

REVIEWING DHS'S TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM PREVENTION GRANT PROGRAM

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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REVIEWING DHS'S TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM PREVENTION GRANT PROGRAM

Tuesday, June 14, 2022

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. J. Luis Correa [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Correa, Titus, Meijer, Bishop, and Harshbarger.

Chairman CORREA. The Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and Accountability will come to order.

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the subcommittee in recess at any point.

I want to start by thanking everyone for joining us today. We are here to discuss a topic that is becoming all too familiar to man of us and every part of this Nation, and that is domestic terrorism.

From the hostage situation at a synagogue in Colleyville, Texas earlier this year to the racially-motivated shooting at a grocery store in Buffalo, New York, to just last month many, many attacks have devastated our communities across the country. In response, the Secretary of Homeland Security recently launched a new urgent review to assess the Department's capabilities to address this rising threat. We are here today discuss one of those capabilities in depth.

A key piece of the Department of Homeland Security's toolbox has been the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program, or TVTP. Since 2011 the Department has identified the need to partner with local communities to address the growing domestic terrorism threat. In 2016 DHS launched the Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program, a predecessor to current TVTP program. However, weak management of that early grant program undermined Homeland Security's ability to determine the effectiveness of the funding and concerns about inherent anti-Muslim bias in some of that program funded projects eroded trust with minority communities. It is local community leaders who are in the best position to know when and how to engage with a vulnerable individual, and ensuring the Department maintains trust with local communities has to be a top priority.

In 2020, DHS relaunched the grant program under the new TVTP name, with a new public health-focused approach. Through

the TVTP grant funding, DHS supports the efforts of local partners who seek to raise awareness about the domestic violent extremism threat and develop community-based networks to provide support to individuals who may be radicalizing to violence before a crime is committed.

Our witnesses today represent four of the organizations that have received TVTP grants in either the fiscal year 2020 or fiscal year 2021 grant cycles. Their projects, executed over a period of 2 years, represent the wide variety of violence prevention efforts that are funded by this program. DHS has sought to support projects that implement promising practices as well as those that propose to test new and innovative solutions to terrorism prevention.

These projects fall into a number of categories including: Enhancing threat assessment capabilities, challenging on-line mobilization narratives, and establishing or enhancing local prevention frameworks. The TVTP program has demonstrated some promising early results but it is still relatively new and although DHS has started the process to ensure an independent review of the efficacy of projects funded in the 2020 grant cycle, that review is not yet complete. Continued oversight of this program will be necessary to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated today.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how they have ensured the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in their work with individuals and local communities, as well as how they plan to measure the impact of their projects. It is of the utmost importance that we get this right and do whatever we can to curb these horrifying attacks we must do immediately.

[The statement of Chairman Correa follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN J. LUIS CORREA

JUNE 14, 2022

We're here to discuss a topic that has hit all too close to home for many of us in recent weeks.

From the hostage situation at a synagogue in Colleyville, Texas earlier this year, to the racially-motivated shooting at a grocery store in Buffalo, New York just last month, hate-fueled attacks have devastated communities across the country. The increasingly frequent acts of domestic violent extremism in places we used to think of as safe, have us all asking what more we can do.

The Secretary of Homeland Security recently launched a new urgent review to assess the Department's capabilities to address this rising threat. We are here today to discuss one of those capabilities in depth. A key piece of the Department of Homeland Security's toolbox has been the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) grant program.

Since 2011, the Department has identified the need to partner with local communities to address the growing domestic terrorism threat. In 2016, DHS launched the Countering Violent Extremism grant program, a predecessor to the current TVTP program. However, weak management of that early grant program undermined DHS's ability to determine the effectiveness of the funding and concerns about inherent anti-Muslim bias in some of the funded projects eroded trust with minority communities.

It is local community leaders who are in the best position to know when and how to engage with a vulnerable individual, and ensuring the Department maintains trust with local communities must be a top priority. In 2020, DHS relaunched the grant program under the new TVTP name and with a new public health-focused approach.

Through the TVTP grant funding, DHS supports the efforts of local partners who seek to raise awareness about the domestic violent extremism threat and develop community-based networks to provide support to individuals who may be radicalizing to violence before a crime is committed.

Our witnesses today represent four of the organizations that have received TVTP grants in either the fiscal year 2020 or fiscal year 2021 grant cycles. Their projects, executed over a period of 2 years, represent the wide variety of violence prevention efforts that are funded by this program. DHS has sought to support projects that implement promising practices as well as those that propose to test new and innovative solutions to terrorism prevention.

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I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how they have ensured the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in their work with individuals and local communities, as well as how they plan to measure the impact of their projects. It is of the utmost importance that we get this right and do whatever we can to curb these horrifying attacks.

Chairman CORREA. With that, I thank you again for joining us today and the Chair would recognize the Ranking Member, if he is here. Is he here?

Mr. MEIJER. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear and see me?

Chairman CORREA. Mr. Meijer, how are you? Welcome.

Mr. MEIJER. Thank you, sir.

Chairman CORREA. Ready for your comments, sir. Welcome.

Mr. MEIJER. Coming to you live off the floor.

So, Chairman Correa, thank you for holding this important subcommittee hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program. Thank you so much to our witnesses for joining us today. I look forward to hearing your testimony about experience they have had with the program as grant recipients, and am particularly interested in learning about what you found to be the most effective and how you think this program might be able to responsibly grow and benefit a larger number of communities in the future.

Over the years the terrorism landscape has evolved and while many grants focusing on terrorism prevention were created as a result of the 9/11 attacks, the current threat landscape has a combination of both international and domestic violence concerns. We must address and evolve our approach so that it is tackling these new and emerging threats and allocating Federal dollars in the most effective way possible.

I believe that we must do all we can to protect our communities and equip them with the tools they need to combat and prevent targeted violence and terrorism in whatever form it takes. The TVTP Grant Program is one such tool that can help communities build and strengthen their resiliency capabilities and prevent threats before they arise. Just last April I co-led a letter to the House Appropriations Committee that was focusing on all of these various funding streams, asking them to increase funding in fiscal year 2022 for the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, which is now off operating as the Center for Preventative Partnerships and Programs, and the TVTP threat program itself. This letter highlighted the fact that in recent years more Americans have been killed by domestic violence extremists than by

international terrorism. The number of terrorism investigations conducted by the FBI has doubled since 2017.

While threats from foreign terrorist organizations remain very real, these figures demonstrate that the landscape is changing, so so too must our thinking.

Recently our country has experienced increased rates of violence, ranging from heartbreaking mass shootings to an attempted assassination of a sitting Supreme Court Justice. We must do more to combat violence and address its root causes, no matter the ideological motivation so that democracy is protected. Violence of any kind is unacceptable and as elected leaders it is our responsibility to find solutions that will promote and protect the safety of those we represent.

The TVTP Grant Program has a great amount of potential to enhance these important efforts. At the same time, I think it is incumbent that we make sure this money is well spent. Simply spending more taxpayer dollars will not fix the problem. We must make sure that Federal grant dollars are spent efficiently, with clear objectives, and measurable outcomes. This grant program must be transparent and accountable to the American people and it must ensure that civil liberties for all Americans are protected.

As lead Republican on the Oversight, Management, and Accountability Subcommittee, I remain committed to working with my colleague, Chairman Correa, to help strengthen the security of our local communities and to bolster and improve DHS programs designed to achieve this goal. It is imperative that we continue to advance bipartisan efforts to increase funding, accessibility, and resources to programs that enhance the safety and security of communities around this country. Targeted violence and terrorism can occur anywhere at any time. We must remain committed to empowering local leaders and local law enforcement to strengthen this resiliency and ensure DHS has the proper funding to support their efforts.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the importance of the TVTP Grant Program, the ways in which they have used these grant awards to protect their communities, and any recommendations that they have to improve the program going forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With that, I yield back.

[The statement of Ranking Member Meijer follows:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER PETER MEIJER

JUNE 14, 2022

Chairman Correa, thank you for holding this important subcommittee hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program, and thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. I am looking forward to hearing testimony about your experiences with the program as grant recipients, and I am particularly interested in learning about what you found most effective and how you think this program might be able to responsibly grow and benefit a larger number of communities in the future.

Over the years, the terrorism landscape has evolved. While many grants focusing on terrorism prevention were created as a result of the 9/11 attacks, the current threat landscape is filled with both international and domestic threats. We must evolve our approach to address these new and emerging threats and allocate Federal dollars in the most effective manner possible.

I believe that we must do all that we can to protect our communities and equip them with the tools they need to combat and prevent targeted violence and terrorism—in whatever form it comes.

The TVTP Grant Program is one such tool that can help local communities build and strengthen their resiliency capabilities and prevent threats before they arise. Last April, I co-led a letter to the House Appropriations Committee calling on them to increase funding in fiscal year 2022 for the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (OTVTP), now operating as the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3), and the TVTP Grant Program.

This letter highlighted the fact that in recent years, more Americans have been killed by domestic terrorism than by international terrorists and that the number of domestic terrorism investigations conducted by the FBI has doubled since 2017. While threats from Foreign Terrorist Organizations remain very real, these figures demonstrate that the landscape is changing, and so must our thinking.

Recently, our country has experienced increased rates of violence, ranging from heartbreaking mass shootings to an attempted assassination of a sitting Supreme Court Justice. We need to do more to combat violence and address its root causes, no matter the ideological motivation, to protect our democracy. Violence of any kind is unacceptable, and as elected leaders, it is our responsibility to find solutions that will promote and protect the safety of those we represent. The TVTP Grant Program has a lot of potential to enhance these important efforts.

At the same time, I want to make sure that this money is well spent. Simply spending more taxpayer dollars will not fix the problem. We must make sure that Federal grant dollars are spent efficiently—with clear objectives, and measurable outcomes. This grant program must be transparent and accountable to the American people, and it must ensure that the civil liberties of all Americans are fully protected.

As lead Republican on the Oversight, Management, and Accountability Subcommittee, I remain committed to working with Chairman Correa to help strengthen the security of our local communities and to bolster and improve DHS programs designed to achieve this goal. It is imperative that we continue to advance bipartisan efforts to increase funding, accessibility, and resources to programs that enhance the safety and security of communities around the country.

Targeted violence and terrorism can occur anywhere, at any time. We must remain committed to empowering our local leaders to strengthening the resiliency in our communities and ensuring DHS has the proper funding to support this effort. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the importance of the TVTP Grant Program, the ways in which they've used these grant awards to protect their communities, and any recommendations they have to improve the program going forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman CORREA. Ranking Member Meijer, I couldn't agree with you more. The mission to protect American lives from terrorism, very important mission. We have to make sure that every taxpayer dollar we invest in this mission is optimal.

Thank you very much, sir.

Members are reminded that the committee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman and Ranking Member in their February 3 colloquy regarding remote procedures. Members are reminded they may submit statements for the record.

[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JUNE 14, 2022

We are here today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) grant program. Although still relatively new, this grant program has become a key part of the Department's strategy to address a rise in violent domestic extremism incidents. Community spaces we all once considered safe—schools, churches, grocery stores—have been repeatedly struck by horrific and tragic violence in recent years. These attacks leave deep and lasting scars on our communities, and our Government must do everything in its power to put a stop to this violence.

Over the last decade, the Department of Homeland Security has tracked the rising number of fatal domestic violent extremism attacks. Perpetrators of these violent acts are often lone wolves and DHS has found that there is no common motivating factor that unites them all, making these attacks difficult to predict and prevent. In response to these challenges, DHS has sought to support local programs to prevent individuals from committing a violent act regardless of the motivating ideology.

Through the TVTP grant program, the Department directly funds State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, nonprofits, and institutions of higher education to help create or enhance violence prevention networks. Known as local prevention frameworks, these networks facilitate connections between community leaders to increase awareness about the domestic violent extremism threat and provide support services for vulnerable individuals who may be on the path toward radicalizing to violence. These support services can take many forms, from youth-resilience programs to media literacy and critical thinking initiatives aimed at combating the pervasive appeal of disinformation. The goal is to reach people who may have started down the wrong path but have not yet committed a crime.

Identifying and working with these individuals is not something that local law enforcement always has the capacity or authority to do. That is why DHS has identified the need to support a whole-of-society approach to violence prevention, with the goal of equipping faith leaders, schoolteachers, and other community members with the tools needed to provide meaningful support. Yet just as importantly, these programs must ensure that the protections for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties that all Americans enjoy are not swept aside in the name of prevention.

We must be aware of the limitations inherent in the goal of preventing a crime before it happens. The DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has worked closely with the Department's Center for Prevention Partnerships and Programs, to ensure that both DHS and the projects it funds are protecting already vulnerable individuals and communities. But continued oversight from this committee and others will be necessary.

I look forward to the completion of the Department's independent review into the efficacy of these grant programs, and I am pleased we have the opportunity today to delve more deeply into how some of these projects have been designed and implemented. It is my hope that DHS will stand as a leader in the fight against domestic violent extremism and provide a light for local communities during their darkest hours.

Chairman CORREA. Without objection, Members not on the subcommittee shall be permitted to sit and question the witnesses.

Now I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness, we have Dr. Kirk Braddock, an assistant professor, School of Communication at American University. His research focuses on persuasive strategies used by violent extremist groups to recruit and radicalize audiences targeted by their propaganda. Dr. Braddock also explores how theories of communication, persuasion, and social influence can be used to inform practices meant to prevent radicalization among the vulnerable audiences.

Second witness, Ms. Humera Khan, the president and founder of the Muflehun, a think tank specializing in preventing radicalization and domestic violent extremism. She has also served as co-investigator for the Department of Defense's Minerva Research Institute project on terrorist propaganda, as well as strategic advisor to the U.N. Security Council managing the countering violent extremism portfolio.

Our third witness, Mr. Paul Kim, a deputy district attorney with the LA District Attorney's Office, where he has served for over 25 years. Mr. Kim currently works with the hate crimes unit within the organized crime division.

Our final witness is Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kelenske, commander of field support bureau and deputy director of the Michigan State Police. He is responsible for strategic leadership for the emergency management and homeland security division and intelligence

operations division, which includes the State of Michigan's Fusion Center.

Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be inserted in the record.

I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Braddock.

Welcome, sir.

**STATEMENT OF KURT BRADDOCK, PHD, ASSISTANT
PROFESSOR, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY**

Mr. BRADDOCK. Mr. Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, thank you for having me here today.

Members of the committee, thank you for having me to testify in relation to DHS's Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, formerly TVTP.

As Chairman Correa said, I am assistant professor of public communication at American University where I am also a faculty fellow at a research center focusing primarily on domestic extremism and terrorism, called the Polarization and Extremism Research Innovation Lab.

Between these two appointments, I work at the intersection of communication and violent extremism, where I try to understand how communication influences people to engage in violent activities on behalf of ideologies that we see both domestically and internationally.

My work in this area really stems from the events of September 11, 2001, which really instilled in me a drive to find ways and understand why people could engage in such evil and find ways academically to protect Americans from this kind of violence. To this end, for the last 20 years I have studied violent Islamic Jihadists, violent extremists from the far left and the far right, Irish Republican dissident groups, lone actor terrorists, violent animal rights activists, single issues terrorists, Christian extremists, and every other extremist you can find.

I sit in front of you today to discuss my unique experience with the CP3 Program. At present, this program, where my research is intended to understanding disinformation and conspiracies perpetuated by far-right extremists and their intended audiences and, more importantly, how we can prevent those audiences from engaging in violence in support of that disinformation, those conspiracies. I focus on the far right in this project because I know how important it is for the U.S. Government to use its budgets efficiently, getting the most value for every dollar spent.

To that end, I sought to develop a project that addresses what all data show to be the most significant threat to domestic American security at the moment, far-right violent extremists. Stated most simply, I want to get you all the most bang for your buck. I am glad to say that to date the project has been a relative success, resulting in multiple deliverables for CP3, as well as a large workshop attended by some of the foremost experts in right-wing extremism and disinformation. I hope that my work continues to be of use for DHS in this regard.

From the outset of this project, CP3 program, formerly TVTP, has been very enthusiastic and supportive of any research that I

have done. Personnel at CP3, some of which I will mention by name later, have been in constant contact with me throughout my work and have sought to help me address logistic problems associated with my research at every turn.

One specific challenge that I ran into in the early goings of the project was related to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which limited to the degree to which I could meet collaborators, research participants, or other colleagues fact-to-face. Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic and the limitations it put on my research, CP3 continued its support by facilitating the completion of deliverables that can be worked on without face-to-face contact. Some of these include the development of training modules for stakeholders that helped them build resilience to disinformation within their communities, as well as training modules for those who would train others to help build this resilience.

After COVID protocols were sufficiently lifted, we were able to hold the in person workshop on understanding disinformation and future threats, one of the themes of which was a focus on LGBTQ+ communities, which as we saw just a couple of days ago, does seem to be a target of the far right, or at least some elements of it.

I understand my role here today will be to testify in more detail about my experiences with CP3 to gauge its value for the American people. To this end, I offer my full endorsement thus far. Not only has the program funded a range of research that addresses a variety of threats facing the country, it also demands accountability. Very few research programs require measures of program effectiveness to the degree that CP3 does. Because of this, the field is rife with pundits that pose as professional. Prominent media figures, twitter experts, and backseat driver pundits have long commented on the effectiveness of certain practices to reduce the risk of violence, but have provided no evidence to this effect. CP3 doesn't allow for this kind of fast and loose commentary.

If only for CP3's demands for research accountability and proof of intervention effectiveness, I believe the program provides excellent value.

But before turning to your questions to provide further detail about my project, I want to thank by name on the record John Wilder of CP3. He has been my program manager and with my project he has been a godsend on coordinating, organizing, and demanding accountability on my part for why my project is being effective.

With that, I look forward to your questions and I will also apologize in advance if you hear my dog tapping around during my testimony. I think he just wants to be part of the Congressional record.

So thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Braddock follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KURT BRADDOCK

14 JUNE 2022

Esteemed Members of the committee, thank you for having me here today to testify in relation to the Department of Homeland Security's Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships. My name is Dr. Kurt Braddock and I am an assistant professor of public communication at American University. I am also a faculty fellow at a research center at American University called the Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab. Between my appointments, I work at the intersection

of communication and violent extremism where I seek to understand how different forms of communication influence individual decisions to engage in illicit political violence. My work in this area was inspired by the events of September 11, 2001, which instilled in me a drive to protect my fellow Americans through my work. To this end, for the last 20 years, I have studied violent Islamic jihadists, violent extremists from the far-left and the far-right, Irish republican dissident groups, lone-actor terrorists, violent animal rights activists, religious Christian extremists, and every other ideology you can imagine. I sit in front of you today to discuss my experience with the Department of Homeland Security and its CP3 program, which has funded a project I am currently working on.

At present, I am working on a research project geared toward understanding how disinformation and conspiracies perpetuated by far-right extremists persuade their intended audiences, and more importantly, how we can prevent those audiences from engaging in violence in support of those conspiracies and disinformation. To date, this project has been a success, resulting in several deliverables for the CP3 program, including a large workshop on the world's foremost experts in extremism and disinformation. I hope that my work continues to be of use to the Department of Homeland Security, and in turn, the country.

My experience with the CP3 program began when it was referred to as the program for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention in 2020. Prior to my being hired at American University, I began working on a research proposal concerning the work I described above. I was made aware that my research had been funded just before my official start date at AU in the summer of 2020.

From the outset of the project, the CP3 program has been enthusiastic and supportive of my research. Personnel at CP3 (some of whom I will mention by name later) have been in constant contact with me over my work and have sought to help me address logistic problems associated with the research at every turn. One specific challenge I faced in the implementation of my research was the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which limited the degree to which I could meet collaborators, research participants, or colleagues face-to-face. Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic and the limitations it put on the early part of my research, CP3 continued its support by facilitating the completion of deliverables that could be worked on without face-to-face contact. Some of these deliverables included the development of training modules for stakeholders to build resilience to disinformation in their communities, training modules with guidance on teaching others about building this resilience, reviews of research related to disinformation and far-right violent extremism, and finally, after COVID protocols were sufficiently lifted, an in-person workshop on understanding disinformation and future threats.

I understand that my role here today will be to testify in more detail about my experiences with the CP3 program to gauge its value to the American people. To this end, I offer my full endorsement. Not only has the program funded a range of research that addresses a variety of threats facing the country, it also demands accountability for that research. Very few research programs require measures of program effectiveness to the degree that CP3 does. Because of this, the field is rife with pundits posing as professionals. Prominent media figures, Twitter "experts," and backseat driver pundits have long commented on the effectiveness of certain practices to reduce the risk of ideological violence, but have provided no evidence to back their claims. The CP3 program does not allow for this kind-of fast-and-loose commentary. For every question I ask, every experiment I design, every bit of data I collect, I must demonstrate whether the intervention I am testing is effective. This is a breath of fresh air in our field.

If only for CP3's demands for research accountability and proof of intervention effectiveness, I believe the program provides excellent value. Before turning to your questions to provide further detail, I would like to thank, by name, John Wilder of CP3. He is the program manager on my project, and has been a godsend on research coordination, organization, and accountability.

With that, I look forward to your questions.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you, Mr. Braddock. Your dog's comments on the Congressional record will be accepted without objection.

Mr. BRADDOCK. They are not worth it.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you for your testimony.

Now I recognize Ms. Khan to summarize her statement in 5 minutes.

Welcome, Ms. Khan.

**STATEMENT OF HUMERA KHAN, PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER,
MUFLEHUN**

Ms. KHAN. Good afternoon, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify about the DHS Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.

My name is Humera Khan and I am the president and co-founder of Muflehun, and we are an independent resource center at the nexus of society, security—

To prevent domestic terrorism and targeted violence in a country, it is essential we focus on, No. 1, raising awareness of the threat and using a public health approach as the solution for violence prevention. But No. 2 is allocation of resources by Federal, State, and local governments to mitigate risk factors and enhance protective factors for primary prevention of violence.

So Muflehun was actually the recipient of two DHS fiscal year 2020 TVTP grants and that focus on these two areas. One for an upstander training branded Tackle! to raise awareness, and the second is an innovation grant called the Community Resilience Early Warning System, CREWS, for primary prevention of domestic terrorism and targeted violence.

CREWS is a data-informed platform to help mayors, county executives, city managers, and locally-elected leaders prioritize risk and protective factors specific to their jurisdictions and to allocate budgets aligned with the need of their local prevention frameworks. CREWS uses publicly-available open-source data of society and community risk and protective factors at the National, State, and local levels. It does not use any individual level information, nor is there any personally identifiable information, PII, in the platform.

So we are grateful to DHS for funding this innovative approach and to our four pilot locations for their commitment to protecting their communities. Our preliminary analysis has focused on hate crimes and domestic terrorism, and over the next few weeks we will be completing our initial analysis for mass casualty shootings and school shootings.

After our analysis is finalized, and in partnership with the stakeholders, we will be recommending priorities for steering limited resources to build local prevention frameworks. We will be conducting briefings and capacity-building workshops at each pilot location to facilitate multi-stakeholder partnerships based on their specific needs.

In 2020, Muflehun also got the TVTP grant for the Tackle! Upstander training. That was implemented in partnership with the American Jewish Committee, AJC. That training curriculum includes awareness of the threat of targeted violence and domestic terrorism and targeted violence, understanding how hate and bigotry can incite violence, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim bigotry, and Black racism, and anti-Asian hate, the role of communities in violence prevention and the role of engaged upstanders in recognizing that individuals are experiencing distress and knowing what to do in these situations. The participants from 12 States included elected officials, district attorneys, human rights commissioners, school safety officers, superintendents, county emergency management directors, and law enforcement.

So the implementation of our two TVTP grants over the last 18 months has resulted in several learnings, right. Based on that we do recommend: No. 1, While the threats of domestic terrorism and targeted violence continue to increase, \$20 million of grant funding each year is stretched thin over our whole country. It is inadequate. Grant funding levels should be increased multiple-fold. No. 2, greater attention should be given to increasing awareness levels by encouraging the scaling of capacity-building programs such as Tackle! and other similar initiatives. No. 3, the regional prevention coordinators are one of the greatest assets of DHS. They are experienced professionals, they are an invaluable resource for the grantees and the local stakeholders alike. But there is not enough of them; there need to be at least one RPC per State. No. 4, while DHS is adding members to its team, there is still a gap for more technically-qualified staff with subject-matter expertise that is aligned with the public health approach. No. 5 is data-informed analysis facilitates improved decision making. DHS should utilize data in its selection of future grants by matching data informed needs of geographic locations to the proposed solutions at State and local levels.

So let me end by emphasizing that we must accelerate our efforts with increased resource allocation, and not be discouraged by the mistakes of the past. We cannot wait for another Tree of Life Synagogue attack or Charleston's AME church attack or Buffalo supermarket killings or the Uvalde school massacre before we decide to allocate resources toward primary prevention.

Thank you again for your attention and for the opportunity to share Muflehun's experiences and perspective.

I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Khan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HUMERA KHAN

JUNE 14, 2022

Good afternoon, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify about the DHS Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.

My name is Humera Khan and I am the president and co-founder of Muflehun. Muflehun is an independent non-profit founded in 2010. We are at the nexus of society, security, and technology, and serve as a resource center for preventing and countering hate, extremism, and violence, and for building resilience. Our mission is to facilitate a world with justice for all by cultivating prosperity.

ORGANIZATION OVERVIEW

Muflehun works with stakeholders to design contextualized solutions to complex social challenges aimed at increasing social resilience. We conduct research and analysis of current violent extremism challenges, identifying root causes and developing relevant solutions; applying the learnings from research to pilot programs to counter the threats faced by society; sharing lessons with partner organizations and providing support in their capacity building for adapting and delivering localized versions of the programs; and regularly providing analyses and learning to policy makers for improved macro-level decisions.

Our research and pilot programs feed into capacity building of individuals, communities, Federal and local government agencies, multi-lateral agencies and independent organizations, as well as institutions involved in the efforts of preventing and countering violent extremism or those influenced by any act of incurred or potential violent extremism. Muflehun has designed and implemented multiple projects providing capacity building to adapt and deliver localized solutions and reg-

ularly provides analyses and learning to policy makers for improved decisions domestically and internationally in more than 10 countries.

Muflehun has a special focus toward the increasing threats within USA, drawing upon its rich subject-matter expertise and vast network of resources, applying technology tools and methods to design relevant solutions for the local challenges faced in society. We provide support to Federal, State, and local governments in developing community resilience frameworks, increasing the safety of the local populations.

BACKGROUND

Every few weeks, the news headlines announce another attack, another shooting, another round of thoughts and prayers for the victims and their families, another post-attack post-mortem revealing that there were warning signs and red flags for years and yet help could not be coordinated in a way to prevent the tragedy from occurring. This oft-repeated cycle needs to stop.

To prevent domestic terrorism and targeted violence in our Nation it is essential to focus on two main areas: (1) Raising awareness of the threat and utilizing a public health approach as a solution for violence prevention, and (2) the allocation of resources by Federal, State, and local governance for primary prevention to mitigate risk factors and enhance protective factors.

Muflehun was the recipient of two fiscal year 2020 Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) grants from DHS that focused on these two areas. One is for an upstander training titled Tackle! designed to raise awareness, and the second is an innovation grant titled the Community Resilience Early Warning System (CREWS) to recommend resource allocations for primary prevention of domestic terrorism and targeted violence. Following are brief overviews of the projects funded by the DHS TVTP grants.

CREWS

In 2020, Muflehun received DHS TVTP grant No. EMW-2020-GR-00087 for the Community Resilience Early Warning System (CREWS) to recommend resource allocations for primary prevention of domestic terrorism and targeted violence, namely hate crimes, mass casualty shootings, and school shootings.

The challenge Muflehun took on in designing and implementing CREWS was to apply a public health approach for primary prevention of these threats of domestic terrorism and targeted violence without repeating the failures of previous CVE efforts. The CREWS project is grounded in decades of academic research, and uses data to inform our understanding of mitigation of risk factors and enhancement of protective factors at local governance levels. It was developed with the objective of facilitating systemic change, and encouraging multi-stakeholder partnerships and prevention frameworks.

CREWS is a data-informed platform to help mayors, county executives, city managers and locally-elected leaders prioritize risk and protective factors, specific to their jurisdictions, that need to be addressed to prevent domestic terrorism and targeted violence, and to allocate budgets aligned with the needs of their local prevention frameworks.

CREWS uses publicly-available open-source data of societal and community-level risk and protective factors at the National, State, and local levels. It does NOT use any individual level information, nor is there any Personal Identifiable Information (PII) in the platform. The factors are identified from academic research conducted over the past 20 years, and are grouped into several categories: Economic, education, health, public safety, community cohesion, social participation, and influence of ideology. The machine-learning models are trained on 20 years of data including the years 2000–2019. Muflehun is working with four pilot locations to apply the results of the data findings and support the local government leaders in understanding how their financial resources can be better utilized in developing local prevention frameworks.

We are grateful to the DHS for investing in this innovative approach in fiscal year 2020, and to our pilot locations for their commitment to protecting their communities, and their willingness to use data to understand how best to build resilience. Many thanks to the Mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania and her office, the leadership of the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, Pennsylvania, the County Executive of New Castle County, Delaware and his office, and the State senator of the 3rd District of Connecticut for their bold leadership.

Our preliminary analysis has focused on hate crimes and on domestic terrorism, and over the next few weeks we will be completing initial analysis for mass casualty shootings and school shootings.

Our findings show that: (1) Each location has a unique combination of risk factors and protective factors; what is a risk factor for one location might not be contributing to increasing vulnerability at another location. Examples of this are school spending and income inequality which vary considerably across locations. The prioritized resource allocation portfolio for each location will therefore necessarily look very different (2) The combination of risk and protective factors for each location change over time and analysis must take recent trends into account (3) Some factors, such as drug overdose deaths, mental illness rates and access to health resources, are consistently amongst the top ten risk factors for domestic terrorism and hate crimes across all the pilot locations, over the past 10 years (4) Whereas there is considerable overlap in the risk and protective factors for domestic terrorism and hate crime, they are not identical. Local governments would be well-served to prioritize resource allocation for factors that impact both domestic terrorism and hate crimes for greater impact. Examples of this are cyberbully and school-based bullying (5) Enhancing protective factors, rather than only mitigating risk factors, should be part of the design of local prevention frameworks.

These examples of early findings are only the first step in the wealth of information that will be available from CREWS to share with our pilot location partners.

After our analysis is finalized and in partnership with our stakeholders, we will recommend priorities for steering limited resources to facilitate comprehensive local prevention frameworks. Before our project ends at the end of the year, we will be conducting briefings and capacity-building workshops at each pilot location and facilitating multi-stakeholder partnerships based on their specific needs. Increasing the efficient utilization of limited resources to build resilience against targeted violence and domestic terrorism is essential for the safety of our Nation.

TACKLE

In 2020, Muflehun received DHS TVTP grant No. EMW-2020-GR-00093 to implement an upstander training designed to raise awareness of the threat of domestic terrorism and targeted violence, and to enhance the ability of community leaders to identify and respond to individuals at risk of mobilizing to violence.

The Tackle! Upstander Training was implemented in partnership with American Jewish Committee (AJC) and its network of 24 regional offices and 11 Muslim-Jewish Advisory Councils (MJACs) that build ties between Jewish and Muslim leaders to work against hate, anti-Semitism, and anti-Muslim bigotry.

The 8-hour training curriculum includes:

- Awareness of the threat of targeted violence, domestic violent extremism, and recruitment tactics
- Understanding of how hate and bigotry can incite violence, including narratives that ignite anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim bigotry, anti-Black racism, and anti-Asian hate
- Local prevention frameworks and the role of communities in violence prevention
- Understanding the role of engaged upstanders to recognize when individuals are experiencing distress and broadcasting their intent to move toward violence, and knowing what to do in such situations.

The participants included elected officials, district attorneys, human rights commissioners, school safety officers, principals, and superintendents, town and county emergency management directors, sheriffs, and law enforcement officers. We were also tremendously fortunate that DHS Regional Prevention Coordinators (RPCs) joined each of our cohorts for discussions and engagement with the participants about existing local resources.

One hundred eighty leaders in 9 cohorts attended the virtual course with 154 participants completing the full training (85 percent). Participants were surveyed on their starting knowledge and post-training to assess the change in their willingness and skills to be engaged upstanders. The results inform our understanding of the dire need for more awareness, the effectiveness of our Tackle! curriculum, and suggestions for improvements:

- When asked if participants had heard the terms domestic terrorism and targeted violence, 94 percent indicated that they knew of the terms however only 25 percent knew what the terms actually meant.
- When asked about using a public health approach for violence prevention, a mere 22 percent knew the concept, with over 30 percent never having heard of it before.
- After the Tackle! Training, 86 percent of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that they had the skills to prevent violence, an increase of 37 percent.
- Similarly, post-training 73 percent were very likely to engage with a friend or family member they were concerned about, an increase of 21 percent.

- Participants consistently stated the most helpful features were “case studies and real-life examples” and requested “more case scenarios with upstander interventions”

Given the low levels of awareness of the threat and how to respond to it even by the very leaders who are entrusted to keep us safe, the need to scale up awareness is imperative for the safety of our country.

To ensure sustainability of the Tackle! training beyond the DHS TVTP grant, Muflehun and its partners have applied for support from private foundations to continue to enhance the curriculum and provide training in new locations.

LEARNINGS FROM THE CREWS AND TACKLE! PROJECTS

The implementation of our two DHS TVTP grants over the last 18 months has resulted in several learnings and recommendations which we will briefly share:

1. While the threats of domestic terrorism and targeted violence continue to increase, \$20 million of grant funding each year, stretched thin over our whole Nation, is woefully inadequate. It is merely a drop in the bucket and what we need is a firehose. We recommend that the grant funding levels should be increased multiple fold.
2. Our experience in implementing the CREWS and Tackle! projects has highlighted the low awareness levels of the threats of domestic terrorism and targeted violence (and how to respond to them) of our leaders who are entrusted to keep us safe. We would request the House Homeland Security Committee to give greater attention to increasing awareness levels by encouraging the scaling of capacity building programs such as Tackle! and other similar initiatives. Giant strides are required to build the capacity of the local leaders; only baby steps have been taken so far.
3. The DHS Regional Prevention Coordinators are one of the greatest assets of DHS CP3. They are experienced professionals who understand what is happening on the ground and are an invaluable resource for the grantees and the local stakeholders alike. Muflehun has worked closely with the Regional Prevention Coordinators while implementing the CREWS and Tackle! projects and has witnessed their support in developing local prevention frameworks. But there is not enough of them; there need to be at least one per State, and in more populated States, multiple Regional Prevention Coordinators per State are required.
4. DHS CP3 has provided overview documents to encourage the development and implementation of local prevention frameworks. However, much more detailed guidelines are needed that factor in the necessary sophistication and coordination required to effectively design and implement these approaches. DHS should incorporate the learning from its various grantees to accelerate the in-depth understanding and process of developing well-informed local prevention frameworks.
5. While DHS CP3 continues to add members to its team, there remains an unfilled gap for more technically qualified staff with subject-matter expertise that are aligned with the public health approach that DHS is now taking toward preventing domestic terrorism and targeted violence. Without the required expertise and knowledge, there is a risk that essential technical areas of developing local prevention frameworks will remain unattended or previous mistakes from CVE might be repeated.
6. Data-informed analysis facilitates improved decision making. Our experience in implementing the CREWS project displays the variation in the combination of needs for local prevention frameworks. Muflehun recommends utilization of data by the DHS TVTP Grants program in its selection of future grants by matching the data-informed needs of geographic locations to the proposed solutions at State and local levels.

CONCLUSION

Let me end by emphasizing that DHS TVTP grant funded projects such as CREWS and Tackle! are only the beginning of the long journey of solutions ahead of us as a Nation. To make the required progress, we must accelerate our efforts with increased resource allocation, and not be discouraged by mistakes of the past. We need to learn and continually improve our approaches to make our country safer by tackling the public safety challenges upstream rather than intervening only after they become threats to communities. We must not wait for another Tree of Life Synagogue attack or Charleston AME church attack or Sandy Hook School shooting, or Buffalo supermarket killings or the Uvalde school massacre before we decide to allocate resources toward primary prevention.

Thank you again for your attention and for the opportunity to share Muflehun's experiences and perspectives. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you very much, Ms. Khan.

I recognize Mr. Kim to summarize his statement in 5 minutes. Welcome, sir.

STATEMENT OF PAUL KIM, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Mr. KIM. Thank you, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, and distinguished Members of this committee.

My name is Paul Kim and I am a deputy district attorney at the DA's Office here in Los Angeles County.

I am currently assigned to the hate crimes unit. I have been assigned here for about 8 years. The hate crimes unit vertically prosecutes all serious hate crimes that happen within the County of Los Angeles, including any case that involves great bodily injury or death, any case that is committed by an organized hate group, and cases that are either complex in nature or require a seasoned deputy district attorney.

In this capacity, my primary role is I am a trial attorney. My secondary role is I do community outreach. I work closely with our partners, our community-based partners, ranging from the Jewish groups to the AAPI groups, and including members of the LGBTQ community as well.

During the time that I was prosecuting hate crime cases, about 3 years ago I came across an issue. I had a defendant that had committed a crime of violence against a member of the LGBT community here in Long Beach. This had gone all the way up to the very highest levels at my office and a disposition was reached to include 200 hours of community service. Obviously our goal was to try to raise the defendant's awareness when it came to the LGBT community. When we reached out to one of our partners, one of our stakeholders, I was immediately asked what did this individual do. When I described what happened and I described the nature of the injury, what was I was told by the director was, Mr. Kim, this individual has committed an act of violence and has seriously injured a member of our community. We don't desire to have him participate doing any community service with our members or on our property.

Now, this posed a problem. One of the things that we know is that hate is not innate, it is something that is learned, it is something that is acquired. Somewhere he learned to hate this group of people because of whatever characteristic it is that you are biased against. When we start with that point, and we also consider the penal code, the California penal code 422.85, which suggests that whenever you place somebody on a grant of probation, you should engage in some sort of cultural sensitivity and awareness training. LA County didn't have an anti-bias program.

One day, when I was doing community outreach with the Museum of Tolerance, I was on a call with the LA City Attorney's Office, who was working with the Museum of Tolerance, who was also a TVTP awardee, on their one-to-one program, which is a 15-hour coaching program. At that time I met Michael Brown, who is the

deputy director of field operations, and I reached out to Mr. Brown after I heard his talk and he mentioned that there was a grant available. So I told him I would like to apply for the grant. I told him there was a need in the county, specifically when it came to trying to address the bias-motivated violence that caused the individual to target whoever it was for whatever crime was committed.

Mr. Brown encouraged me to apply. It was the first time I had applied. It was in fact the first time that LADA had applied for a Federal grant. We had previously applied for local grants, State grants, but never a Federal grant. At this point, I must echo Dr. Braddock, John Wilder is also my program analyst and he has been incredibly helpful when it comes to helping us get the basics of this program done.

The program is three-fold. No. 1, we want to focus on counseling. One of our sub-recipients is Gateways Hospital and Mental Health Center. They are going to have a clinician that is going to be working for 80 hours, 40 individual and 40 hours of group, trying to see if they can determine what the roots of the bias animus are and where they came from.

Second, we are going to be working with a community-based organization called Second Call. Second Call does re-entry for former felons and they are going to be acting as professional facilitators and they are going to be acting as coaches in helping with the anti-bias portion of the program.

Finally, we are working with Three Strands to develop an anti-bias program, an anti-bias curricula, that can be used for any category of bias once it is created.

I think that the CP3 program is really amazing. I think that what it is going to permit us to do is to develop two things. No. 1, an offender-centric study—not a very large one, but an offender-centric one, and, No. 2, the tools and the modules that are necessary to try to address explicit bias.

I look forward to the questions and I thank you for inviting me to participate.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kim follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL KIM

REACCH is a program designed to reduce recidivism of bias-motivated crimes in the County of Los Angeles through a multidisciplinary regimen that aims to foster understanding, empathy, and self-awareness, and prevent future transgressions of bias-motivated crimes. In recognition of the importance of DHS's public health approach to violence prevention, this project will utilize substance abuse and mental health treatment, functional impairment identification, anger management and cognitive behavior restructuring, vocational and educational training to address maladaptive behavior in general and bias animus in particular. REACCH also aims to aid participants of the program to begin the process of reconciliation with the victim or peer victim group through letters of apology, direct interaction, and community service. We have partnered with several community organizations including Gateways, 2d Call, and 3Strands to holistically recognize, analyze, and rectify the roots of bias animus, and have set up both qualitative and quantitative measures to thoroughly evaluate our method of reducing recidivism.

Chairman CORREA. Mr. Kim, thank you very much for your testimony.

Now I would like to recognize Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

Welcome, Colonel.

**STATEMENT OF CHRIS A. KELENSKE, COMMANDER, MICHIGAN
STATE POLICE**

Mr. KELENSKE. Thank you Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee for allowing me to discuss the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.

My name is Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kelenske and I am the deputy director in charge of the Field Support Bureau of the Michigan State Police, or MSP. In this role, I oversee MSP's Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division, as well as the Intelligence Operations Division, among other areas. MSP was awarded a grant of \$451,255 from the fiscal year 2021 DHS Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program and today I will be discussing how we are using this important Federal support.

Too many times in recent years we have experienced incidents across our great Nation where individuals have targeted others and committed acts of violence leading to far too many senseless deaths. The Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant is a tool that is helping us in Michigan to hopefully prevent these incidents before they occur by establishing a regional Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team and a State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer program.

Our Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team consists of multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional partners who identify individuals who are on a pathway to violence and intervene by providing them with productive alternative outcomes.

The State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer program includes law enforcement, first responders, and private-sector partners across Michigan who will enhance awareness and strengthen collaboration and information sharing to aid in preventing targeted acts of violence.

We recognize the need to develop behavioral threat assessment management capability in our State to ensure prevention frameworks are adopted that will allow local stakeholders to participate in communications addressing radicalization to violence. To address our behavioral threat assessment management gap within the terrorism prevention and targeted violence framework, we are developing one regional concept Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team that covers three counties. These three counties include the seat of State government and the State capitol of Michigan, have a combined total population of just under 500,000 people, and are comprised of both urban and rural communities. This Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team will serve as a conduit to identify persons of concern who pose a threat of targeted violence, and then provide referrals to independent programs as a form of prevention. This initial, multi-disciplinary team that this grant is helping to create is comprised of professionals from the local community who will collaborate to increase communications, develop protocols, and work with individuals who have risk factors of targeted violence and terrorism.

Using our grant funds, we are hiring a specialist who will be on-board within the next month who will be responsible for developing

and managing the team, providing intervention and threat assessment training for team members, and for developing team protocols. A critical success factor for this program is having the funds to keep this specialist employed beyond the grant period, as this would provide communities with the coordination, training, and confidence to identify at-risk individuals and respond with a coordinated community approach for successful targeted violence intervention and prevention.

Future grant opportunities will help us to expand this regional team concept State-wide. Additionally, through this grant, and in partnership with Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships or CP3, we have recently begun to collaborate with Michigan State University School of Medicine and the National Policing Institute on a project that will train a highly-skilled set of clinicians to be deployed across Michigan who will supplement the regional behavioral threat assessment teams by providing advanced care and safety or management plans for those most at risk for becoming radicalized toward acts of targeted violence.

We are also sensitive to the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, which is why the privacy policy of the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center will be adhered to in all cases brought to the attention of the Behavioral Threat Assessment Management team. Individuals associated with cases that pose a public safety risk will be treated with the same Constitutional protections as any other individual encountered by law enforcement.

The goals of the Fusion Liaison Officer program are to provide training to increase awareness of targeted violence through outreach, community involvement, and intervention. As part of this grant, we received funding for two part-time, contract analysts to assist with the delivery of the Fusion Liaison Officer training, which is in-person training provided to law enforcement, first responders, and private-sector personnel. This training seeks to increase awareness of the risk factors and radicalization to violence process, strengthen strategic partnerships, and bolster information and intelligence sharing. To date, we have hired one of two part-time contract analysts to assist the Fusion Liaison Officer coordinator, finalized our educational materials, held a Joint Community Awareness Briefing with our CP3 partners that included 30 of our State intelligence members, and conducted 1 of the scheduled 10 training sessions. Once the initial groundwork is complete and the program is established, the Fusion Liaison Officer coordinator, who is a senior intelligence analyst in the Michigan State Police, will be capable of managing the program independently without the sustainment of the contract analysts beyond the grant performance period.

Thank you for your time and this opportunity to share our experiences in Michigan. At this time I am happy to take any questions you may have for me.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelenske follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRIS A. KELENSKE

JUNE 14, 2022

Thank you Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee for allowing me to discuss the U.S. Department of Home-

land Security's (DHS) Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program. My name is Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kelenske, and I am the deputy director in charge of the Field Support Bureau of the Michigan State Police, or MSP. In this role, I oversee MSP's Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division, as well as the Intelligence Operations Division, among other areas. MSP was awarded a grant of \$451,255 from the fiscal year 2021, DHS Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program. Today I will be discussing how we are using this important Federal support.

Too many times in recent years, we have experienced incidents across our great Nation where individuals have targeted others and committed acts of violence leading to far too many senseless deaths. The Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention grant is a tool that is helping us in Michigan to hopefully prevent these incidents before they occur by establishing a regional Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team and a State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer program.

Our Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team consists of multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional partners who identify individuals who are on a pathway to violence and intervene by providing them with productive alternative outcomes.

The State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer program includes law enforcement, first responders, and private-sector partners across Michigan who will enhance awareness and strengthen collaboration and information sharing to aid in preventing targeted acts of violence.

We recognize the need to develop behavioral threat assessment management capability in our State to ensure prevention frameworks are adopted that will allow local stakeholders to participate in communications addressing radicalization to violence. To address our behavioral threat assessment management gap within the terrorism prevention and targeted violence framework, we are developing one regional concept Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team that covers three counties. These three counties include the seat of State government and the State capitol of Michigan, have a combined total population of just under 500,000 people, and are comprised of both urban and rural communities. This Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team will serve as a conduit to identify persons of concern who pose a threat of targeted violence, and then provide referrals to independent programs as a form of prevention.

This initial, multi-disciplinary team that this grant is helping to create is comprised of professionals from the local community who will collaborate to increase communications, develop protocols, and work with individuals who have risk factors of targeted violence and terrorism. Using our grant funds, we are hiring a specialist who will be on-board within the next month who will be responsible for developing and managing the team, providing intervention and threat assessment training for team members, and for developing team protocols.

A critical success factor for this program is having the funds to keep this specialist employed beyond the grant period, as this would provide communities with the coordination, training, and confidence to identify at-risk individuals and respond with a coordinated community approach for successful targeted violence intervention and prevention. Future grant opportunities will help us to expand this regional team concept State-wide.

Additionally, through this grant and in partnership with Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships or CP3, we have recently begun to collaborate with Michigan State University School of Medicine and the National Policing Institute on a project that will train a highly-skilled set of clinicians to be deployed across Michigan who will supplement the regional behavioral threat assessment teams by providing advanced care and safety or management plans for those most at-risk for becoming radicalized toward acts of targeted violence.

I want to mention that we are sensitive to the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, which is why the privacy policy of the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center will be adhered to in all cases brought to the attention of the Behavioral Threat Assessment Management team. Individuals associated with cases that pose a public safety risk will be treated with the same Constitutional protections as any other individual encountered by law enforcement.

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To date, we have hired one of two-part time contract analysts to assist the Fusion Liaison Officer coordinator, finalized our educational materials, held a Joint Community Awareness Briefing with our DHS CP3 partners that included 30 of our State intelligence members, and conducted 1 of the scheduled 10 training sessions.

Once the initial groundwork is complete and the program is established, the Fusion Liaison Officer coordinator, who is a senior intelligence analyst in the Michigan State Police, will be capable of managing the program independently without the sustainment of the contract analysts beyond the grant performance period.

Thank you for your time and this opportunity to share our experiences in Michigan. At this time I am happy to take any questions you may have for me.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you, Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske, for your testimony.

I want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony as well.

I will remind the subcommittee that we will each have 5 minutes to question the panel.

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions and my first question would go to Mr. Braddock and Ms. Khan. As you know, this TVTP program is essentially a 2-year cycle. Fiscal Year 2020 just coming to a close. So question, briefly, can you tell me what your programs were able to achieve over the last 2 years?

Ms. Khan.

Ms. KHAN. So we have two projects. I will count both of them.

So for CREWS we have—let us see, we have four pilot locations who are committed to trying out this new approach of using data-informed analysis to support the primary prevention of violence. We are very specifically working with them to help understand the risk and protective factors for the allocation of resources.

So this is about working with them to develop the recommendations for their sites. Of course, all of this is based on the fact that we have actually built out the CREWS platform, which is bringing in open-source data from the last 20 years from multiple Government agencies to actually understand what is playing out in terms of risk factors and protected factors.

For Tackle! we have actually completed the Tackle! training program and we have trained over 150 participants over 12 States. This is a virtual training. After the Tackle! training we have found that 86 percent of our participants agreed or strongly agreed that their self-perception is that they have the skills to prevent violence. So this was actually an increase of 37 percent just based on those 8 hours of training.

Then similarly we found that after the training, 73 percent, right, were actually willing to engage with a family or friend that they were concerned about. That is an increase of over 20 percent in that.

So we have—I mean for—so for Tackle! we have completed all our grant requirements because we finished early. We actually went above what we had promised. For CREWS it is on-going and we have—and we are now—already sent the pilot locations the initial results and we are working with them to develop the recommendations and see how they are doing their budgets and how they are building their partnerships.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you.

Mr. Braddock.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

So this project was designed as a two-phase project, the first of which was meant to inform the second phase. Before I describe ex-

actly what we have achieved so far, let me describe what the basis of the project is.

This project hinges on the idea of something called attitudinal inoculation. The idea being that if you expose somebody to a weakened form of an idea in the same way the body is exposed to a weakened form of a virus, they can develop resilience to that idea. Now, there is about 60 years of research in communication science showing that this is an effective means of helping people prevent being persuaded by these sorts of ideas.

So the first phase of the project was meant to develop deliverables and trainings that help people develop their own inoculation messages. So in the years that we worked so far there have been four major real outcomes.

No. 1, we have developed this literature base around inoculation and disinformation that can be of use to stakeholders. I know that literature is a boring word to politicians and to practitioners. So we have made this a way that is accessible to practitioners. One of the things I really want to do with this work is to make sure it is easily accessible and digestible by people that are going to use it. So it has been boiled down to its basest element so that people can understand it.

Second, we have developed a reading list for people so they can look at this information. But the two major hallmarks of the first phase are the trainings that have been undertaken and the workshop that we have undertaken. The training, so far I think we have conducted three. Two were we trained stakeholders directly and I think we have trained probably 200 by now, stakeholders from around the country in developing inoculation messages for specific threats that they face in their communities.

So although my focus for my project is on the far right and disinformation specifically, different communities have different kinds of threats that face them. So I want to be able to train those communities to address those informational threats that face them specifically. So we have trained several individuals, 200 or so, in how to develop inoculation messages for those specific threats.

For the project, going into phase two, we conducted this workshop where we had about I guess 30 of the world's foremost experts on right-wing extremism and disinformation and identified some of the threats coming down the pipeline in terms of disinformation and the kind of violence that might come from the American far right, one of which, as I mentioned, was the LGBTQ threat.

Building on that, we will be conducting an experiment where we are testing inoculation against this very idea in areas around the country where this idea is starting to percolate based on searches and search engines that are completely anonymized.

So we have achieved a lot of our foundational work, conducted several trainings, we have identified these threats, and the last step is to test inoculation based on the threats we have identified.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you, Dr. Braddock.

I now recognize Ranking Member Meijer for 5 minutes of questions.

Welcome, sir.

Mr. MEIJER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me?

Chairman CORREA. Yes, yes. A for effort.

Mr. MEIJER. But, you know, I really appreciate all the witnesses' testimonies today. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing on the subject.

I will start with Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske. I appreciate you coming in from Michigan today, from the great State of Michigan, the greatest State of Michigan.

With all the grant funding that you have received, the Michigan State Police, Michigan Intelligence Operations Center, or MIOC, implemented their State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer program. The goal of the program of course is to provide training to law enforcement, first responders, and private-sector partners across the State to enhance awareness and also strengthen collaboration.

Now, since the implementation of this training, can you share how the information sharing and collaboration has improved between the key stakeholders in this space, what have you found to be best practices in information sharing, and how can other local communities implement similar processes to strengthen collaboration?

Mr. KELENSKE. Thank you for your question.

We have only been able to get one of the two part-time contract analysts in place to date. The focus has been mostly in the creation and updating of the educational materials for the Fusion Liaison Officer trainings and then initial meetings with State and Federal partners. We have numerous Fusion Liaison Officer training sessions that will occur, with three coming up actually in August and September. With the training session we had and future trainings, we expand our targeted violence and terrorism prevention ecosystem of stakeholders, which by its very nature fosters information sharing and collaboration through frequent discussions, interactions, and our product distribution. Personnel in the sessions not only get comfortable with Fusion Center and Fusion Liaison Officer personnel who they provide information, but they understand the process of the information sharing and benefits of collaboration.

After our first FLO training, our Fusion Liaison Officer training session, we did not see an increase in suspicious activity reports, but we did see an increase in requests for service. But we cannot say if this at this time is attributed to the FLO training or some other factors, but we are going to continue to look at these impacts from our training session as we move forward.

With over 7,000 individuals, and that is law enforcement, emergency management, our private-sector partners, who currently receive our daily information bulletins from our Fusion Center, and with the increased exposure to the FLO program through our trainings, I am certain our information sharing and collaboration will continue to flourish and increase. We also look to our stakeholders to help us continue to identify how we can improve our collaboration and information sharing.

We also have more interaction with agencies and personnel on the threat mitigation and targeted violence and terrorism prevention through our biweekly meetings with State agencies who are interested in behavioral threat assessment teams. Additionally, by embedding our DHS CP3 coordinator into our Fusion Center, we have more direct and quicker access to DHS resources, as well as

having our regional coordinator's expertise in implementing targeted violence and terrorism prevention programs.

Last, we have engaged with our renowned experts on this topic from Michigan State University to collaborate with us and to provide guidance as we move forward.

As far as your question on best practices, first and foremost, providing actionable, relevant, and timely information to stakeholders. Then build a network of multiple disciplines that have regular meetings to engage with each other, identify that essential reporting mechanism and how the distribution of information should occur, discussing appropriate interventions, as well as hold joint training sessions that foster trust and demonstrates the effectiveness of inter-agency and multi-disciplinary collaboration.

Then we continue to look at what has been done in Virginia, North Carolina, and recently Florida, who has shown that behavioral threat assessment management is a best path forward with I believe it was a May 2007 study.

So we will continue to look at our partner States to see what are the promising practices as we continue to move forward, sir.

Mr. MEIJER. This is the last question.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske, you know, you mentioned in your testimony the importance to protecting privacy, civil rights, civil liberties, throughout the work of behavioral threat assessment management team.

You know, obviously, in the State of Michigan we saw the—just in recent months the acquittal of four individuals who were accused of participating in the kidnapping plot against the Governor. It is in the realm of domestic violent extremism, making sure we are protecting civil liberties, we are not getting to the point, which has been alleged of conducting entrapment operations. Now, some of that obviously is a little bit more right-ward than kind-of the focus on the prevention side, but could you provide more details into that process and how your Department ensures that, you know, in the course of doing their work they are also protecting, you know, civil liberties, civil rights, and just the privacy of American citizens more broadly?

Mr. KELENSKE. Yes. I can provide a lot more information. I believe we have our intelligence operations operation center policy privacy, is a 6-page document that is posted on-line. I can ensure that that gets sent to you. It is a public-facing document. But we take that very serious. We look at that all the time to ensure those protections are in place, as well as an agency it is embedded in our official orders or policies to ensure that all members continually have those protections at the front of their mind. But I can provide you that document, sir, or the link to that document if that is OK.

Mr. MEIJER. I appreciate it, Lieutenant Colonel, and, Mr. Chairman, with that I yield back.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you, Mr. Meijer.

I now recognize Mr. Bishop for 5 minutes of questions.

Mr. Bishop.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Braddock, I would like to ask a couple of questions of you. One of the other witnesses at least related, how much have you received in grants from DHS for this sort of research?

Mr. BRADDOCK. This particular grant was \$568,000 I believe, and change. Somewhere in that realm.

Mr. BISHOP. How about over the course of time? How much in total from DHS?

Mr. BRADDOCK. In terms of this grant or overall in my personal research?

Mr. BISHOP. Why don't you first do this grant and then overall.

Mr. BRADDOCK. This grant I think we are about halfway through the money that we spent, and overall DHS just add another \$5,000 to it for a grant that I got in graduate school for my dissertation.

Mr. BISHOP. So about a half million, give or take a few thousand? Is that what you are saying in total?

Mr. BRADDOCK. Give or take. Yes, I would say somewhere between \$550,000 and \$580,000.

Mr. BISHOP. OK. One thing you said in your testimony, and I saw it in the written testimony as well, is that you credit DHS for its program here for the use of "measures of program effectiveness". You say that is kind-of rare in the field. Then you say "because of this, the field is rife with pundits posing as professionals".

Mr. BRADDOCK. Mm-hmm.

Mr. BISHOP. I take note of that because I am concerned about that, especially with the recent hullabaloo about the disinformation governance board and the like and the way I see that.

But let me ask you about this, on May 16 you had a tweet thread out there that I took a look at addressing what you call stochastic terrorism.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Mm-hmm.

Mr. BISHOP. Looking into it, it is a term that has been bandied about the last 5 years or so. I mean it has been a little earlier than that, but not much, but 5 years in active use. You describe it as "a form of incited terrorism whereby a communicator has access to a platform and big audience".

Mr. BRADDOCK. Mm-hmm.

Mr. BISHOP. "When the communicator uses coded language that promoted violence within an audience of millions, at least one is likely to interpret it as a call to arms". Then you go on to say—that is the end of your quote, but you say you really can't predict who, when, or where, but as a matter of probability, at least one person will view it that way and might act on it.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Correct.

Mr. BISHOP. So that is what you described stochastic terrorism as. Then you—I mean you distinguished that from incitement, right? I mean the law already recognizes that if you—

Mr. BRADDOCK. Absolutely.

Mr. BISHOP [continuing]. Call for violence immediately, that is incitement. That is not protected. But the line that *Brandenberg v. U.S.* drew by the Supreme Court was it is not—you can even talk about violence, calling for violence. You can't call for immediate violence. That is incitement. Otherwise it is protected, isn't that right?

Mr. BRADDOCK. That is correct, yes.

Mr. BISHOP. OK. So then you go on in that tweet thread and you say in one that President Trump is a stochastic terrorist with respect to the January 6 riot at the Capitol, right?

Mr. BRADDOCK. Correct.

Mr. BISHOP. OK. So he is a terrorist. Then you also say that with respect to the 2019 El Paso Walmart mass shooting of people of Hispanic descent, that President Trump was a stochastic terrorist of that event, right?

Mr. BRADDOCK. Right. Among others, yes.

Mr. BISHOP. OK. Then you have a tweet here that says—ends with this—it says—well, let me just pull it up—it says Carlson is a danger to U.S. domestic security. You are talking about Tucker Carlson, right?

Mr. BRADDOCK. I am.

Mr. BISHOP. Your conclusion is that Tucker Carlson is a terrorist.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Stochastic terrorist.

Mr. BISHOP. OK.

Mr. BRADDOCK. I distinguish between an activist terrorist, someone who engages in violence, and a stochastic terrorist as the inciter not meeting the legal definition for incitement.

Mr. BISHOP. OK. It is not an inciter in law, but one in your definition, a stochastic terrorist. I guess I will keep using that term—it is hard to say stochastic. It is a statistical term, right?

Mr. BRADDOCK. I know, it is annoying. Yes, yes, it is a statistics term that I didn't come up with. The term stochastic terrorist came up—I think it emerged somewhere around 2011–2012.

I actually had a discussion with somebody earlier—I just did a podcast where I say I don't actually like the terms stochastic terrorist because terrorism—

Mr. BISHOP. I am not a big fan either.

Mr. BRADDOCK [continuing]. Is an activity. What is that?

Mr. BISHOP. I am not a big fan either.

Let me go on with that.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Go for it. Yes, yes.

Mr. BISHOP. So the word stochastic is when—you know, you are familiar with the Chuck Schumer statements about Kavanaugh and Gorsuch, you have released the whirlwind and you will pay the price. You won't know what hit you if you go forward with these awful decisions. Is Chuck Schumer a stochastic terrorist?

Mr. BRADDOCK. I would say that one walks the line. There is another one from the left—I forget who it was—that said it, but somebody on the left a couple of—maybe it was last year—talked about getting in the face and getting aggressive with police, or something along those lines. I forget—

Mr. BISHOP. Like Maxine Waters, how about that? Let us make sure we show up wherever we have to show up and you push back on them and you tell them they are not welcome anymore anywhere. Is she a stochastic terrorist?

Mr. BRADDOCK. I have made that argument.

Mr. BISHOP. Is Joe Biden—after the attempt on Kavanaugh's life said merely that evening that if—he went on late night comedy and predicted a mini revolution if the Supreme Court overturns Roe. Is President Biden a stochastic terrorist?

Mr. BRADDOCK. I wouldn't think that meets the line, no. But you mentioned a point earlier too where it all relates to data and collecting data as to whether one connects to the other. That is the research I am trying to conduct now. I am actually not related to

the project I am testifying on now, but another research project I am working on is looking at the connection between the two.

Something I think you are alluding to but I want to distinguish is stochastic terrorism isn't illegal. Just because the term is in it doesn't mean that it is illegal. Incitement is illegal. That doesn't mean the phenomena doesn't exist.

Mr. BISHOP. Well, that is what I am concerned about. I don't know if the Chairman might indulge me a little bit since it doesn't look like we have got a long train of people, but let me just ask this.

Chairman CORREA. Go ahead.

Mr. BISHOP. The end of that tweet thread I was talking about says one more thing, I am a firm believer that 1A—you are referring to the First Amendment—is sacrosanct.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Mm-hmm.

Mr. BISHOP. But there is a debate that needs to be had about whether and how stochastic terrorism is allowed to occur.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Sure.

Mr. BISHOP. So you are talking about some restriction that by your own definition is different than where the Supreme Court is about what is protected by the First Amendment, aren't you?

Mr. BRADDOCK. It is not a legal restriction I am arguing for. The arguments I make for against stochastic terrorism are building of resilience against that particular strategic communication because it is a strategic form of communication. Although it is not legal incitement, it can be argued to relate to the behaviors that take place later. Though it is not illegal, it doesn't mean that we can't do counter persuasion against it. It is a strategic communication device like any other.

Mr. BISHOP. So sort-of last line—last point that can take me back to that tweet I showed you.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Sure.

Mr. BISHOP. Have you been paid taxpayer dollars by DHS to study Tucker Carlson as a stochastic terrorist?

Mr. BRADDOCK. No.

Mr. BISHOP. OK. Has that been a feature of your research? Have you researched Tucker Carlson?

Mr. BRADDOCK. I mean informally. For my own edification I have.

Mr. BISHOP. Sufficient to the point that you are willing to say on Twitter that he is a stochastic terrorist for the Buffalo massacre, right?

Mr. BRADDOCK. I am willing to say it on Congressional record, yes.

Mr. BISHOP. But you haven't researched to quantify anything or to come up with a statistical relationship?

Mr. BRADDOCK. There are researches—I haven't done that argument—

Chairman CORREA. Mr. Bishop, I am going to—

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence.

Chairman CORREA. We are going to have a second set of questions if you so wish.

But let me get to Ms.—

Mr. BRADDOCK. Can I make one last statement, Chairman?

Chairman CORREA. Go ahead, go ahead, go ahead. This is a good discussion. Go ahead.

Mr. BRADDOCK. No, it is.

Chairman CORREA. Make your point.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Mr. Bishop, these are the exact discussions that I am talking about in that tweet thread that I want to take place. The fact that these discussions can actually take place and we can find where a line is, or if there is a line, that debate needs to take place. This is what I enjoy about these sorts of things.

It is not meant to be—it is not meant to mean that somebody should be arrested for saying something, but these sorts of words do have implications. We have 100 years of research showing that words have implications. Even if they are not legally actionable, they need to be talked about. These are the discussions that I like to have with both sides.

Mr. BISHOP. The Chairman has been very gracious to allow me to go on.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you.

Mr. BISHOP. I look forward to maybe taking it up with you for a little further—if I get another chance, Mr. Braddock.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman CORREA. OK. You got it.

Mrs. Harshbarger, welcome. You get a little bit over 5 minutes. How is that? Go ahead.

Mrs. HARSHBARGER. Hi, I am good. I am good to go. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the panel for being here today.

You know, I have a question about how you measure the program effectiveness. You know, from what I understand, DHS defines targeted violence as any intentional act against a pre-identified target based on that target's perceived identity or affiliation that is intended to intimate, coerce, or generate publicity about the perpetrator's grievance.

I guess my question to any of the panel is how do you measure the program effectiveness and performance standards? How do you integrate that into this TVTP grant program? How did having a performance standard and accountability measure help you evaluate your projects and improve the effectiveness of your projects? Because how do you know something is successful if you don't have outcomes and measures put in place to measure that program?

That is to anyone on the panel.

Mr. BRADDOCK. I will go very quickly, because I don't want to take everybody's time here.

In mine there are several measures of effectiveness, the primary one being the inoculation, actual treatments. You can pre- and post-test people to see how they feel about a particular topic before and after they receive the inoculation treatments. That is the plan with the experimental phase of the overall project.

In terms of the trainings that I have done and those sorts of things, we have actually conducted surveys of people who have gone through the trainings who have intentions about inoculation, who understand it, who believe it would be useful for their specific communities. We can actually do statistical analyses of their responses to see whether there is improvement in what they feel

about the actual strategy moving forward. Those have all shown positive improvement.

In terms of the second part, the—what I mentioned earlier—the actual inoculation treatments, those are based on controlled experimentation, which in social science is the gold standard, but hard to come across. So there is several different measures that I use. Again, one of the I think cornerstones of the TVTP program is that it demands these kinds of evaluations as we do these sorts of thing.

Mrs. HARSHBARGER. Yes. Absolutely.

Does anybody else have a comment for us?

Mr. BISHOP. I thought you were trying to yield, Diane. I am sorry.

Mrs. HARSHBARGER. No, it is OK, Dan.

Ms. KHAN. So I was going to talk about for our programs we actually use pre- and post-questionnaires and various feedback and survey instruments very specifically to measure the shift in knowledge and willingness to act based on information that they have received. So, for example, for our Tackle! program what we started off with is—and this is when you mentioned actually the definitions of—who knows what the definitions even mean. So we actually asked the participants that. It turns out that 94 percent of the participants had heard the terms domestic terrorism and targeted violence and yet only 25 percent knew what they meant.

Same thing we asked about public health approach, what is that? Barely 20 percent knew of the concept and about 20 percent had never even heard of it before.

So you can imagine, right, that when we are talking about what is targeted violence, what is domestic terrorism, what is public health approach, mass majority of our participants had no idea. These were the elected officials and the leaders who are there to protect us. So there is this—for us it was this huge awareness that—recognition that awareness is essential. Without the awareness there is no way of actually doing prevention or having a public health approach or any of this stuff if people don't even know what it is they are trying to do.

So that for us was important.

We also found through our training that after our training—and I mentioned this earlier also—is that we found after our training over 85 percent of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that they now—there is a certain section of skills to actually, to be upstanders and knowing what to do in various types of situations and running through case studies and role plays, and they found that they were actually ready to do it. This was an increase of over 37 percent. That is a huge increase because we are talking about, you know, 6 hours live training, 2 hours on-line, right. So a total of 8 hours virtual training. It is 1 day of training, which caused this huge increase in their willingness and they actually—the skills of that they had.

Then the other thing, which we were checking against is the willingness to act. Because it is one thing to say oh, I know what to do, but the question is, am I willing to do it? There we also saw that after their training over about 75 percent—73 percent were willing to actually engage with friends and family.

When we are talking about upstanders, right, in this case we are not talking about here is a random stranger. This is not about the DHS like see something, say something. When we are talking about upstanders, it is how can people who you know within your own network recognize if an individual is going through any sort of distress, is any crisis in their life, and then how to get them help way before they actually are trying to get toward violence. So for that, so you want the friends and family, you want our own networks to be one of, hey, something is happening but what to do about it. There we saw that, again, post-training there was an increase. There was almost a 20 percent increase.

So we did—yes, we are absolutely using metrics. We have to—

Mrs. HARSHBARGER. Yes, yes. I know that—did you want to say something, sir? Mr. Kim.

Mr. KIM. Thank you, Representative Harshbarger, I did.

One of the things I think that is interesting about the REACCH Program, which is—it stands for Reconciliation, Education, and Counseling Crimes of Hate—is we are dealing specifically with criminal defendants who are being placed on probation and are going to be completing the program as a term of probation.

I think there are two interesting things that we can talk about here when we are talking about metrics. The easiest metric is going to be whether or not they further offend. So we are seeking to get permission to track them for 5 years to see whether or not they commit offense and then, if they did commit an offense, did they target the same group that they targeted the first time. It is not so much recidivism in terms of global recidivism, but targeted and selected recidivism that this program is about. I do feel that having the ability to check their criminal record is clear quantifiable empirical factor that we can look at.

The other thing I would like to mention to this committee is this program is making a deliberate effort to bring victim reconciliation into the arena. When I say that, one of the target participants that is going to be working with us, he was White, he was with his wife, she was White, and they ended up all over the National press because they came across an African American man and his ethnic wife and they got out of the car and they started saying things like only White lives matter. This was all being recorded by the victim's wife. What is interesting here is even though the court only has jurisdiction over the defendant, the individual who struck the truck with the shovel, after talking to him and his attorney and saying we would like you to participate in this program, he and his wife have both agreed to participate in victim reconciliation with the victims. In this instance the victims, the man and his wife, have agreed to sit down with the defendants—well, a singular defendant. What is interesting I think there is, you know, metrics—I mean when we try to make it quantifiable can be very difficult, but qualitatively here, having the victim and the defendant sit down to talk about what happened, for the defendant to be given the opportunity to apologize and for the victim to be given the opportunity to accept, goes way beyond the defendant and the victim, it involves the entire community, whether it is a Jewish community that is involved, whether it is the African American community that is involved, whatever community it is.

So I would like to point that out. Sometimes there are qualitative factors that are difficult to measure, but they do yield I think significant results.

Thank you for your question.

Mrs. HARSHBARGER. Thank you, Mr. Kim.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you very much.

Any other Members that wish to ask their 5 minutes of questions?

Seeing none, would you all be interested in a second run of questions?

Mr. BISHOP. I would, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman CORREA. So would I. OK, let us move to a second round. I will start with a set of questions. I am going to try to hold to 5 minutes.

I am going to ask Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske a question and thoughts if I may.

Lieutenant Colonel, you are running part of the Fusion Center in Michigan. We here in Orange County, California also have a Fusion Center and they do some great things, from cyber to intel, trying to prevent some bad stuff from happening. One of the concerns that I have heard from Fusion Centers is the communication not be as good as it should be and that sometimes communication is from the Feds now, but not—or I should say from the bottom up and not from the bottom back to the Fusion Centers.

Any thoughts?

Mr. KELENSKE. I think we have seen over the years that the communication ebbs and flows. I will say, we are—have been doing this since right after 9/11 and we are light years ahead of where we were. I think everyone would agree with that. But I do feel that the communication is effective. We can always do better.

I also think the communication between the Fusion Centers throughout our Nation, to include the work that the National Fusion Center Association is doing to keep everyone together is also very, very good, sir.

We always can do better. Sometimes we are limited by the information that gets pushed up to us that is down at the local level. That is what kind-of delays some of the actions that we take.

Chairman CORREA. Can you elaborate on that specific point please?

Mr. KELENSKE. The last one, sir, about getting the information pushed out?

Chairman CORREA. Yes, sir.

Mr. KELENSKE. Yes. So this is exactly why we want to get our Fusion Liaison Officer program in place. Because that is going to put people who are trained in the process of identifying information that is relevant to the Fusion Centers so then we can look at that information and say, yes, we need to do further on this or, no, that is Constitutionally-protected, there is nothing more to do here. But we have to get that information pushed up to us, whether it is from our Fusion Liaison Officers or through the general public, through the see something, say something. In Michigan we have an OK to say school tip line. That is what generates our suspicious activity reports.

Chairman CORREA. Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske, sir, if I may interrupt you. You just said something interesting, which is if you have information that is Constitutionally-protected, in the context of a possible clear and present danger, how do you resolve that issue?

Mr. KELENSKE. Well, if it is a clear and present danger, I guess I would question what is protected in that regard. A lot of times—not a lot of times—sometimes we might get information that somebody may not—they could even have just a beef with their neighbor and they push that up to our Fusion Center. That is not something for us to act on. That is very different than information that we actually look at, has a criminal nexus, and we need to look through more.

Chairman CORREA. So in a situation where you do have that balancing act of Constitutionally-protected activity versus the possibility of something terrible coming to happen, you do have a mechanism to resolve that and hopefully make the right decision?

Mr. KELENSKE. Yes. Our Fusion Center personnel, as well as the Fusion Center personnel throughout our Nation, are trained very well and very much understand what they can and can't do based on the Code of Federal Regulations.

Chairman CORREA. Now, you know, we look back at 9/11 and because of the misinformation, the silos that we operated before 9/11, Homeland Security was created to eliminate a lot of those silos. You just said that things could always be better. I guess my open question to you would be how do we make sure we continue to improve on our communication? Because I am bothered. You all do a great job. You have got thousands and thousands of fact and data points and you have got to figure out what this stuff means, but any thoughts on how we can specifically improve on what you do within the Constitutional confines of assuring that we prevent the next horrific thing from happening?

Mr. KELENSKE. Yes. I think we continue to leave egos at the door and I think we continue the open dialog and collaboration not only with local, State, and Federal partners, but also with our private-sector and non-Governmental organizations, as well as those that are responsible for overseeing civil rights, civil liberties, and our Constitutional protections. We all have to be engaged with each other.

Chairman CORREA. Looks like my time expired.

So what I am going to do is hand it over to our Ranking Member Meijer for 5 minutes of questions.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. MEIJER. Thank you, Chairman Correa. Again, I appreciate the second round of questioning.

You know, I know Ms. Khan was talking about just over the overall funding levels and some of those frustrations and concerns, you know, that the money can only go so far. Obviously some of the goals of grant programs are to kind-of spur additional insights and information and hearings like one we are having today where we can evaluate what potentially that number needs to be.

But I guess, again, to Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske, you know, the training that has been provided by the newly-created Fusion Liaison Office program, how in your view has that helped deter

acts of terrorism or violent threats in your communities? As a corollary, how would an increase in funding allow you to more efficiently achieve the desired outcomes of your program?

Please, I would be curious to your thoughts.

Mr. KELENSKE. It is a great question, sir.

We have only had the one initial training. I will say that one individual I know of—and I am sure there may have been others—from the initial training, did already provide information to our field analysts to follow up on. This was a result of providing not only the training but providing attendees field analyst locations and contact information that facilitates that reporting, collaboration, and investigation. While nothing came from this report, it does demonstrate that the training is providing an effective identification and reporting process.

To your point, or your question on increased funding, that allows us to appropriately resource gaps we continue to identify as we move through this process. This could include increasing staffing for tip lines and our watch desk personnel or Fusion Liaison Officers at the local and State level, State-wide implementation of our Behavioral Threat Assessment Management teams from the local and State level—we at least want one per State Police district—provide trainings for additional skilled workers in mental health—that is a continual gap—host more training sessions on preventing targeted violence and terrorism prevention and increase community engagement and education.

Once the Behavioral Threat Assessment Management team or teams are in place, we also need to make sure that we have the bandwidth to handle the requests for service effectively and efficiently because we know with training and more community engagement and education we will get more, or an increase in, requests for service.

Mr. MELJER. Obviously the question of ultimate responsibility in funding source between State and Federal is something for us to kind-of discuss in a bit more detail in other fora.

But, you know, I guess kind-of turning back to what Ms. Khan was talking about earlier—and I would welcome if anyone else wants to address this as well, more than happy—but what we have heard from many in the community that are applying for grants across the board, you know, not necessarily under DHS, but that can be a very cumbersome process. I would just be curious for your own experiences, how challenging was the application for TVTP funding and how did you find that relative to other, you know, grant processes that you have undertaken throughout your other kind-of Federal interactions?

Ms. KHAN. So from our perspective, the TVTP grant was fairly standard. This is not very different from any other Federal grant, even State-level grants. The requirements for what you have to write is actually not too bad. So the process itself, I think it just—there are instructions and you have to follow it. Anytime you are applying for any Federal or any government grant you have to follow the instructions. As long as you are doing it—and they have like time lines, make sure you do this 2 weeks ahead time, a week ahead. So as long as you are following it, you are all good.

So I think there is just a place where you have to, you know, dot your Is and cross your Ts because you are dealing with the Government. I think it is not just that once the grant process is easy, reality is that if you want to get the funding, you have like 200 pages of compliance. But that is just the Federal process and you have to make sure that all your systems——

Mr. MEIJER. I see a lot of heads nodding on the compliance front, yes.

Ms. KHAN. You see, it just is the fact of life when you are dealing with any sort of Government money. It is no different from anything else.

Mr. MEIJER. OK.

Mr. Chairman, I see my time is close to expiring, so I yield back. Thank you again.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you, Mr. Meijer.

Now I recognize Mr. Bishop for 5 minutes, sir—5 minutes.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let us go back, Mr. Braddock, to what we were talking about, stochastic terrorism. I——

Mr. BRADDOCK. Let us do it.

Mr. BISHOP. Your paper says that—your testimony says at present I am working on a research project geared toward understanding how disinformation and conspiracies perpetuated by far-right extremists persuade their intended audiences and more importantly how we can prevent these audiences from engaging in violence in support of these conspiracies and disinformation.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Mm-hmm.

Mr. BISHOP. So the concept of stochastic terrorism is part of that theory, right?

Mr. BRADDOCK. Not necessarily. Not necessarily.

Mr. BISHOP. Has any of your research for DHS addressed the concept of stochastic terrorism?

Mr. BRADDOCK. No.

Mr. BISHOP. OK. Let us talk about this just a little further.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Sure.

Mr. BISHOP. So stochastic, from what I read, means random.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Well, random, although guaranteed to occur. Statistics means it—out of statistics it means it is random where and when it will occur, but it will reliably occur.

The best way to explain it——

Mr. BISHOP. Well, but the difference between—I mean if something is random, it happens without regard to a causal factor. But when you talk about stochastic terrorism, you are attributing to a Donald Trump or a Tucker Carlson, they caused——

Mr. BRADDOCK. But what you said is not true. You can attribute something to random. If you remember in biology class or—biology class is the best example to use it. When I was in biology class in high school you would take a petri dish and you would sneeze into the petri dish and then you would close the petri dish. Then 3 days later bacteria would grow somewhere. You can't predict when and where, but it would grow somewhere. That is attributable to the sneeze.

A better example, maybe not in biology class, is if you are sitting on your front porch in North Carolina, right—North Carolina, and

you are looking out on the horizon. I know it gets hot in North Carolina, I have been to Chapel Hill plenty of times. You see dark clouds rolling in on your porch. You know lightning is going to strike somewhere. You can't predict when and where, but it is going to strike somewhere. That is attributable to the heat meeting the cold.

Mr. BISHOP. So, OK. So we are all far afield pretty much. I will leave for the moment for somebody else who is watching to decide whether there is a concept is different between randomness and something caused by an efficient cause.

But let us leave that aside for one moment. Let me just get a couple of more examples.

You said you had no hesitancy to conclude that President Trump is a stochastic terrorist with respect to January 6 and with respect to the El Paso shooter. You said that Tucker Carlson is a stochastic terrorist with respect to the Buffalo attack. But then you said you thought Chuck Schumer walked the line when he said what he said about you won't know what hit you when addressed it to Supreme Court Justices. Why does that walk the line?

Mr. BRADDOCK. Because I don't know what hit you, isn't as direct as there are people replacing you in your country or isn't as direct as we are going to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue and then not walk down Pennsylvania Avenue with those people.

Mr. BISHOP. OK.

Mr. BRADDOCK. These are implied directives.

Mr. BISHOP. Let me keep going. Maxine Waters. I started talking about that where she said wherever these people show up, you push back on them, you tell them they are not welcome anymore anywhere. That is not stochastic terrorism? Is that what I understand?

Mr. BRADDOCK. Did you ignore what I said earlier? I said yes, that would be.

Mr. BISHOP. Oh, you said Maxine Waters is a stochastic terrorist? OK.

Mr. BRADDOCK. I said these are incidents of stochastic terrorism.

Mr. BISHOP. How about this, Eric—well, let me ask you—I am going to ask you one more. Eric Swalwell says the Republicans won't stop with banning abortion, they want to ban interracial marriage. Is he a stochastic terrorist?

Mr. BRADDOCK. No. Not out of that quote.

Mr. BISHOP. Nothing would inspire anybody to do anything? Let me ask this, was Frank James, the guy in the Buffalo—and New York subway who shot in the subway and I don't remember what all else he did—was he inspired by stochastic terrorism of say Black Lives Matter and critical race theorists?

Mr. BRADDOCK. I am not familiar with the Frank James case. You are going to have to explain to me what happened and the quotes you are attributing to his actions.

Mr. BISHOP. You are not aware of the Brooklyn subway attack that just happened about 2 or 3 months ago?

Mr. BRADDOCK. No, I am not familiar with it.

Mr. BISHOP. All right. Let me see. OK. When Joe Biden said—I think I may have done that one—Hillary Clinton on the Dobbs

leak. This decision will kill and subjugate women. What an utter disgrace. Is that stochastic terrorism?

Mr. BRADDOCK. There is no implied directive. If you can't see the difference between mentioning something that will occur and an implied directive, like we are going to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue, one implies that there is some justifiable motion toward an action. I could talk about the theory that underpins why my argument is that these certain cases are stochastic terrorism versus others aren't.

Mr. BISHOP. Our time probably doesn't allow for that. I got 20 seconds.

Let me just try to get at it one other way. Is calling Republicans White supremacists itself a form of stochastic terrorism?

Mr. BRADDOCK. No.

Mr. BISHOP. Hmm. How about the——

Mr. BRADDOCK. It is just like calling Democrats communists and socialists isn't stochastic terrorism.

Mr. BISHOP. All right. The woman who runs the account on Twitter, Libs of TikTok, *Washington Post* identified her, said she was a domestic terrorist. She has had a spate of death threats as a consequence. Is *Washington Post* a stochastic terrorist?

Mr. BRADDOCK. Through identifying her? No. It has to be an implied directive.

Chairman CORREA. I will allow you that last one, Mr. Bishop. We are out of time, but go ahead Dr. Braddock. Go ahead and finish answering that one.

Mr. BRADDOCK. I can do this all day, Mr. Chairman. But that last one——

Chairman CORREA. OK.

Mr. BRADDOCK [continuing]. There needs to be an implied directive toward what is happening.

Again, I am more than happy to send information to the panel and to Mr. Bishop. Like I said, I like having these conversations. I know it is kind-of a gotcha game, but I enjoy having these conversations because ultimately it means less violence from both sides.

But I will be happy to send some material——

Chairman CORREA. Later—and after the hearing——

Mr. BRADDOCK. I am sorry?

Chairman CORREA. Dr. Braddock, after the hearing you are more than welcome to supply written answers to any of the questions that the Members may have.

Mr. BRADDOCK. I really actually want to. For Mr. Bishop, I know we don't have time, but I will send you the materials that link implied messaging to actions so you have a better idea where I am coming from because it is kind-of a lecture. I know that Government time is valuable.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Dr. Braddock. Thank you.

Mr. BRADDOCK. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.

Chairman CORREA. I look forward to getting that information.

Now, I am going to go back to—Ms. Titus has joined us, is that correct? Ms. Dina Titus.

Ms. TITUS. I am here, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman CORREA. Madam, how are you?

Ms. TITUS. Oh, I am good. Thank you. I apologize for being late. Today is election day in Nevada.

Chairman CORREA. That is what I figured. I heard that you were busy today so I want to give you 5 minutes if you can to ask the panel of witnesses some questions.

Welcome, ma'am.

Ms. TITUS. Well, thank you.

As you know, we are currently involved in an increased domestic threat environment and this is due to a number of factors. But one thing that has been cited is the forthcoming decision by the Supreme Court on abortion. So I wrote a letter, I was joined by some Members of this committee and the Chairman and Chairman Thompson, to the Secretary of Homeland Security asking them to please remain vigilant and come up with a plan to deal with this and kind-of get ahead of the game instead of reacting.

But I would like to go back to Dr. Braddock to talk about those some with his research to counter disinformation campaigns. One of the big ones from some of the right-wing groups is great replacement theory. That is being used in the context of the abortion issue. So all those things kind-of come together.

I wonder if you could talk about how we can prevent on-line forums from perpetuating untruths or how can tackle the situation if we are expecting a rise in dangerous attacks? Could you just share some of your research or findings on those kind of topics?

Mr. BRADDOCK. Sure. Absolutely.

Mr. Bishop will like this, this applied to both the left and the right. Inoculation is useful for any kind of ideology in my research that advocates for violence. The idea is to prevent ultimately violence that perpetuates from a violent extremist ideology.

So I mentioned earlier kind-of what inoculation is, attitudinal inoculation. It is a strategic counter-persuasive strategy whereby there are two major elements to it. In one you essentially warn a target who hasn't been exposed to an idea before, or has been exposed to it minimally, that there is a third actor out there that is third actor out there who is trying to use them for their own devices and may try to get them to engage in behaviors they might not otherwise engage in.

Being Americans especially, Americans very much value their own autonomy, so when we think somebody is going to try to persuade us, we really don't like it and we kind-of become resolute in our beliefs and attitudes. That is what I really like about it, is because you can approach people, and I have approached people, and said listen, I may not agree with your political points of view, that is OK. You can have whatever beliefs and attitude you have, I just want to make sure you don't engage in violence. There are people out there who would have you engage in violence. That is step one.

Step two is to present them with counter-arguments against what they are going to encounter.

Now, my research and 60 years of research in other context has shown that when you do this, there are a couple of pretty cool things that happen. No. 1, they experience what is called reactance in response to that. So what they do—I guess the best way to explain this is have you ever been in a store and you just want to window shop and somebody comes up to you and wants to sell you

something, that weird gross feeling where you want them to just go away, that is what they experience when they encounter the propaganda. So they get angry and they counter argue against it. That is No. 1.

No. 2 is that they attribute less credibility to the person that might try to persuade them down the line. They think they are less credible.

What I found in my research, and the most important thing for me, is No. 3. They report significantly less intention to support that group or that person with violence. They might still ideologically believe whatever they want to believe, but they report less intention to get violent on the back of it.

So I argue, and I have argued, that one of the key things that we need with respect to disinformation, in the United States and elsewhere, is some comprehensive media literacy in schools to help kids understand when they are encountering information that might be false. It is not their fault, it is not school districts' fault, it is not the Government's fault that we don't have this, it is just that digital technologies have advanced so quickly and web 2.0 technologies, where people can create their own content, has advanced so quickly we haven't been able to keep up with it.

So we need to arm people who don't have the capacity for identifying true versus false information from anywhere. They don't have that capacity. We need to help them with that. I think that inoculation, at least from the research that I have shown thus far, would benefit that.

Now, there are boundaries around inoculation, like there is with any counter-persuasion strategy or any communication strategy, but that is what research is for. That is why we are parsing it out.

Ms. TITUS. The Department of Homeland Security is paying attention to this? There are grants for this or? How can we pursue that suggestion?

Mr. BRADDOCK. I hope they are. They gave me more than a half million dollars to research it, so I hope they are paying attention. But—

Ms. TITUS. I don't want your findings just to go on a shelf somewhere.

Mr. BRADDOCK. No, I am actually—that is one of the things that—we mentioned John Wilder a couple of times, my program manager. One of the things that we are very cognizant of is this needs to reach the people that need to use it. So I have conducted a couple of trainings already with people all around the country, right wing, left wing, and everything in between to help them develop inoculation messages in their communities against the specific disinformation problems that they face. From what I have learned from those individuals, after they have undergone the training, they have reported back to me that they intend on using it and they have talked about the different kinds of disinformation they face. It is not just coming from what my focus is on this project, being the right wing, they see it coming from all over the place. They want to help prevent people from being taken in by it and, most importantly, engaging in violence on behalf of it.

I am interested in preventing violence. Beliefs and attitudes, that is—people can believe whatever they want. These inoculation

trainings were meant to help people to help others, prevent them from engaging in violence on behalf of any kind of disinformation they encounter.

Ms. TITUS. Very interesting.

Well, thank you very much for allowing me to come back, Mr. Chairman. Learned a lot.

Chairman CORREA. Thank you very much, ma'am. Good luck today in your election.

Ms. TITUS. Thank you.

Chairman CORREA. Mrs. Harshbarger, are you there? Would you like to ask 5 minutes of questions, ma'am? Going once, going twice.

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today and the Members for their questions. That was a good hearing today.

Members of the committee may have additional questions for the witnesses and we ask that you respond to those questions expeditiously in writing.

The Chair reminds the Members that the committee record will remain open for another 10 days.

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you very much. Good afternoon to all.

[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR KURT BRADDOCK

Question. Each of the grant projects you represent were funded as part of the Department of Homeland Security's whole-of-society approach to violence prevention, which emphasizes involvement from community leaders across multiple disciplines. Cooperation from community partners will be critical to ensuring these projects achieve the most impact.

In the execution of your grant project, how have you worked to ensure buy-in from the communities you're working in and partnering with?

Answer. Thank you for your question; I am very pleased to respond to someone from my home State.

One of the cornerstones of my project is the development and implementation of attitudinal inoculation campaigns geared toward preventing the assimilation of right-wing disinformation and/or violent extremist ideologies based on that disinformation. Attitudinal inoculation is based on the premise that if someone is warned about an imminent effort to persuade them and are offered counter-arguments that challenge those persuasive efforts, they will be better equipped to become resilient to persuasive messages. For this project, participants will be warned about potential exposure to right-wing extremist ideas based on disinformation and provided counter-arguments to challenge it. One of the benefits of this approach is that individuals are approached as a potential ally rather than an adversary. In effect, participants are told that we are aware that they are not dangerous—and that we want to help prevent them from becoming dangerous. This is different from many approaches to counter-radicalization which have been ineffective due to their accusatory approach. Therein lies one of the key factors that facilitates buy-in from vulnerable communities.

Many communities in which disinformation and extremism are pervasive are skeptical of counter-radicalization messaging approaches that assume imminent guilt on the part of program participants. Because inoculation avoids assumptions of imminent violent activity on the part of the target audience, I have found communities to be more accepting of its tenets and the strategic efforts that feature its employment.

In addition to the conceptual elements of inoculation that make it a more attractive option to communities than more traditional counter-radicalization/counter-disinformation efforts, this specific research program also includes—as a part of its deliverables package—a series of training initiatives in which stakeholders in both the U.S. Government and in vulnerable communities themselves are trained on how to develop and implement attitudinal inoculation efforts specifically tailored to their own audiences and disinformation problems. At present, the research program has trained over 200 stakeholders. In the next 3 months, we have training sessions planned to train several more hundred. Expected stakeholders will include more Government officials from across the intelligence community, as well as community leaders who are in a unique position to not only identify vulnerable individuals in their communities, but also implement their own inoculation practices.

In sum, the research program associated with the money allotted to American University promotes a counter-radicalization/counter-disinformation strategy that is historically accepted by vulnerable communities not only because of its conciliatory approach, but also because it is amenable to training in which stakeholders can tailor the approach to their respective contexts.

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR HUMERA KHAN

Question. Each of the grant projects you represent were funded as part of the Department of Homeland Security's whole-of-society approach to violence prevention, which emphasizes involvement from community leaders across multiple disciplines.

Cooperation from community partners will be critical to ensuring these projects achieve the most impact.

In the execution of your grant project, how have you worked to ensure buy-in from the communities you're working in and partnering with?

Answer. For our CREWS project (DHS TVTP grant No. EMW-2020-GR-00087)

- We are grateful to our pilot locations for their commitment to protecting their communities, and their willingness to use data to understand how best to build resilience.
- To ensure local buy-in we engaged with and received written commitment from all four pilot locations before we started our analysis.
- Many thanks to the Mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania and her office, the leadership of the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, Pennsylvania, the County Executive of New Castle County, Delaware and his office, and the State senator of the 3rd District of Connecticut for their bold leadership.
- All model results are shared with the pilot locations, at interim and final stages.
- All recommendations will be co-developed with pilot locations and their stakeholders.
- We are providing training and workshops for all stakeholders identified by the pilot locations.

For our Tackle! Upstander Training Project (DHS TVTP grant No. EMW-2020-GR-00093)

- To ensure local buy-in we partnered with the American Jewish Committee (AJC). AJC Regional offices and their regional Muslim-Jewish Advisory Councils co-hosted each of our trainings. This resulted in attendance by diverse local leadership across multiple sectors.
- Overview information about the trainings was included in the invitations so everyone who registered did so voluntarily, and already knew what the curriculum would cover.
- Several registrants invited their networks and colleagues to further expand the diversity of professional sectors that participated.
- The participants included elected officials, district attorneys, human rights commissioners, school safety officers, principals, and superintendents, town and county emergency management directors, sheriffs, and law enforcement officers.

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR PAUL KIM

Question. Each of the grant projects you represent were funded as part of the Department of Homeland Security's whole-of-society approach to violence prevention, which emphasizes involvement from community leaders across multiple disciplines. Cooperation from community partners will be critical to ensuring these projects achieve the most impact.

In the execution of your grant project, how have you worked to ensure buy-in from the communities you're working in and partnering with?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR CHRIS A. KELENSKE

Question. In the execution of your grant project, how have you worked to ensure buy-in from the communities you're working in and partnering with?

Answer. Our buy-in comes from our holistic approach with Government and private-sector partners. From the moment the Michigan State Police received the grant award, we have actively engaged our partners to ensure all voices and perspectives are being heard and applied to our multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplined approach. We are working with specific intent to ensure we do not produce a behavioral threat assessment team built inside of a vacuum that doesn't account for the knowledge and experiences that our community partners bring to the conversation.

Training, outreach, and awareness with our Government and private-sector partners will ensure they are aware of all available resources and, more importantly, how to utilize and access those resources. Additionally, ensuring our returned results are actionable, relevant, and timely will build trust and legitimacy within the relationships that we continue to foster and leverage.

At the end of the day our goal is to establish a team that represents the communities we serve and provides value with helping to identify concerning behavior and off-ramping individuals prior to becoming radicalized and committing acts of targeted violence against others.