts in the global jihad.
  - Afghanistan AQ's former safehaven and a key component of the group's strategy in promoting global jihad.

#### Al-Qa'ida's Expanding Global Outreach


- AQ's strategic reach is increasing in North Africa, Europe, and Iraq
  - AQ Deputy Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced last year that the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) – a group based in Algeria - merged with al-Qa`ida and is now called the al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
  - AQ will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qa`ida in Iraq as its most visible and capable affiliate and the only affiliate known to have expressed a desire to attack the US homeland.



#### Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis

## AQ Intent on Attacking ONG Infrastructure

- (U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida continues to demonstrate its intent and capability to target oil and natural gas infrastructure—exploiting media to promote attacks in sector
  - Video messages
  - Jihadi websites
- (U//FOUO) Targets identified in 2006 Oil fatwa:
  - Oil pipelines
  - Oil facilities
  - Oil industry-related individuals (including soldiers guarding facilities)
  - Not permitted: attacks on oil wells









#### Saudi Extremist Networks

- (U//FOUO) Saudi Arabian Ministry of the Interior (MOI) continues to arrest suspected and AQ-affiliated terrorists.
  - Arrested 172 militants in a 6-9 month period; 7 terror cells uncovered:
    - Operational support cell; 9 members; gathering weapons and information on petroleum facilities
    - Group of 5 individuals associated with the 24 February 2006 Abqaiq attack
- (U//FOUO) On 5 June the ministry announced the arrests of 3 AQ members responsible for recruiting youths on the internet and encouraging attacks on Saudi oil facilities.

(U//FOUO) Some individuals associated with these cells remain at large and continue to represent a threat to Saudi Arabia's ONG infrastructure; threat levels remain high as al-Qa'ida and insurgent groups have an enduring interest in attacks targeting oil facilities.



## **AQ** and Afghanistan

## AQ views Afghanistan as one of its most important priorities

- Possible alternate safehaven in northeastern Afghanistan if the FATA is lost due to its remoteness and tough terrain, which is very similar to Pakistan's FATA.
- Collaboration and cooperation between AQ and its preferred rulers for Afghanistan – the Taliban - has not ceased or diminished since 9/11/2001. Just as AQ's historical ties to the FATA run deep and provide them safehaven, so too do the ties with the Taliban.
- AQ leaders have made numerous public statements supporting Mullah Omar and his Taliban, indicating AQ continues to cooperate and collaborate with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

#### **Pakistan**

- AQ Senior Leadership remains active
  - Increased extremist activity in FATA areas
  - •Tribal leaders agreed to keep "foreigners" from the region
  - •Reduced military presence afforded AQ an opportunity to reconstitute
- •Stand-off between Pakistani government forces and mosque leaders turns violent
  - •Increased suicide attacks since assault on mosque
  - •Al-Zawahiri calls for Pakistanis to join the jihad to revenge attack by government forces
- •Al-Zawahiri increasingly active in issuing propaganda statements
  - Recent UBL statement contained old clips, but meant to reassure the followers that he remains active and in charge of AQ



Pakistan - Federally Administered Tribal Areas



#### **OVERSEAS TRENDS**

**Soft Targets:** Away from hardened, well-protected facilities towards attacks on more accessible and vulnerable sites of public access or mass assembly

Commercial and Government Facilities: Vehicle borne improvised explosive devices

Mass Transit and Rail: Use of carried or placed improvised explosive devices

- Mumbai, India 11 July 2006
- London, UK 7 July and 21 July 2005
- Madrid, Spain 11 March 2004

Casings and Surveillance: Barot casings demonstrate high level of sophistication

- UK Gas Limos Project
- NY/NJ financial institutions



#### **Terrorist Threat to the Homeland**

- Al-Qa`ida is intent in striking the US homeland and the US will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years
  - AQ pushing other extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities.
- Al-Qa`ida homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of:
  - Producing mass causalities
  - Visually dramatic destruction
  - Significant economic aftershocks
  - Fear amongst US population



#### **Terrorist Threat to the Homeland**

- AQ will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material
- Lebanese Hizballah may attempt to attack the Homeland
- Existence of radical, self-generating cells suggest that the US is not immune to what we judge is an expanding radical and violent segment in the west
- Non-muslim, "single-issue" groups will probably conduct attacks

#### Threats to Infrastructure

- Al-Qa'ida and affiliates likely <u>continue to have interest in</u> <u>attacking</u> Homeland infrastructure to inflict casualties, instill fear in the public, and to damage our economy
  - Iconic and highly symbolic Homeland sites likely remain enduring targets
- Terrorists likely remain interested in conducting attacks against U.S. <u>mass transit sector and the aviation sectors</u>
  - Relative ease and success in which similar attacks were conducted in Madrid, London and Mumbai bombings
- Improvised explosives, carried or vehicle borne, are the devices that are the preferred attack method against infrastructure targets



#### **Terrorist Threat to Food and Agriculture**

- DHS lacks credible information to indicate planning for an attack against the Food and Agriculture sector, but continues to pay great attention to this threat
  - Al-Qa'ida documents recovered from Afghanistan in 2002 indicate interest in animal and plant disease agents, while discussions among Islamists demonstrate general awareness of potential effects of introducing animal and plant diseases
  - Al-Qa'ida has shown an awareness of chemical and biological agents' utility as *food contaminants*, while discussions among Islamists and terrorist training manuals show interest in food contamination as an attack method



#### **Terrorist Threat to Food and Agriculture**

- While the biochemical industry is the main focus of animal rights extremists, and environmental extremists have a tangential focus on food and agriculture, both groups continue to show interest in targeting food and agriculture
  - Animal rights extremists have targeted agricultural research facilities, as well as food products that experiment on animals, and some recent actions have been tied to frustrations over recent legislation targeting these extremists
  - Environmental extremists have targeted USDA Forest Service Research facilities, while the broader anarchist movement has also shown an interest in targeting food and agriculture



#### **Insider Threats to Infrastructure**



**Dhiren Barot** 



JFK plot lead



- Recent terrorist plots show the importance of insiders to gain access to targets
  - AQ planner Barot had tasked a cell member to secure employment at a hotel in the UK to learn how to deactivate fire and security systems
  - JFK plot leader had been a cargo handler at the airport. He used his job-related knowledge to conduct surveillance and plan the attack
  - The Fort Dix Six used a family member's pizza restaurant to gain access to the post in 2006 and conduct preoperational surveillance

### **Suspicious Activity Overview**

- SAR proven utility for investigative purposes
- Potentially useful for Trend and Pattern Analysis
  - However no baseline to evaluate
  - Incomplete data set
  - Inconsistency with data collection
- Exercise that requires federal and state cooperation



## **Suspicious Activity Analysis**

- Electric Power
- Dams
- Oil & Gas
- Chemical
- Nuclear
- Transportation related activity

Data is inconsistent, nonstandard and not reliable for developing judgments and assessments. We need a more comprehensive plan to incorporate State data.



### **Categories of Data Studied**

**ELICITING INFORMATION** 

**BREACH / INTRUSION** 

**ATTEMPTED INTRUSION** 

SABOTAGE/ TAMPERING/ VANDALISM

**CYBER ATTACK** 

**FLYOVER** 

**PHOTOGRAPHY** 

**EXPRESSED THREAT** 

**OBSERVATION** 

**WEAPONS DISCOVERY** 

**OTHER** 

THEFT



## **Recent Suspicious Activity**

- 10K lbs of ammonium nitrate reportedly stolen from a truck driver
- Fort Peck dam reportedly going to be attacked by an IED in January 2008
  - Both reports are serious in nature and were investigated promptly by authorities
  - Both reports were found to be not terrorism related

First reports are generally vague, incomplete and often inaccurate!



#### **Bulk Cell Phone Purchase Activity**

- Local and State law enforcement agencies received numerous calls reporting suspicious bulk cell phone purchases.
- In retail locations throughout the U.S., cell phone purchasers:
  - Visited multiple locations and purchased hundreds or thousands of phones.
  - Attempted to conceal their identity.
  - Were described as Middle Eastern.
  - Used gift cards or cash.
- DHS and FBI assessed that most individuals engaged in such purchases were taking advantage of discounted prices in the U.S. and reselling the phones for profit overseas.
- DHS and the FBI determined some buyers were associated to terrorist networks. The suspected motive was fundraising.\*

\*DHS/FBI Joint Homeland Security Assessment 7 February 2006



#### Suspicious Activity: AQ Casing Reports



- High degree of detail and awareness of site vulnerabilities, security operations, and law enforcement and emergency response
- Extensive use of open sources to obtain background information on targets, employees, and building structure



**Dhiren Barot** 

- Illustrates AQ's interest in financial industry facilities as targets
  - Commercial facilities, mass transit and rail are often co-located with financial institutions in Chicago, New York, Washington, DC, and other major cities



#### Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis

#### **Areas of Focus**

- Police/security forces: The notes provided details on the private security personnel and police officers for each institution
- Traffic Flow: Location and traffic flow near police stations or other security agencies
- Cameras: Number, location, and function of all visible cameras on the exterior and interior of a given facility
- Building construction/vulnerabilities: Glass and its destructive power is noted in one of the casing reports
- Other building/vulnerabilities notes: Location of HVAC systems, emergency exits and escape routes, sprinklers and fire detection systems
- Secondary targets: Alternative target options considered in case the primary target site proved logistically unfeasible; focus on collecting data on alternate, less protected targets indicates AQ's interest in softer targets
- Attack timing: The surveillant clearly recognized the exploitability of large crowds that gather at set times on a recurring basis



#### **Suspicious Activity: Some Conclusions**

- Interesting convergence of incidents; but no definite terrorism nexus
  - Foreign intelligence may provide valuable start points for data evaluation
- No discernable patterns or trends emerged to date to suggest preoperational activity
- Building increased relationships with Private Sector
  - Useful in outreach and evaluation of their security
- Cross sector evaluation challenges but potentially beneficial



#### **Al-Qa'ida Priorities**

- U.S. is still the "Brass Ring"
- Other Western countries and Western interests are valid
   Targets
- Aiming for the Spectacular... or the Achievable?







#### Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis

#### **Conclusions**

- Al-Qa'ida remains intent on <u>attacking the Homeland</u> and US interests overseas
  - Opportunities may be reduced through increased security, but not eliminated— al-Qa'ida continues to adapt to security environments
  - Homeland-specific operational planning continues
- Affiliated Sunni extremists and like-minded individuals also harbor intent to <u>conduct mass-casualty attacks</u> in the Homeland
  - An attack by domestic extremist elements or affiliates (to include "homegrown" extremists) will be viewed by al-Qa'ida as a success
- DHS lacks credible information to indicate transnational terrorist planning for an attack against food and agriculture,
  - But al-Qa'ida and other Islamist groups have shown interest in targeting the food and agriculture sector
- Food and agriculture is not the primary focus of domestic animal rights and environmental extremists,
  - They have attacked food and agriculture-related targets in the past, and likely will continue to show an interest in the sector

