

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TO :
TITLE : STEPPED UP COURSE B
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EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526
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DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016

~~NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION~~ JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31 DEC 2037

~~TO DECLASSIFICATION~~
~~REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF~~

~~DATE: MAR 2016~~

OKAY TO RELEASE AS
RESTRICTED AND WITH CIA
CONCURRENCE
A. Vash

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Considerations

In our Operational Representatives discussions, it was generally acknowledged that a widespread revolt of the Cuban people against the regime might well lead to an open appeal by Cubans for help by U.S. military forces, as the regime's security forces attempt to crush the revolt. The CIA operational people, who would implement a stepped up Course B as Phase II of Operation Mongoose, do not believe this course of action by itself would bring the overthrow of the regime in Cuba; they believe that the use of U.S. military force in the final stage must be anticipated, for success.]

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At the close of the attached CIA section on "covert activities," there is a list of policy approvals deemed required. It is suggested that this be read in conjunction with the CIA operational suggestions as outlined in the section. It is noted that authority would be required for overflights (resupply, leaflet drops, infiltration, exfiltration), use of U.S. submarines for infiltration and exfiltration, major sabotage operations, stepped up psychological actions (including propaganda balloons and establishing a medium-wave Radio Free Cuba), training Cubans on U.S. bases, some operational use of Guantanamo, and more flexibility in the composition of paramilitary groups (selection of Cubans in U.S. forces and strengthening with non-Cubans).]

In the "covert activities" section, it is noted that CIA would support State in any feasible action to develop individual Latin American country support and would provide covert support to the CRC and appropriate Cuban groups, to assist in the achievement of the goal of Operation Mongoose.

My own comment is to urge that you give the fullest possible consideration to the concept of actions by Cuban groups, and actions from and by Latin American countries, to achieve the goal of Operation Mongoose. Consideration of this concept is urged, since it alone could offer making the responsibility for initiative and actions reside in groups and countries other than the U.S. If a support concept is possible which would permit U.S. assets to assist such non-U.S. operations, with reasonable assurance of mutual objectives and methods, then this would be the most desirable concept for winning our goal.

Attachments

~~TOP SECRET~~

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