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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

FOIA review completed on 12 January 2017. Portions of this document no longer meet the classification standards of E.O. 13526, Section 1.4. As such, I am downgrading specific portion-marked paragraphs as "UNCLASSIFIED."

Partial classification downgrade executed by:

DANIEL L. KARBLER
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff
U.S. Strategic Command



**USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12
STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND FORCE EMPLOYMENT
(U)**

30 July 2012

**Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 30 July 2022**

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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HEADQUARTERS, US STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NE 68113-6500
30 July 2012

SUBJECT: USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12 fulfills a requirement established in Appendix B to Enclosure G, CJCSI 3110.01H, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 10.
- (U) 2. ~~(S)~~ Upon SecDef approval and update implementation, USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12 dated 1 May 2012 supersedes USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-08 dated 1 December 2008 in its entirety, to include Change 1. Strategic forces will continue to be capable of providing a credible response to any attack at any time.
3. (U) USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12 was coordinated with USTRANSCOM, USSOCOM, USPACOM, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USAFRICOM, the Joint Staff, the Services, and supporting component and task force commanders during the review process.
4. (U) The supporting plans listed in Base Plan, paragraph 3b (Tasks) must be reviewed and forwarded to this headquarters for review within 90 days of update implementation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

//signed//

JOHN W. RAYMOND
Major General, USAF
Director, Plans and Policy

DISTRIBUTION:
(Annex Z)

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30 JULY 2012

USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12 (U)
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS AND RECORD OF CHANGES (U)

1. (U) Plan Title

a. (U) Long Title: USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12, Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment.

b. (U) Short Title: USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12.

2. (U) This document is classified SECRET to protect information revealing operation plans of the US military. Information in OPLAN 8010 must be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of the plan, including those required to develop supporting plans.

3. (U) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 of the United States Code, Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

| <u>CHANGE NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> | <u>EFFECTIVE DATE</u> |
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USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12 (U)
PLAN SUMMARY (U)

1. (U) Situation

a. ~~(S)~~ General: Framing the Problem

(1) (U) Due to its wide ranging responsibilities, USSTRATCOM has a global perspective with a specific focus on certain adversaries who could quickly destabilize the international environment, threaten US interests, or threaten the interests of US allies and partners. During the Cold War the enemy was a well known single adversary, and our capabilities and strategies were developed to match that one adversary. With the end of the Cold War the international landscape has changed. Fiscal constraints, the emerging global economy, and the economic interdependencies that now exist between many nations have increased the complexity of international security cooperation. The global security landscape is marked by protracted conflict, constant change, enormous complexity, and increased uncertainty. While the fundamental nature of military conflict has not changed, today's operating environment is unlike any we have ever seen. The number and type of actors are changing, and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is less clear. Rapid technological evolution and the wide civil availability of formerly advanced military capabilities have reduced "entry costs," making available completely new weapons and enabling actors to access capabilities that would not have been available to them in the past without significant investment. Of the threats we face, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) clearly represent the greatest threat to the American people, particularly when pursued or possessed by violent extremists or state proliferators. The trend in overall threats facing the US for the next decade points toward the dominance of asymmetric threats, including WMD and threats to the space and cyberspace domains, over conventional military threats. Blurred boundaries and overlapping claims to sovereignty in global domains will continue to present national security challenges. While dynamic security concerns in space and cyberspace evolve, traditional threats to national security continue to be presented by sovereign states, both the *peer and near-peer* and those *regional* adversary states with emerging WMD capabilities. To address such pressures, the US must plan against a variety of adversaries. Regardless of the state, the

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use of WMD by any state has impacts to international security. Strategies for one adversary will not necessarily be appropriate for another adversary. As such, this plan contains strategies to handle various challenges from each adversary. Adversaries can be broken down into two groups, peer/near-peer states and regional states and non-state actors.

(U)(a) ~~(S)~~ Peer/Near-Peer States. States which possess the resources and capability to compete economically and militarily with the United States. Additionally, these states have the capability to confront the US on a global scale in a sustained way and to a sufficient level where the ultimate outcome of a conflict may result in severe damage to vital US interests.

(U)(b) ~~(S)~~ Regional States and Non-State Actors. States and non-state actors that do not possess the resources and capability to compete economically and militarily with the United States but are aggressively pursuing WMD and associated delivery systems as a means to advance their interests through intimidation and coercion. Nuclear weapons in the hands of regional states increase the potential for WMD proliferation to terrorists, accelerate proliferation overall, and contribute to regional instability. Rogue state or terrorist possession of nuclear weapons will impact regional security and runs counter to US national interests.

(U)(2) ~~(S)~~ Meeting the Challenge. USSTRATCOM meets these global challenges by integrating all of its capabilities through a series of plans (e.g., CONPLANS 8035 Space Control, 8039 Cyberspace Operations, and USSTRATCOM's Deterrence and Assurance Campaign Plan) which are collaboratively developed to achieve success with our assigned missions of strategic deterrence, force employment, space, and cyberspace operations. This plan specifically addresses deterrence and force employment objectives against a specific adversary.

(3) (U) The following countries present global threats:


(a) ~~(S)~~ Russia. Russia will remain one of the most influential actors in the European theater because of its geographic position, resources, traditions, and ambitions. Russian leaders will continue to promote the nation as an influential player on the world stage, insisting on regional and global recognition, and will resist actions perceived to be a Western encroachment on its vital interests. Unbalanced economic development, endemic social problems, internal unrest, and declining ethnic Russian birth rates almost certainly will constrain its resurgence over the coming decade. However, a confident,

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(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC




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
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(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC

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(b) ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ China. China is coming to a crossroads

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC

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
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC



(c) (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC


(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC



(d) (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC



(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC

(e) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a), (b) & (c) USSC

b. (U) Area of Concern

(1) (U) USSTRATCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). USSTRATCOM has a global area of responsibility, to include space and cyberspace. Although USSTRATCOM has no geographic AOR, it is responsible for mission area planning for adversaries within other combatant commanders' AORs. (references (b) and (d))

(2) (U) USSTRATCOM Area of Interest (AOI). USSTRATCOM supports worldwide operations as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and as requested by a combatant commander.

(3) (U) Operational Area. USSTRATCOM forces operate on a global basis as necessary to satisfy national or theater objectives per references (a), (c), and (d). When tasked to execute an operation or mission, CDRUSSTRATCOM will collaborate with applicable combatant commanders to ensure

deconfliction/coordination. Additional details are outlined in Annex C (Operations).

c. (U) Enemy

(U)(1) ~~(S)~~ This plan aligns strategies and capabilities to deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries that have global reach and/or influence. The term "enemy" is used in the singular form throughout this document for simplicity. However, because of the global view of this plan and the varied nature of the adversary set, multiple enemies are addressed.

(2) (S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

d. (U) Friendly

(1) ~~(S)~~ Center of Gravity (COG) Analysis.

(a) COG. The National Leadership. As a decision making body, the national leadership, which includes the President, Cabinet members, the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, and CDRUSSTRATCOM, controls the posturing and employment of strategic forces, including nuclear, space, and cyberspace, in order to achieve the deterrence and force employment objectives of this plan. Members of the COG, specifically the President and Secretary of State, have the responsibility of conducting diplomacy and statecraft before, during, and after execution of this plan, both of which support deterrence before and restoration of deterrence after execution. Likewise, members of this body, specifically the President, the SecDef, and CDRUSSTRATCOM [Redacted]

[Redacted] The national leadership, as a whole.
[Redacted]

(b) (U) Critical Capabilities (CC). In order to effectively exercise its power and authority, the national leadership must deter and defend the US and its vital interests against strategic attacks, maintain a viable market economy, make timely decisions, and communicate those decisions to strategic forces--these are enduring capabilities regardless of which adversary the US is facing.

1. (U) CC 1. Deter and defend the US and its vital interests against strategic attacks. The Constitution requires the federal government to provide for the common defense of the nation. The national leadership must effectively deter potential adversaries and defend the US and its interests in order to maintain its power to govern.

a. (U) Critical Requirements (CR).

(1) (U) CR 1.1. Strategic forces. Having the forces to defeat an adversary is one of the critical requirements to both deterring and defeating an adversary. The US must ensure that the strategic forces are available, survivable, and maintained in order to achieve the objectives of this plan.

(2) (U) CR 1.2. Will to employ strategic forces. Along with physically having the forces, the will to employ those forces, if appropriately messaged to other nations, serves as a deterrent and as the actual execution of strategic forces if deterrence fails.

b. (U) Critical Vulnerabilities (CV). The CV relating to this CC and the associated CR will vary based on the capabilities of each adversary. Therefore, these issues will be discussed in more detail in the individual

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

2. (U) CC 2. Maintain a viable market economy. A viable market economy is the engine that allows for a robust defense of the nation, through the manufacture, maintenance, and employment of strategic forces.

a. (U) CR.

(1) (U) CR 2.1. Trade. Trade is critical, not only because of the revenue created, which supports a large deterrent force, but by the relationships it creates and maintains with other nations. Through a highly interdependent global economy, adversaries are deterred from attacking an economic partner.

(2) (U) CR 2.2. Funding. The ability to build and maintain strategic forces, which deter aggression during early phases of conflict and defeat adversaries if deterrence fails, requires substantial funding.

b. (U) CV. The CV relating to this CC and the associated CR will vary based on the capabilities of each adversary. Therefore, these issues will be discussed in more detail in the individual

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

3. (U) CC 3. Make timely decisions. The decision to act or not to act, depending on the situation, must be made in a timely manner in order to protect decision makers, strategic forces, and vital interests of the US, and to achieve the objectives of this plan. These decisions will vary based on the threat. The timeliness of the decision should not be misunderstood to mean a quick decision. Depending on the threat scenario the timeliness of the decision could be delayed until all the supporting instruments of national power can be coupled together for the full effect of a US response.

a. (U) CR.

(1) (U) CR 3.1 Receive accurate information. Members of the National Security Council, intelligence officials, and combatant commanders provide the national leadership with the information and context of the current situation. This allows the national leadership to understand the environment, develop strategic courses of action, and desired end states to the situation. These recommendations will support decision making. This CR requires survivable and robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities.

(2) (U) CR 3.2 Understand meaning and context of information. In order to ensure appropriate employment of strategic forces to achieve the objectives of this plan, the national leadership must understand the information they receive and use it to frame the situation correctly. This requires one or more conversations with the national leadership, supported by intelligence providers, to appropriately frame the situation and understand the first, second, and third order effects of any response by US strategic forces.

b. (U) CV. The CV relating to this CC and the associated CR will vary based on the capabilities of each adversary. Therefore, these issues will be discussed in more detail in the individual

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

4. (U) CC 4. Communicate decisions to strategic forces. Once the decision has been made to execute strategic forces, communicating the

decision to the forces is critical to the success of achieving the objectives of this plan.

a. (U) CR.

(1) (U) CR 4.1 Survivable communications. In order to communicate to the strategic forces, communications systems must be capable of functioning under all possible conditions, including nuclear environments.

(2) (U) CR 4.2 Continuity of government. Several of our adversaries are assessed to have the capability of striking our decision makers with little or no warning. In order to maintain a communications link with the strategic forces, the US must have a method of passing the legal authority to execute strategic forces in any situation.

b. (U) CV. The CV relating to this CC and the associated CR will vary based on the capabilities of each adversary. Therefore, these issues will be discussed in more detail in the individual [redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

[redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

e. (U) Assumptions

(1) (U) Although our understanding of the adversaries' risk tolerance, values, logic, and cohesiveness will remain incomplete, their decision calculus is at least partially discernable and can be influenced.

(2) ~~(S)~~ This plan has a [redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC
[redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(3) (U) The US will plan and operate within a coalition framework, to the greatest extent feasible.

(4) ~~(S)~~ The US cannot [redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC
[redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC
[redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC except where specifically governed by treaty obligations.

(5) ~~(S)~~ In the event of a hostile act or intent, the President of the United States (POTUS) or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) will authorize CDRUSSTRATCOM [redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC
[redacted] (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(6) ~~(S)~~ The US will [redacted] will not be possible.

(7) ~~(S)~~ The US will [redacted]

(8) ~~(S)~~ The US will [redacted]

(9) (U) Adversary-Specific Assumptions. Detailed adversary-specific assumptions [redacted]

f. (U) Legal Considerations. In accordance with reference (i), legal review is required in the development of strike options and prior to option execution to ensure compliance with the US Constitution, applicable US statutes, international treaty/agreement obligations to which the US is a party, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), customary international law, rules of engagement (ROE), and national policies.

(1) ~~(S)~~ ROE will be in accordance with reference (j), [redacted] In accordance with (IAW) reference (j), unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. However, the obligation to intervene, and the ability of strategic forces to act, may be restrained by specific guidance concerning the unit's mission. If any conflict between this general policy and specific guidance pertaining to performance of this plan is perceived, mission executers should request supplemental guidance from CDRUSSTRATCOM or the appropriate combatant commander. See Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement (ROE)) to Annex C (Operations) for further details.

(2) (U) The use of any weapon, kinetic or non-kinetic, must comply with the key principles of LOAC: military necessity, avoidance of unnecessary suffering, proportionality, and discrimination or distinction. All of these principles will be taken into account when developing and executing courses of action (COAs). Planners and operators will consult their servicing staff judge advocate to ensure adherence to these principles.

(3) (U) See Appendix 4 (Legal) to Annex E (Personnel) for further details.

g. (U) Risk/Mitigation

(1) (U) Risk. Deterrence actions do not achieve desired outcome. This can happen in three general ways: 1) planners mischaracterize an adversary's decision-making process and develop an inappropriate deterrence strategy; 2) the adversary perceives US actions in a way the US does not intend, and therefore acts in a way that is counter to US deterrence strategy; or 3) some adversaries may not be easily deterred, given the content of their decision calculus and our inability to affect it. Mitigation. Develop readily executable and adaptively planned response options to de-escalate, defend against, or defeat hostile adversary actions.

(2) (U) Risk. Unintended second- and third-order effects on other actors as a result of the assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defend/defeat efforts focused on the primary actor. Mitigation. Cross-indexing proposed deterrence actions and activities across the decision calculus of other adversaries and allies to detect and address potential second and third order effects. Develop measures of effectiveness/measures of performance (MOE/MOP) to determine deterrence cause and effect on adversary/actor behavior and perception shift.

(3) (U) Risk. Adversaries misperceive messages. Mitigation. Constantly assess culturally appropriate strategic communication strategy, tightly integrated through the interagency process.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Risk. Operational imperatives in (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC the development of policy. Mitigation. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(5) ~~(S)~~ Risk. CDRUSSTRATCOM not given requisite authorities to (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC thus jeopardizing the US ability to (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC Mitigation. Phase 0 activities will include requests to (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC in order to receive this authority before the need arises.

(6) ~~(S)~~ Risk. Lack of strategic warning or misinterpretation of strategic warning by the US. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(7) (U) Military/Operational Risk. Due to the adversary and scenario-specific nature of military/operational risk, these factors are detailed in each

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

2. ~~(S)~~ Mission.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of Operations

(1) ~~(S)~~ Commander's Intent. USSTRATCOM employs situation-appropriate mission area capabilities to deter adversaries from behavior that threatens our nation, its vital interests, or our allies and partners. When necessary,

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

It is essential that USSTRATCOM maintain unity of effort with other combatant commands, our interagency partners, and our allies and partners through close collaboration in multiple venues. The end state is a stable and secure environment in which adversary leadership is unwilling or incapable of using their forces to threaten US vital interests.

(2) (U) General

(a) ~~(S)~~ The

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

Applicable annex content supports the full range functionality (e.g. the means) designed to achieve desired plan objectives. To help manage the utility of this plan's responses, the six-phase model, as described in ref (ee), is applied in the planning framework. The plan emphasizes escalation control designed to end hostilities and resolve the conflict at the lowest practicable level, consistent with meeting national objectives. This plan follows a premise that to achieve escalation control, the US military and other instruments of national power will effectively match an adversary on multiple levels of conflict. Reference (n) serves as the basis used in this plan to describe deterrence objectives and the general means used to obtain them. Specific strategic concepts for achieving

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b) ~~(S)~~ In accordance with ref (a), the USSTRATCOM Campaign Plan

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

Campaign Plan. This plan relies on the USSTRATCOM Campaign Plan to identify or create opportunities in the strategic environment through its execution. In turn, this plan produces specific operations and activities that will be performed during steady-state/phase 0 and therefore shapes the USSTRATCOM campaign plan by nominating desired steady-state activities.

(U)(c) ~~(S)~~ This plan provides options to deter, dissuade, control escalation with, and if necessary, defeat adversaries who threaten US interests. This plan also assures allies and partners of extended deterrence. Deterrence operations are designed to convince adversaries not to take actions which threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-makers, while dissuasion operations are designed to convince an adversary against gaining a capability. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome.

1. ~~(S)~~ Deter, Dissuade, and Escalation Control Objectives.

These objectives rely upon system analysis aimed at the cognitive processes of an adversary, namely the key decision makers. They focus on affecting the adversaries' strategic decision makers by analyzing their strategic profiles and strategic calculus. System analysis will expose effects which can be generated to highlight the specific interests of the strategic decision makers which will restrain them from unacceptable actions. Objectives in this category include deterring an adversary from taking a specific action, dissuading an adversary from gaining a capability, and, in the event of conflict, controlling escalation to restore deterrence.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC Additionally, objectives aimed at escalation control incorporate attacking an adversary's capability while affecting the will of the key decision makers.

(U) 2. ~~(S)~~ Assurance and Extended Deterrence Objective. Our allies and partners must have supreme confidence in our ability to respond appropriately to adversary threats and capabilities. These relationships are critical and communicate a willingness to act in support of regional stability. This includes ensuring and maintaining security agreements with partners and allies.

3. ~~(S)~~ Defeat and Defend Objectives. These objectives rely upon system analysis aimed at defeating the adversary. They focus efforts on defeating adversaries' forces and defending US, allied, and partner forces and interests. Examples of these objectives are (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

System analysis will expose effects which can be generated to defeat, or render ineffective, an adversary's offensive capabilities.

(d) ~~(S)~~ The goal of the application of force is to attack the appropriate enemy "system" to eliminate the enemy's capability to continue to fight and influence key decision makers to cease hostilities. As a result, some adversary components may remain untouched but, because of the resulting attack, cannot function as part of a cohesive whole. This approach to strategy requires a thorough understanding of specific characteristics of the enemy system; in turn, this understanding generates a series of executable actions intended to produce specific and discrete effects on key components of the adversary's vital systems. This understanding and design logically precedes development of this plan and underpins (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(e) ~~(S)~~ This plan directs assigned (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(f) (U) Managing outcomes is conducted through the use of the joint planning six-phase construct, mentioned earlier. Each phase describes functions designed to integrate mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, conflict termination, redeployment, and demobilization activities applicable to each respective phase. Activities associated with preceding phases continue, as applicable, during execution of each succeeding phase. For each phase of the campaign, the descriptive paragraphs below describe general activities that relate to each phase. The description of the phases and associated activities that follow are general in nature and may or may not apply to all adversaries.

1. (U) Phase 0 (Shape)

a. ~~(S)~~ During phase 0, USSTRATCOM, in collaboration with applicable GCCs, conducts steady state operations to assure allies and partners, dissuade competitors from developing capabilities, and deters potential adversaries from attacking the US, its allies, and partners. These integrated operations include all USSTRATCOM mission capabilities, as applicable. In particular, USSTRATCOM

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

USSTRATCOM conducts

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

USSTRATCOM conducts routine deployment of strategic forces for planned training and exercises, and theater security cooperation activities (e.g. exercises) to ensure unified actions with GCCs, allies and partners. Should the security environment shift, these operations will prepare USSTRATCOM

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

b. (U) Transition Point to Phase 1 (Escalatory): Specific

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

2. (U) Phase 1 (Deter)

(U) a. ~~(S)~~ During this phase, USSTRATCOM, in collaboration with applicable GCCs, continues operations to assure allies and partners, dissuade potential competitors from developing capabilities, and deter potential adversaries from attacking US, its allies, and partners. USSTRATCOM advises generation or adjustments to force survivability posture and, if directed by the

President or SecDef, executes those actions in order to demonstrate US capabilities and resolve, increase survivability of strategic forces, and allow rapid transition to force employment. USSTRATCOM continues to provide strategic forces readiness for planned deployments, training, and exercises, and theater security cooperation activities (e.g. exercises) to ensure unified actions with GCCs, allies and partners. USSTRATCOM maintains friendly space and cyberspace assured access and, if a specific threat is identified, takes actions in order to protect the US space and cyberspace infrastructure and mitigate effects if an attack occurs. All USSTRATCOM forces prepare for execution of subsequent phases in order to defeat potential adversaries.

b. (U) Transition Points to:

(1) (U) Phase 0 (De-escalatory): Crisis resolved; threat of aggression/coercion on US vital interests no longer present. Strategic forces return to steady state readiness.

(U)(2) ~~(S)~~ Phase 2 (Escalatory): Current level of friendly activity ineffective in controlling threat of aggression/coercion; increase resource allocation and employ forces.

3. (U) Phase 2 (Seize the Initiative)

a. ~~(S)~~ During this phase, USSTRATCOM, in collaboration with applicable GCCs, (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

when ordered by the President or SecDef. USSTRATCOM (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC USSTRATCOM will (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC as directed by the President or SecDef, (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC USSTRATCOM provides options to the President for the (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC USSTRATCOM continues efforts to dissuade possible competitors from taking actions and deterring adversaries from increasing attacks against US interests while assuring partners and allies of its resolve to keep the situation from escalating. USSTRATCOM prepares to transition to Phase 3 if de-escalation does not occur.

b. (U) Transition Points to:

(1) (U) Phase 0 (De-escalatory): Crisis resolved; any attacks have ceased and the threat of aggression or coercion on US vital interests is no longer present.

(U) (2) ~~(C)~~ Phase 1 (De-escalatory): Any attacks on US vital interests have ceased and the threat of aggression or coercion on US vital interests has decreased.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Phase 3 (Escalatory): Current level of friendly forces activity [redacted]
[redacted]

4. (U) Phase 3 (Dominate)

a. ~~(S)~~ During this phase, USSTRATCOM, in collaboration with applicable GCCs, conducts operations, integrated across all mission areas, in order to defeat adversaries and return to phase 0 on terms acceptable to the US. USSTRATCOM, as directed by the President, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] As directed, USSTRATCOM will [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] As directed, USSTRATCOM conducts offensive space and cyberspace operations in order to defeat malicious adversary use of those domains. Additionally these actions maintain US and allied freedom of action within the space and cyberspace domains.

b. (U) Transition Point to Phase 4/5: US activity results in de-escalation, adversary capitulation, or direction by the President or SecDef to de-escalate of US activities.

5. (U) Phase 4 (Stabilize)

a. ~~(S)~~ During this phase, USSTRATCOM, in collaboration with applicable GCCs, [redacted] order to maintain a credible force structure that assures allies and partners, dissuades competitors from developing capabilities, and deters potential adversaries after an exchange with one or more adversaries. USSTRATCOM continues to [redacted]

USSTRATCOM will maintain, and if necessary, reclaim assured access to space and cyberspace, as directed.

b. (U) Transition Point to Phase 5: Civil authority assumes control/responsibility of the former adversary state. Attacks or the threat of aggression/coercion from actors associated with the former adversary have de-escalated to a level that can be controlled by the civil authority.

6. (U) Phase 5 (Enable Civil Authority)

(U)a. ~~(S)~~ During this phase, USSTRATCOM, in collaboration with applicable GCCs, continues operations to recover and reconstitute its forces to steady state operations in order to assure allies and partners, dissuade competitors, and deter adversaries. USSTRATCOM maintains freedom of action in the space and cyberspace domains. As directed, USSTRATCOM provides defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).

b. (U) End state (Transition to Phase 0): The global security environment is stable and balanced, US vital interests are neither attacked nor threatened by attack and US support of civil authority in adversary state is minimized.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Concept of Support

(1) (U) Security, logistics, personnel, and administrative support will be furnished by supporting commands in accordance with Service directives, command arrangements agreements (CAA), memorandums of understanding (MOU), TF operating instructions, and the logistics concept for support operations outlined in USSTRATCOM plans and directives.

(2) (U) GCC and USSTRATCOM components will coordinate with and support lateral and subordinate unit commanders in maintaining a daily capability to support OPLAN 8010 mission execution.

(3) ~~(S)~~ Strategic lift will be required for deploying forces sourced and validated in the applicable OPLAN 8010 TPFDD.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

movement priority.

b. ~~(C)~~ Logistics. A logistics supportability analysis will be performed to identify any potential logistics shortfalls prior to OPLAN 8010 execution. This

OPLAN (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

For further discussion

on logistics, see Annex D (Logistics).

5. (U) Command and Control

a. (U) Command

(1) ~~(S)~~ Command Relationships. Per ref (c), in general, CDRUSSTRATCOM will be the supported commander during execution of this plan. During phases 0 and 1, CDRUSSTRATCOM and the affected geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) will share supported/supporting relationships in pursuit of the nation's deterrence objectives. USSTRATCOM's actions may support the deterrence objectives of one or more GCCs; likewise, the deterrence actions conducted by the GCCs in support of their own plans may support the global deterrence objectives of USSTRATCOM.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

DRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

will prescribe

command relationships by scenario. See also Annex J (Command Relationships).

(2) (U) Command Succession. Should USSTRATCOM (or CDRUSSTRATCOM) become incapable of performing command functions, succession to command will be as directed by ref (nn), and succession to Continuity of Operations, USSTRATCOM (COPSTRAT) will be as directed by ref (oo), Command Element Procedures.

b. (U) C4 Systems

(1) (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

[Redacted content]

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(2) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

The national community will

use specific networks during the execution of

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(3) (S) Commanders will ensure operations and communications personnel are aware that most

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

Due to the possibility of

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) USSC

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HEADQUARTERS, US STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE NE 68113-6500
30 JULY 2012

USSTRATCOM OPLAN 8010-12 (U)
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

a. (U) US Strategic Command Strategic Deterrence Security Classification Guide, 1 Jun 2009 (U//FOUO) (OPR: J52)

b. (U) US Strategic Command Strategic Target Planning Security Classification Guide, 1 Oct 2006 (S) (OPR: JFCC GS J51)

c. (U) US Strategic Command Emergency Action Procedures (EAP-STRAT) Volume 01A Security Classification Guide, 1 Jun 2009 (S) (OPR: J381)

(U) 1. ~~(C)~~ See references (a), (b), and (c). These classification guides provide users with general categories of mission areas and topics and their respective levels of protection. The level of protection listed represents the highest level of protection required by these mission areas and topics. If a document derived from this plan contains particular portions that are unclassified when standing alone, but classified information will be revealed when they are combined or associated, those portions shall be marked as unclassified and the page shall be marked with the highest classification of any information on or revealed by the page. An explanation will be added to the page or document identifying the combination or association of information that necessitated the higher classification.

2. (U) Users who desire information from these documents and are unsure of the proper classification should contact the document OPR or the J5 security POC at (402) 294-1099 or DSN 271-1099.

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