



上海國際問題研究院

SHANGHAI INSTITUTES FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

台湾问题影响因素的新变化 ——两场选举的视角

New Changes in Influencing Factors of Taiwan Question – From the Perspective of Two Elections

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摘要

2024 年正值全球“大选年”，其中最为引人注目的无疑是在 1 月落幕的台湾地区领导人选举和将于 11 月举行的美国大选。在世界局势愈发动荡、经济增长疲软无力、全球治理挑战增加的背景下，今年的选举将对未来数年的全球格局产生深远影响。因此，本报告从台湾地区领导人选举和美国大选这两场选举的角度切入，聚焦台湾问题，分析了这两场选举下台湾问题影响因素的新变化。

报告首先分析了美国因素对台海形势和两岸关系的影响。拜登政府台海政策的重中之重是“保持台海和平稳定”，防止中美关系“脱轨”，同时借台湾选举强化“民主对抗专制”的政治叙事，还试图通过支持台湾当局的“渐进台独”政策试图寻求两岸的“永久分裂”。报告认为，拜登政府将继续强化美台安全合作，既强化对中方的军事威慑，也可避免来自共和党的压力和批评；拜登政府“平衡”应对台湾地区选举对两岸关系的影响，既是防止两岸紧张关系升级影响民主党的选情，更是借机强化美国台海利益。特朗普的涉台言论使美国台海政策的“可信度”大打折扣；同时在共和党对华政策辩论中，一些人不断拉抬所谓的“武统”风险，为推动美台军事勾连寻找依据，这为下一届可能的共和党政府推行更加军事化的台海政策做了铺垫。

第二部分分析了其他外部力量对台湾地区选举结果的评估及其对台政策走向。日本方面，近年来随着国际局势及台湾岛内政局的演变，日本的对台政策发生了重大的变化，日本更加积极地全面推动日台关系的发展。总体上看，一方面日本的对台政策仍未逾越红线，另一方面日本把台湾及台海地区与日本的根本利益紧密联系在一起。在安全领域不断强调“台湾有事就是日本有事”，不断强化双方经济领域与社会领域的交流与联系。韩国方面，台湾地区“二合一”选举结果出台后，韩国较为谨慎地表

明了自己的立场。尹锡悦总统上任后，韩国的对台政策虽仍然强调其一个中国的立场没有改变，但逐渐向美日倾斜。欧洲方面，欧洲大国对台湾选举的表态较为谨慎，但一些中东欧国家政府、“亲台”议员发表了极为挑衅的言论。基于价值观、经贸利益、美国因素等原因，预计欧洲国家（欧盟）对台湾问题的关注度将会持续上升，欧洲（欧盟）国家对台政策将保持“深化”、“强化”的趋势和惯性。

第三部分侧重于探究新形势下港澳因素对两岸关系的影响。报告认为，民进党当局借港澳议题污名化“和平统一、一国两制”，在岛内塑造“恐共”氛围，在国际上迎合“民主对抗专制”叙事框架，为其推动“台独”议程制造借口；其次，“台独”、和“港独”势力在国际上合流，恶化“一国两制”实践的外部环境和两岸关系正常发展的外部环境；再次，美国污名化“一国两制”在港实践，美国当局将对台政策与对港政策在对华战略结构下联动；另外，基于中美关系恶化及地缘政治博弈的需要，美国将继续采取“以港遏华”的对港政策；最后，民进党当局歪曲港澳维护国家安全的立法行为，借助港澳推行“去中国化”政策。

第四部分主要是对台湾当局推动“台独”国际化政策的分析该政策包括：保住所谓的“邦交国”，继续谋求参与国际组织，以美欧日为重点的针对性措施。对美方向，博取美国信任、使美方不再“疑赖”是台当局对美政策的第一诉求；对欧方向，推动欧洲议会强化“友台”立场，推动中东欧地区改变对台政策，推动欧盟启动对台经贸协议谈判是台当局的重点；对日方向，台当局将继续推动“台湾有事就是日本有事”的叙事，通过互访加强政治互动、鼓动日本政客发表干涉台海言论、推动日本掏空一个中国原则等。

报告最后部分提出了应对上述新变化的政策建议。一是中国大陆既要看到台湾问题外部环境存在的多重严峻挑战，也要看到外部环境中依然存在、甚至在不断增长的有利于我解决台湾问题的条件与优势。二是加强管控，尽量不让台湾问题成为中美关系稳定的主要障碍。三是重视正确处理好中美关系中的三对关系。四是继续把坚持自身发展、提升实力作为根本之策。

引言

当今世界变乱交织，世界百年大变局呈现全方位、多维度、深层次加速演进态势，两岸关系正是在此外部环境 with 影响因素的新变化中备受冲击。

美国因素是台湾问题最大的外部因素，美国对华战略遏压与美国大选影响未来两岸关系的发展走势。。美国“以台制华”战略持续推进，导致台湾问题“国际化”、“军事化”、“联盟化”色彩明显。2024 年美国大选结果“关系到美国的自由民主本身的命运、左右着国际秩序的走向”¹，如特朗普当选，“最大余波或将体现在外交领域”，“进入一个混乱的‘后美国时代’”²，²直接影响美国台海政策。

就两岸关系外部国际环境而言，影响国际局势的多重变量复合叠加、加速突变，一系列“灰犀牛”、“黑天鹅”的防范及管控难度激增。国家安全概念泛化，保护主义、单边主义上升，民粹主义抬头，经济逆全球化、产业链与供应链区域化、碎片化更趋明显。俄乌冲突使美西方和俄罗斯的关系更为紧张，全球安全环境进一步恶化。全球经济复苏艰难，通胀加剧，食品、能源和大宗商品的供应和价格受到冲击，全球经济碎片化和阵营化趋势明显。以巴冲突进一步加剧了地缘政治对抗色彩。

报告认为，港澳问题特别是港澳问题中的外部因素和中央对港澳的治理对台湾问题仍将产生重要影响。

就两岸关系的台湾岛内影响因素而言，民进党开启第三个四年执政期后，赖清德拒不承认一个中国原则与认同“九二共识”，其“就职演说”不仅没有放弃在岛内推动“去

1 “美国大选将左右国际秩序的未来”，搜狐网，https://www.sohu.com/a/756844126_114911，最后访问时间：2024 年 8 月 21 日。

2 马克斯·布特：“如果特朗普胜选，他将摧毁美国主导的世界秩序”，美国《华盛顿邮报》网站 1 月 31 日，转载《参考资料》，2024 年第 33 期，第 13 页。



中国化”与在国际社会推进“‘台独’国际化”的活动，而且继续以“台湾、中国，一边一国”定位两岸政治关系，强化“互不隶属”主张，将两岸关系描绘成“两国关系”；赖提出进一步强化与实践“全面强化吓阻”、“提升经济安全”、“展开民主伙伴合作”、“维护两岸现状”“四大支柱”；通过“认知作战”，强化两岸对立对抗，反对“和平统一”，持续排斥与反对“一国两制”。由于赖清德在选举中只获得40%多的选票支持，不排除其为了巩固岛内支持，强化执政“合法性”并争取连任而采取冒进的、严重挑衅两岸关系和平发展的“极端台独”政策路线，也就是说，赖清德比陈水扁的“工具台独”、蔡英文的“渐进式台独”更危险。

在内外因素冲击下，两岸关系发展备受考验。所幸中国政府主导两岸关系的实力与能力在不断增强，持续推进两岸关系和平稳定与国家和平统一政策的决心与意志坚定不移，掌握着两岸关系发展的战略主动，国际社会一个中国框架不断得到巩固。未来四年，两岸关系应能在各种风险与挑战中克难前行，国家统一始终走在正确的道路上。

第一章

美国因素对台海形势和 两岸关系的影响

第一章

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“中国”议题乃至整个美国外交政策都不是此次美国总统大选的主要议题，因此，此次大选对美国台海政策并无清晰可见的直接影响，但潜在影响却是重要的，主要表现在以下方面：一是拜登政府继续强化美台安全合作，既强化对中方的军事威慑，也可避免来自共和党的压力和批评；二是谨慎处理台湾地区选举对两岸关系的影响，防止两岸关系紧张升级影响民主党的选情；三是特朗普的涉台言论使美国台海政策的“可信度”大打折扣；四是在共和党对华政策辩论中，一些人不断拉抬所谓的“武统”风险，为推动美台军事勾连寻找依据，这为下一届可能的共和党政府推行更加军事化的台海政策做了铺垫。

（一）美国对台湾地区选举结果的评估及其对台政策走向

美涉台研究学者在选前的预判是，赖清德将以 42% 左右的得票率当选，民进党在台湾地区立法机构席次不过半，国民党席次可能过半，影响选举结果的最大变数是柯文哲支持者的投票情况。从结果看，这一预判基本准确。美方对台湾地区选举结果的评估主要包括以下内容：第一，选举结果没有出人意料的地方，选后形势总体平稳。第二，赖清德是弱势领导人，不太可能在岛内推动“国家正常化”进程。

第三，台湾地区立法机构内国民党、民进党和民众党之间的博弈值得关注。

选后，美东时间1月13日，拜登总统离开白宫赴戴维营度假时被记者问到台湾地区选举结果，他表示，“我们不支持台湾独立”。美国国务院网站发表国务卿布林肯的书面声明，“祝贺赖清德赢得选举”，“也祝贺台湾人民再次展示了其健全的民主制度和选举进程的力量”，“美国致力于保持两岸和平与稳定”，“美国期待与赖清德和台湾所有政党领导人进行合作，推动美台非官方关系”。1月14日，由共和党籍前国家安全顾问斯蒂芬·哈德利（Stephen Hadley）和民主党籍前副国务卿詹姆斯·斯坦伯格（James Steinberg）组成的美国非官方代表团抵达台湾，以“符合惯例”的方式向台湾当局及赖清德传递美国政府的信息。1月26至27日，美国国家安全顾问沙利文（Jake Sullivan）与中共中央政治局委员、外交部长王毅在泰国会晤，沙利文强调了保持台海和平稳定的重要性。³

以上安排传递出拜登政府对台湾地区选举结果及其影响的两大考虑。一是“保持台海和平稳定”是拜登政府台海政策的重中之重。拜登政府一方面不断要求赖清德及其团队延续蔡英文的政策，“保持台海现状”，防止因台湾问题导致中美关系“脱轨”；一方面由拜登总统本人出面再次向大陆保证“美国不支持台独”，以防止中方所谓“过度反应”，导致台湾问题在美国大选年成为热门议题，民主党因此受到共和党的批评。

二是借台湾地区选举强化“民主对抗专制”的政治叙事。5月19日，国务院网站上发布了布林肯对赖清德“就职”的祝贺，开篇即为祝贺赖清德成为台湾“第

3 “Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Meeting with Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi”, The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/27/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan’s-meeting-with-chinese-communist-party-politburo-member-director-of-the-office-of-the-foreign-affairs-commission-and-foreign-minister-wang-2/>, 最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

五任民选总统”。⁴台湾问题事关中国主权独立和领土完整，根本不是一个意识形态问题。但在对华执行大国竞争战略的情况下，美国政府故意混淆台湾问题的本质，不断用“民主对抗专制”的叙事为台湾当局寻求“合法性”。

（二）拜登政府继续强化美台安全合作

2月21日，美国国防安全合作局（DSCA）宣布，美国国务院批准对台湾出售先进战术数据系统升级计划与相关设备，预估价值7500万美元，预计需要美国政府人员与承包商代表各200名赴台提供技术协助与服务。这是拜登任内第13次，也是台湾地区选后美国政府的第一次对台军售。6月，拜登政府又宣布了两笔对台军售，一是向台湾出售总值约3亿6020万美元的武器，包括720套弹簧刀300型杀伤人员和反装甲巡飞导弹系统（Switchblade 300 Anti-Personnel and Anti-Armor Loitering Missile System）；二是291套Altius 600M-V攻击型无人机系统，以协助台湾提高“应对当前和未来威胁”的防御能力。

美东时间4月20日，美国众议院以385票同意、34票反对、1票弃权通过了“2024年印太安全补充拨款法”（H.R.8036），向“印太伙伴”提供81亿美元的援助，23日该法案获拜登总统签署成法。该法案与“21世纪以力量求和平法案”（H.R.8038）、“乌克兰安全补充拨款法”（H.R.8035）和“以色列安全补充拨款法”（H.R.8034）一起通过，显示出台湾问题在美国全球防务中的战略核心性。该法案总计81亿美元，主要目的是应对中国在“印太”地区的行动，其中33亿美元用于发展美国潜艇基础设施，20亿美元为向台湾和其它美国主要盟友提供的“对外军事融资”（FMF），19亿美元用于补充美国国防部（DoD）向台湾提供的军事

4 “Taiwan’s Presidential Inauguration”, Taiwan’s Presidential Inauguration – United States Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/taiwans-presidential-inauguration/>, 最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

服务、军事教育及训练，以及美国国防部向地区合作伙伴提供的国防物品和服务。⁵

拜登总统从其上任至今，已四次公开表示将“协防台湾”，受到共和党内一批认为美国在台海政策上应将“战略模糊”改变为“战略清晰”者的支持，但其总体对华政策仍受到来自共和党的批评。特朗普政府副国家安全顾问博明（Matt Pottinger）表示，拜登政府对华政策一开始是对的，从2023年“气球事件”开始就错了，“接连不断地派内阁级官员访华，这只能被中方解读为示弱”，而且不应“管理竞争”，而应“赢得竞争”。⁶在对华强硬成为华盛顿两党共识、府会共识的情况下，拜登政府在大选期间最重视的就是在其台海政策上显示对华军事威慑有力且有效，以此来抵御来自共和党的批评与挑战。

（三）拜登政府“平衡”应对台湾地区选举对两岸关系的影响

拜登政府在台湾地区选举前由国安会高官出面解读美国台海政策，选后对该结果的“平衡”应对凸显了其防止两岸紧张关系升级影响民主党选情的考虑。

1月11日，美国国家安全委员会（NSC）高官就台湾选举向媒体吹风，并在其中完整论述了拜登政府的台海政策，包括“美国反对任何一方单方面改变现状，不支持台独，支持两岸对话，希望两岸以双方人民都能接受的方式和平解决分歧，只要分歧是和平解决的，美国对分歧最终解决不持立场”。⁷

美东时间1月13日，拜登总统在离开戴维营时回应记者关于台湾选举的提问

5 邵育群：“《印太安全补充拨款法案》包藏美国对台战略祸心”，《世界知识》，2024年第10期。

6 “Taiwan defense strategic ambiguity needs clarifying: U.S. analyst”，Nikkei Asia, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Taiwan-defense-strategic-ambiguity-needs-clarifying-U.S.-analyst>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

7 “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official on Taiwan Elections”，The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/01/11/background-press-call-by-a-senior-administration-official-on-taiwan-elections/>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

时说,“我们不支持(台湾)独立”。⁸美国政府台海政策由诸多内容组成,拜登总统在台湾选后的回应中强调“不支持台独”的内容,可见其对台湾当选领导人“台独”立场的担心。赖清德选前赴美“应试”,做出“蔡规赖随”的承诺,但显然未能打消美国政府及战略政策界的疑虑。拜登总统在台湾选后迅速发出“不支持台独”的清晰信号,其防止赖清德挑畔两岸关系,损害美国利益的目的非常清楚。

1月13日,美国国务院网站以“国务卿”名义发表声明,祝贺赖清德赢得选举,同时重申了美国政府的台海政策。与4年前美国政府在蔡英文连任后发出的声明不同,此次声明特别强调了“美国致力于保持台海和平与稳定”。⁹

1月14日,拜登政府派出的由共和党籍前国家安全顾问斯蒂芬·哈德利(Stephen Hadley)和民主党籍副国务卿詹姆斯·斯坦伯格(James Steinberg)率领的代表团抵达台湾,传递美国政府给台湾地区当选领导人的政策信号,这是美方管控台方未来政策的“传统”做法。

1月27日,美国国家安全顾问沙利文和中共中央政治局委员、中央外办主任王毅在泰国曼谷会晤。美方在会晤情况介绍中称,“沙利文强调了保持台海和平稳定的重要性”。¹⁰这说明拜登政府在台湾选后最关注的是台海“和平稳定”,最担心的是两岸紧张关系激化,以演化为对美国总统大选民主党选情的冲击。

除了上述担心外,拜登政府也企图利用台湾地区领导人的调整,进一步强化和巩固美国的台海利益。一是继续凸显台湾在“民主对抗专制”话语框架中的作用。

8 “Biden: ‘We do not support independence’ for Taiwan”, Politico, <https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/13/biden-taiwan-independence-lai-00135445>, 最后访问时间:2024年8月21日。

9 “Statement by secretary of state michael r. pompeo on taiwan’s election”, American Institute in Taiwan, <https://www.ait.org.tw/statement-by-secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-on-taiwans-election/>, 最后访问时间:2024年8月21日。

10 “Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Meeting with Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi”, The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/27/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-s-meeting-with-chinese-communist-party-politburo-member-director-of-the-office-of-the-foreign-affairs-commission-and-foreign-minister-wang-2/>, 最后访问时间:2024年8月21日。

5月19日，美国国务院网站以“国务卿布林肯”的名义发表声明，祝贺赖清德就职为台湾“第五任民选总统”，并试图凸显“台湾民主制度的韧性”。¹¹二是污名化中方反制“台独”势力和外部干涉力量的军事行动，指责中方破坏台海和平。5月20日赖清德发表“就职演说”，该演说通篇充满了对中国大陆强烈的挑衅和仇视。5月23日至24日，中国人民解放军东部战区在台岛北部、南部、东部及金门岛、马祖岛、乌丘屿、东引岛周边，开展“联合利剑-2024A”联合演训，惩戒“台独”分裂势力谋“独”行径，警告外部势力干涉挑衅。¹²美国国务院发言人米勒发表声明称，美国严重关注解放军在台岛周围的军演，并指责中方利用台湾选举进行军事挑衅，侵蚀了几十年来维持台海和平稳定的规范。¹³

（四）特朗普的涉台言论使美国台海政策的“可信度”大打折扣

特朗普在竞选期间被问到“美国是否会出兵保护台湾”的问题时，其回答发生了如下变化：2023年9月，此时的特朗普还未成为共和党的正式总统候选人，但媒体高度关注其在台湾问题上的立场。美国全国广播公司（NBC）的记者在访谈节目中反复提问特朗普（Donald Trump）是否会出兵保护台湾，特朗普的回答是“我不会说的，我不会说的”；¹⁴2024年7月，特朗普已经成为共和党总统候选人，在接受布隆伯格商业周刊（Bloomberg BusinessWeek）的采访时，他称“台湾几

11 “Taiwan’s Presidential Inauguration”, United States Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/taiwans-presidential-inauguration/>, 最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

12 “东部战区位台岛周边开展“联合利剑-2024A”演习”，中共中央台湾工作办公室、国务院台湾事务办公室, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/bmst/202405/t20240523_12622178.htm, 最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

13 “PRC Military Drills near Taiwan”, United States Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/prc-military-drills-near-taiwan/> 最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

14 “Meet the Press – September 17, 2023”, NBC News, <https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-september-17-2023-n1307173>, 最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

乎把美国的芯片生意全拿走了”；“台湾应该付给美国保护费”；“台湾离美国有 9500 英里远，离中国只有 68 英里”。¹⁵

特朗普的回答和拜登总统多次表示会“协防台湾”形成了鲜明的对比，有些美国媒体直接把特朗普“台湾应该付给美国保护费”的说法解读为“暗示美国不会出兵”。这使得美国台海政策的“可信度”大打折扣。首先，如果说 2023 年特朗普不愿就“美国是否会出兵”表态可以被理解为保持“战略模糊”的话，那么其 2024 年 7 月的表态则显示出立场的摇摆和不确定。其次，给台湾岛内的“疑美论”提供了最新的论据，特别是显示出“弃台论”和“掏空论”确实是站得住脚的。¹⁶第三，特朗普要对台湾收“保护费”的做法与其敲诈日韩等盟友的做法如出一辙，这种做法连与美国有双边协议的日韩等非常紧张，何况是台湾当局呢？

（五）部分共和党人企图推行更加军事化的台海政策

在共和党对华政策辩论中，一些人不断拉抬所谓的“武统”风险，为推动美台军事勾连寻找依据，这为下一届可能的共和党政府推行更加军事化的台海政策做了铺垫。总统大选期间，共和党内展开了激烈的对华政策辩论，其中很重要的部分就是关于美国台海政策的辩论。一些人，如前特朗普政府副国家安全顾问博明（Matt Pottinger）不断拉抬所谓的中方“武统”的风险，¹⁷为推动美台军事勾连寻找依据。虽然此类观点和共和党内的 MAGA（让美国再次伟大）派别的看法并不相同，特朗普如赢得大选，博明本人也未必能再进政府，但他与其他一些人的观点可能对下一届共和党政府的台海政策产生影响，使其朝更加军事化的方向继续发展。

15 “The Donald Trump Interview Transcript”，Bloomberg Businessweek，<https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-trump-interview-transcript/>，最后访问时间：2024 年 8 月 21 日。

16 “汪署申：台湾社会“疑美论”呈现新走向”，环球网，<https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/4GP4Cgikvha?imageView2/2/w/228>，最后访问时间：2024 年 8 月 21 日。

17 Boiling Moat: 《Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan The Boiling Moat》，Hoover Press, 2024.

第二章

其他外部力量对台湾地区选举 结果的评估及其对台政策走向

第二章

其他外部力量对台湾地区选举结果的评估及其对台政策走向

（一）日本对台湾地区选举结果的评估及其台政策走向

日本外务大臣上川阳子在选后发表声明祝贺赖清德当选。声明称，“对于日本而言，台湾是极为重要的合作伙伴和重要的朋友，双方拥有共同的基本价值观，有着密切的经济关系和人文交流”，并表示“日本政府将致力于进一步深化日本与台湾之间的合作与交流。”¹⁸ 此后日本首相岸田文雄在东京电视台节目上说：“我认为在共享基本价值的经济关系与人际交流上，台湾是非常重要的伙伴。”“透过对话和平解决有关台湾的各种问题，及必须实现有助这个地区和平与稳定的形式，这是我国基本方针，这个方针未来也不会改变”。¹⁹ 日本涉台学者松田康博及小笠原欣幸认为，“台湾意识已成形，本土派势力即使分裂，民进党最终仍能当选，并预期民进党长期执政的可能性增强，而国民党长期衰退的趋势却很明显”。²⁰ “延续

18 “台湾总统大选落幕 世界各国作出反应”，美国之音，<https://www.voachinese.com/a/world-reactions-to-taiwan-election-20240114/7439239.html>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

19 “日相岸田首提台湾总统大选结果”，台湾“中央社”，<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202401160314.aspx>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

20 “日本学者分析台湾总统大选：本土派势力够壮大”，台湾“中央社”，<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202401270163.aspx>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

蔡英文的政策，对国际社会来说有利”。²¹

近年来随着国际局势及台湾岛内政局的演变，日本的对台政策发生了重大变化，即更加积极地推动日台关系的全面发展。首先，在“1972年体制”的限制下日本积极推动与台湾“国会外交”的机制化与功能化。执政的日本自民党与台湾民进党连续3年举办“2+2”国会议员会议，研讨重大领域的合作。其次，日本积极推动与台湾在重大经济领域的合作。2024年2月台积电日本熊本厂举行开幕典礼，专家分析，“台积电在日本设厂成为台日经济安全保障的新起点。”²²再次，日本配合美国的印太战略大肆干预台海局势。在3月举行的美日峰会上双方宣布了约70项国防合作协议，美日同盟将展开六十四年以来最大的升级，以形成所谓对华威慑。²³另外，2024年日本外交蓝皮书指出，台湾海峡的和平稳定对日本的安全保障至为重要。为此，日本大幅提高国防预算，并在台海周边地区整兵备战。

总体上看，一方面日本的对台政策尚未逾越红线，仍将日台关系限制在非官方领域。但另一方面，日本不断强调“台湾有事就是日本有事”放大所谓台海冲突的风险，为其提高国防预算，成为“正常国家”创造合法性。同时，日本积极配合美国台海政策，在重新“解读”联大2758号决议问题上帮腔，妄图推动台湾问题“国际化”，这些动向值得高度警惕。

21 “延续蔡英文政策对国际社会有利”，台湾“中央社”，<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202401140092.aspx>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

22 “台积电日本设厂推动“台日同志国” 强化经济安全保障”，美国之音，<https://www.voachinese.com/a/taiwan-chip-companies-decouple-from-china-and-flock-to-japan-to-set-up-factories-20240229/7508965.html>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

23 “美日安保史上最大升级 专家：确保对中国形成足够威慑”，美国之音，<https://www.voachinese.com/a/us-japan-security-alliance-undergoes-largest-upgrade-amid-taiwan-strait-tension-20240329/7548845.html>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

（二）韩国对台湾地区选举结果的评估及其对台政策走向

台湾地区选举结果出台后，韩国政府表态较为谨慎。据韩联社报道，韩国外交部官员对台湾选举结果表态称，韩国对台“基本立场不变，愿同台方继续加强各领域实质性合作”。²⁴ 该官员强调，韩方希望台海维持稳定与和平发展。韩联社的报道没有使用“总统与副总统”字眼，而是以“台湾地区选举”及“正副领导人”进行评论。

韩国总统尹锡悦上任后积极强化与美国同盟关系，在台海议题上不断发表言论，显示出韩国对台政策正在发生微妙的变化。一方面，韩国仍然强调其一个中国的立场没有改变。韩驻华大使郑在浩在北京驻华大使馆会见韩国记者时表态，“韩国坚持尊重一个中国原则的立场从未改变，希望维系台海和平稳定，两岸关系和平稳定发展”。²⁵ 另一方面，韩国加强了与美日在涉台问题上的协调与合作，暗示中方可能在台海单方面改变现状，破坏地区和平稳定。2023年8月美日韩在戴维营举行峰会，三国联合声明表示，“我们重申，台海和平与稳定是国际社会安全与繁荣不可或缺的重要因素”。²⁶ 今年6月，韩国国防部长在香格里拉峰会期间与美日防长会晤，再次表示台海和平稳定很重要。8月韩国外交部发言人表示，“韩国、美国和日本正努力通过去年戴维营的协议将三边合作制度化，”“加强以规则为基础的国际秩序”。²⁷

尹锡悦政府在涉台问题上的亲美、日立场受到了国内其它政党的批评。最大在

24 “韩政府就台湾选举结果表态”，韩联社，<https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20240114000300881>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

25 “韩国驻华大使郑在浩重申尊重一个中国原则”，百度，<https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1790107666996800780&wfr=spider&for=pc>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

26 The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, The Republic of Korea, and the United States, The White House, Aug. 18, 2023. The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States | The White House

27 “韩国对美日军事升级审慎乐观”，美国之音，<https://www.voachinese.com/a/south-korea-cautious-about-us-japan-alliance-20240416/7573171.html>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

野党共同民主党党首李在明公开质疑尹政府介入两岸关系的必要性，批评尹锡悦对中国的强硬立场。李在明指出，“2年来，韩国在经济、外交及安全三个领域全都陷入莫大危机，原本中国是韩国输出的第一大国和贸易顺差国，如今反而变成了韩国进口第一大国。”²⁸ 重建韩国党临时党首、议员金峻亨（Joon Hyung Kim）公开表示，针对华盛顿一些军事将领和国会议员认为日本和韩国应该干预台海冲突的言论，该党将与共同民主党合作在国会内推动提案，确保韩国的军事力量只用来应对朝鲜的威胁，韩国不会军事卷入台海冲突。²⁹

（三）欧洲国家（欧盟）对台湾地区选举结果的评估及其对台政策走向

总体来看，欧盟和欧洲大国对台湾地区选举的表态较为谨慎，没有提及赖清德的名字，但一些中东欧国家、各国“亲台”议员发表了极为挑衅甚至是违反一个中国原则的言论。欧盟对外事务部（EEAS）表示，“对台湾举行选举表示欢迎，并祝贺所有参与此一民主进程的选民”。法国外交部和德国外交部都称“向所有参与这次民主活动的选民、候选人以及当选者表示祝贺。”³⁰ 捷克、立陶宛、波兰等中东欧国家政府均表示“祝贺”，捷克总统帕维尔的声明被台媒鼓吹为“突破”。英国外交大臣卡梅伦（Cameron）在声明中表示“希望台海两岸重新努力通过建设性对话和平解决分歧”。

欧洲学者和媒体认为，民进党在“立法院”的弱势地位以及由此引发的蓝绿白攻防，将是赖清德执政面临的重大挑战。中欧亚洲研究所（CEIAS）执行所长马泰·

28 “韩国国会选举朝野首次攻防两岸议题”，中时新闻网，<https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20240329001600-262110?chdtv>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

29 “South Korea opposition aims to stop military’s Taiwan entanglement”，South China Morning Post, Exclusive | South Korea opposition aims to stop military’s Taiwan entanglement | South China Morning Post (scmp.com)，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

30 长期关注台湾的德国记者巴登哈根（Klaus Bardenhagen）指出，这是德国外交部自2012年以来首度祝贺台湾地区选举。

西马尔奇克 (Matej ěmal í k) 称, 在野党对台湾通过捷克非政府组织向乌克兰提供的援助进行审查, 体现出“朝小野大”对赖清德施政造成的不利局面。

欧方学者评估赖清德会延续蔡英文的对欧政策, 这将有助于欧洲国家对台政策连续性, 也有助于延续台欧关系的升温势头。赖清德在两岸关系上面临的挑战要大于蔡英文, 台海“升级和误判的可能性更大”。台海形势长期看不乐观, 但短期可控。

在中欧关系较为紧张, 欧洲对华采取“去风险”政策、台欧加强半导体供应链韧性合作等背景下, 台湾地区与欧洲关系在蔡英文任内出现了较大“进展”。尽管欧盟不同机构与不同欧洲国家的对台政策存在差异, 但总体上看, 基于价值观、经贸利益、美国因素等原因, 欧洲国家(欧盟)对台湾问题的关注度将会持续上升, 欧洲(欧盟)国家对台政策将保持“深化”、“强化”的趋势和惯性。

一是以“不违反一中原则”为借口, 在执行层面使欧洲(欧盟)国家的一中政策模糊、倒退。类似设立“驻立陶宛台湾代表处”等事件, 将不断打破对台交往中的“非官方”界限。

二是加入美“以台遏华”联盟, 配合和支持民进党当局推动“台湾问题国际化”。在美国的支持、鼓励和带动下, 许多欧洲(欧盟)国家都形成“印太战略+联合声明”纳入台海内容的干涉模式, 并强化“台湾问题乌克兰化”认知。

三是欧洲议会呈现“挺台”极端化趋势。欧洲议会在台湾问题上长期扮演了负面角色, 其“挺台”形成议案、窜访、议题等全方位立体式“突破”。“亲台”议员的窜访台湾次数创下新高。欧洲议会涉台决议案, 不仅在数量上不断攀升, 其内容也更加具有指向性, 包括强化与台湾民进党当局的政治经济军事关系, 促进提升与民进党当局实质关系, 协助台湾争取“国际空间”等等, 不断拉高支持台湾当局的调门, 挑衅程度不断升级。

（四）印度对台湾地区选举结果的评估及其对台政策走向

印度媒体舆论认为，赖清德执政能否成功，很大程度上将取决于其能在多大程度上利用台美关系加强台湾的安全并创造新的经济机会。³¹与美欧不同，印度官方未向赖清德发送正式贺电。不过，印台之间的互动在“悄然”增加。2024年6月，莫迪（Narendra Modi）当选连任印度总理，台湾驻印度“代表”葛葆萱第一时间向莫迪表示祝贺，转达赖清德致莫迪的贺电。³²赖清德在社交媒体X上表示“希望强化正在迅速发展的台印关系”，莫迪则回应“期待与台湾建立更紧密关系”。印度莫迪政府与台湾当局的互动显示了双方推动印台关系进一步发展的可能性。

印度总理莫迪自从2014年上任之后，开始将印度实施二十多年的“东望政策”（Look East Policy）升级为“东向行动政策”（Act East Policy），台湾成为该政策的实施对象之一。与此同时，民进党当局也将印度作为台湾“新南向”政策的主攻方向，推动双方关系的实质性发展。在中印边境问题争端恶化、双边关系日益低迷的背景下，印度对台湾的政策也发生了微妙的调整，更加“弹性”地处理对台关系。主要表现为如下方面：

一是印度政府对“一个中国”原则的模糊性表态。自2008年起，印度官方开始不再在外交公报和公开声明中提及“一个中国”原则。根据印方官员的说法，这和中印边境问题相关。

二是谋求与台湾建立全方位的合作。政治领域，双方之间的官方交往变得频密，高层官员的互访增多。经贸领域，印度在追求经济自主和减少对中国大陆的供应链依赖的过程中，寻求与台湾地区加强经济合作，双方在电子、民航、商业、农业、工业等行业的投资与合作逐年上升，特别是在半导体和电子制造业领域。印台都将

31 “Taiwan: After-Election Report”, Indian Strategic Studies, <https://www.strategicstudyindia.com/2024/01/taiwan-after-election-report.html>, 最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

32 “莫迪宣誓就职 外交部祝贺盼强化双方实质合作”，经济日报, <https://money.udn.com/money/story/7307/8020795>, 最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

推动双方的经贸合作视为降低对中国大陆的供应链和市场依赖的一个手段，但双方开展产业合作也面临一系列挑战。社会人文领域，印台之间的交流日益频繁，双方通过教育合作、宗教团体活动、观光旅游合作、劳务合作等手段，强化人员往来。

三是印度政府可能在政治上更多地把中印边境问题和台湾问题相捆绑。印度政府可能将台湾问题视为地缘政治上的一个筹码，把台湾问题和中印边境问题挂钩，以此加大对中方的牵制。

（五）东南亚国家对台湾地区选举结果的评估及其对台政策走向

东南亚国家高度关注 2024 台湾地区选举。选后，印尼、柬埔寨、越南政府重申坚定奉行一个中国政策；缅甸政府发表声明支持一个中国原则；但菲律宾总统与新加坡外交部却都公开祝贺赖清德当选。东南亚各国对两岸关系与台海局势的高度关注，它们的对台政策有以下特点：

首先，绝大多数地区国家坚持一个中国政策，反对“台独”。曾有评论认为，泰国、老挝、马来西亚和文莱四国在台湾地区选举后未发表公开声明，暗示这些国家要在敏感议题上保持谨慎，以期能同时和大陆、台湾发展经贸关系。³³ 但实际情况是，绝大多数东南亚国家都坚持一个中国政策，反对“台独”。马来西亚政府明确表示，“马来西亚重申两国领导人 1974 年 5 月 31 日签署的联合公报原则，坚定奉行一个中国政策，承认台湾是中华人民共和国领土不可分割的一部分，支持中国实现国家统一，不支持任何‘台独’主张。”³⁴ 泰国总理、老挝副总理和文莱外交主管部长都表示

33 Bunly Ek, How Southeast Asia Responded to Taiwan's Elections, The Diplomat, Jan. 30, 2024. How Southeast Asia Responded to Taiwan's Election The Diplomat

34 中华人民共和国政府和马来西亚政府关于深化提升全面战略伙伴关系、共建中马命运共同体的联合声明（全文），2024 年 6 月 20 日。中华人民共和国政府和马来西亚政府关于深化提升全面战略伙伴关系、共建中马命运共同体的联合声明（全文）——中国政府网（www.gov.cn）

其政府将“坚定奉行一个中国政策”。³⁵新加坡外长在7月与王毅外长见面时表示，新加坡恪守一个中国政策，坚定反对“台独”。³⁶即使是菲律宾总统小马科斯也公开表示，“不支持台湾独立，一中政策没有变化”。³⁷

其次，重视发展和台湾的经贸关系。长期以来台湾在东南亚投资高度集中在纺织、制鞋业等劳动密集型行业。在新冠疫情结束，东南亚各经济体期待经济迅速恢复的背景下，各国高度关注吸引来自台湾地区的投资。例如，2023年，台湾地区对越南投资金额为22亿美元，在对越南投资的105个国家和地区之中排名第四，其在越南投资项目共有3200个，注册总额为395亿美元。越南政府明确表示，期待发展并扩大和台湾地区的经贸投资合作关系。³⁸

第三，重视保护其移民工人在台湾的人身安全与权益保障。据统计，台湾目前共有约70万名东南亚籍移民工人，其中印尼籍25.6万，越南籍25.7万，菲律宾籍15.4万。³⁹民进党执政8年内，众多移民工人陷入贫穷的恶性循环，⁴⁰生存状况备受外界批评，因而东南亚国家高度关注赖当局能否改善移民工人的处境，从制度与政策层面维护他们的权益。

第四，菲律宾在涉台政策上“首鼠两端”，强化和美国的军事合作。小马科斯上台后全方位配合美国对华战略，以期在南海问题上谋得更多利益。因此，菲律宾

35 泰国总理赛塔会见王毅，2024年1月29日。泰国总理赛塔会见王毅 _ 中华人民共和国外交部 (mfa.gov.cn)；王毅同老挝副总理兼外长沙伦赛举行会谈，2024年4月7日。王毅同老挝副总理兼外长沙伦赛举行会谈 _ 国家国际发展合作署 (cidca.gov.cn)；王毅同文莱外交主管部长艾瑞万举行会谈，2024年5月14日。王毅同文莱外交主管部长艾瑞万举行会谈 _ 中华人民共和国外交部 (mfa.gov.cn)

36 王毅会见新加坡外长维文，2024年7月28日。王毅会见新加坡外长维文 _ 中华人民共和国外交部 (mfa.gov.cn)

37 菲总统马科斯说不支持台湾独立 称“一中政策”没有变化，美国之音，2024年9月6日。菲总统马科斯说不支持台湾独立 称“一中政策”没有变化 (voachinese.com)

38 越南成为中国台湾企业投资目的地，2024年4月10日。越南成为中国台湾企业投资目的地 (baochinphu.vn)

39 台“劳动部”2024年《劳动统计年报》：<https://www.mol.gov.tw/1607/2458/2464/2468/statisticalReportList>

40 简郁纹、苏欣仪：《带你看见台湾移动的三大困境：政策、法规与歧视问题何解？》：One-Forty 网站：<https://one-forty.org/tw/blog/migrant-issues>



在涉台政策上“首鼠两端”，一方面在台湾地区选后表态上玩弄小花样，但之后又表态仍坚持一中政策，另一方面则强化和美国的军事合作。菲律宾向美军开放使用权限的新增军事基地之一位于吕宋岛北部，其中 1 处距离台湾岛仅约 400 公里，⁴¹ 其配合美国地区军事战略的用意昭然若揭。

41 “菲律宾公布新增 4 个美军基地位置，其中一处距离中国台湾岛仅 400 公里”，观察者网，2024 年 4 月 4 日。
菲律宾公布新增 4 个美军基地位置，其中一处距离中国台湾岛仅 400 公里 (guancha.cn)

第三章

新形势下港澳因素对 两岸关系的影响

第三章

新形势下港澳因素对两岸关系的影响

（一）民进党当局借港澳议题污名化“和平统一、一国两制”

民进党当局借港澳议题污名化“和平统一、一国两制”，在岛内塑造“恐共”氛围，在国际上迎合“民主对抗专制”叙事框架，为其推动“台独”议程制造借口。

“一国两制”提出以来，台湾一些政治势力曲解误导，民进党及其当局不遗余力地造谣抹黑，炒作香港议题以反对“一国两制”，造成部分台湾同胞的偏颇认知。⁴²2019年以来，民进党当局借香港修例风波、国家安全立法、选举制度改革等介入香港事务，配合美国的“以港遏华”，借助香港议题进行选举操作，攻击“一国两制”在香港的实践，成为干预香港事务的主要外部势力之一。⁴³民进党当局利用香港局势，借机发表一系列恶意攻击“一国两制”的言论。民进党当局通过对香港事务的持续介入，歪曲、丑化、诋毁“一国两制”，通过抹黑“一国两制”在香港的实践，强化台湾民众对“一国两制”的恐惧、拒绝心理，挑动台湾社会反对、对抗“一国两制”的情绪，进而攻击大陆。赖清德竞选前后以及上台以来，民进党及其当局继续炒作香港议题。赖清德宣称“香港是被迫走进中国大陆，失去了全世界，台湾不能走亲中回头路”。赖清德宣称，香港实行“一国两制”，在“反送中”运动后已失去民主

42 国务院新闻办公室：《台湾问题与新时代中国统一事业》，人民出版社，2022年，第24页。

43 张建、唐光俊：“民进党当局借‘修例风波’对香港事务的介入：手段、动机及影响”，《台湾研究》，2023年第3期。

与自由，不仅人权受打压也经济退步，还有几十万人离开香港。民进党发言人吴峥妄称，中国大陆过去对香港承诺的“一国两制”50年不变都是“谎言”，在颁布《香港国安法》后，中国大陆将“法律武器化”加强对港经济政治管制，逐步“一国一制”化。美国在国际上对台湾的所谓“民主成就”“政治发展优等生”的“认可”和“加持”是其在全球塑造所谓“民主对抗专制”战略的重要组成部分，其目的是在台海两岸制造对立、贬损大陆政治发展和阻挠台湾民众对大陆的认同。民进党当局迎合美国的这种“民主对抗专制”的叙事，作为其“谋独拒统”的依据和借口。

（二）“台独”和“港独”势力在国际上合流

“台独”势力可能的长期执政冲击“一国两制”的内外部环境。2019年1月中央提出探索“两制”台湾方案以来，台湾当局以香港实践“一国两制”出现问题为由反对“和平统一、一国两制”的力度加大。“台独”与“港独”势力的互动、“合流”趋势明显，“港独”势力借助台湾当局的政策以提升自身能见度。“一国两制”在香港的实践与国家统一、反分裂关系更加紧密，也带来更多的不确定因素。台湾民进党推动“港独”与“台独”合流，“台独”“港独”国际化，“台独”“港独”合流破坏“一国两制”和分裂国家。此前，民进党当局支持“港独”势力在香港的活动，以此对香港进行渗透、破坏，《香港国安法》实施以来，为“港独”分子逃往台湾提供。当前，“港独”分子在国际上的活动借鉴、模仿“台独”势力国际化的“经验”，特别是通过国际游说加强对港制裁，恶化“一国两制”的国际环境。

（三）美国污名化“一国两制”在港实践

2014年支持台湾太阳花学运与支持香港“占领中环”运动的联动，2019年支持香港反修例运动与支持民进党蔡英文连任的互动以及近年来美国支持“台独”与“港独”的联动、支持“台独”国际化与支持“港独”国际化的联动。长期以来美国支持台湾民主化与在香港传播西方民主价值观的联动。美国对华政策框架下的对台政策、对港政策，当前对华政策大框架都是美国对华战略竞争政策，期间穿插遏制和接触政策。美国主导下的涉台叙事、涉港叙事愈加负面，甚至将港台叙事相结合，以打击中国政府的对台政策和对港政策。美国官方政策报告、智库报告、媒体报导等污名化“一国两制”在香港的实践以及中国政府以“一国两制”台湾方案解决台湾问题、实现国家完全统一的政策安排，特别是通过宣称所谓“一国两制”香港实践的“失败”、“一国两制”已经不复存在等谬论来反对用“一国两制”解决台湾问题。实际上，这种负面叙事是美国港台政策联动的重要体现。美国不断提出涉港制裁法案与支持台湾法案也构成美国港台政策的差异以及联动效应。

（四）美国采取“以港遏华”政策

美国通过涉港法案，以法律方式确立自身干预香港事务的地位和扩张干涉的空间，将涉港法案作为施压中国政府和调整美方政策的工具。中美博弈、中西方意识形态冲突导致香港与美西方良性互动的基础条件发生了根本变化，中国崛起、美国打压中国已经令美西方对香港的认知和定位发生了变化。美西方已经把对香港的定位从接触中国的平台和前沿转向遏制中国的工具和筹码。美国对香港进行去功能化、去独特性、去“两制”化，以打击香港的国际地位来削弱香港服务国家的作用和角色。拜登上台以来，美国采取对香港去功能化的政策，其在本质上是对中国所

谓的“去风险化”的一部分，拜登政府企图借助去除香港独特性、单方面取消香港单独关税区地位、不承认“香港制造”、做出负面营商环境指引、唱衰香港、打击香港国际金融中心地位等方式削弱香港，企图将香港作为遏制中国的筹码。拜登政府在对香港去功能化方面采取包括美国国会推动取消香港驻美经贸办事处的法案、推动取消香港在国际组织投票权的法案、发布负面营商环境和投资环境引导、美国官方施压在港美资企业和商会等。拜登政府认为，香港问题关乎美国利益，美国必须设法让香港的发展符合美国利益。美国对香港的政策考量绝不仅仅是经济金融经贸方面的利益，从长期看，战略利益也是重要的考量因素。美国对港政策长期纳入对华战略框架，新中国成立以来，美国对华战略政策经历遏制（containment）、接触（engagement）和竞争（competition）三个主要阶段，当然每个阶段也随便其他两个政策。美国对港政策一直在美国对华战略，特别是这三大战略阶段中变化和调整。在中美战略博弈和美国大选的背景下，预计拜登政府在今年下半年选举前后将出台新一轮制裁、施压香港的措施。从未来趋势来看，美国将继续利用《美国—香港政策法》（United States–Hong Kong Policy Act）、《香港人权和民主法案》（Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act）和《香港自治法》（Hong Kong Autonomy Act）以及总统行政命令对香港进行干预和施加制裁。

（五）民进党当局借势推行“去中国化”政策

民进党当局在国际社会的认知塑造行为日益频繁，当前台湾的国际认知度和好感度出现了一定程度的提升，台湾方面积极打“芯片牌”和“民主牌”，一定程度上博得了西方社会的同情和支持，提升了国际社会对台湾问题的关注程度。民进党当局不断推进“渐进式台独”，大搞“去中国化”，在这一进程中减少台湾与港澳的联系。2024年6月21日，中央政府制定惩治“台独”顽固分子分裂国家、煽动

分裂国家犯罪的司法文件。6月27日，台湾当局陆委会宣称，中国大陆、香港和澳门从2023年起陆续增修国安法令，包括大陆的《国家安全法》《境外非政府组织境内活动管理法》《网络安全法》《反间谍安全防范工作规定》；香港的《中华人民共和国香港特别行政区维护国家安全法》《维护国家安全条例》；澳门也修订《维护国家安全法》。民进党当局宣称，大陆发布的《关于依法惩治“台独”顽固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见》，进一步提高台湾民众赴陆港澳的人身安全风险。

第四章

台湾当局推动“台独” 国际化的政策

第四章

台湾当局推动“台独”国际化的政策

（一）保住“邦交国”

为维持与仅剩 12 个“邦交国”关系，民进党当局基本延续以产业民生类技术、资金援助为主体的对外关系框架，同时加大与美国外交战略的契合度。在策略和手段上，民进党当局从过去“捍卫中华民国主权”逐渐转变为针对不避讳“双重承认”；针对非“邦交国”，着重发展“实质关系”，反映出民进党当局“走向国际”战略背后的“战术性丢邦”和“战略性去中（中华民国）”的政策逻辑。

台当局的“固邦”活动大致透过其外事部门和“国合会”两个层级，前者负责政治和意识形态导向，后者则负责“筑牢物质根基”。根据台外事部门的说法，“与友邦高层及重要官员之互访与各项交流”，以及“以互惠互助原则，契合友邦经社发展需要并导入产业及市场元素”都同等重要，两者互为表里、相互促进，都是注重“交流”，推动、放大与相关利益攸关方的“合力”。⁴⁴

从台外事部门层面来看：

一是延续与所谓“理念相近国家”和跨党派政治组织的联络热度，其中既包括“邦交国”的政府首脑、官员，也包括以“福尔摩沙俱乐部”为代表的跨国、跨党

⁴⁴ <https://ws.mofa.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9VcGxvYWQvNDAYL3JlbGZpbGUvMTE4Lzk5OTlxLzc3YWVwNDJhLTBkNDgtNDZiMS1hYzk5LWw1NzFkZDU0YmNlNy5wZGY%3D&n=MTEy5bm05aSW5Lqk6YOo5Zau5L2N6aCQ566XKOazleWumueJiCkucGRm>，最后访问时间：2024 年 8 月 21 日。

派“挺台”组织。联络交往形式既有不定期的双方互访互动、也有台方在“双十节”等特定时期与外方的机制性联络机制。值得注意的是，与前两年新冠疫情、俄乌冲突、佩洛西窜访台湾等重大事件影响下，台当局与“邦交国”高层联络的层级和频率都有所下降。

二是利用各种“低政治”议题组织机制性交流活动，一般借“文化交流”，以“妇女赋权”“气候变迁”等时代流行议题为名，向外国政府官员、议员、专业技术人士等灌输“反中”情绪，提升台湾“地位”和“价值”。台当局组织的比较有代表性的机制性交流品牌、会议有“外交远朋西语班”“拉丁美洲及加勒比海妇女赋权国际论坛”“太平洋气候变迁论坛”等，参与者一般为台“邦交国”政府首脑、相关领域专业官员、国会议长、议员等。近年来也有一些非“邦交国”官员、议员和民间人士参与其中。

三是重视官民结合的所谓“公共外交”，以“国合会奖学金”“台湾奖学金”等奖学金，资助学生来台学习。既有上述官方背景、具有军事合作色彩的“远朋班”，也有设置在民间机构、由民间机构主办的、更具实务功能的“课程”，其共同特征是面授具有“台独”史观的历史文化课程，其学员既包括危地马拉外交部长、巴拉圭总统府新闻顾问等高级别“邦交国”官员，也有智利、厄瓜多尔、阿根廷、墨西哥等其它非“邦交”国家政府官员。⁴⁵

四是协同和补充美国全球和区域战略。主要是在美台“全球合作暨训练架构（GCTF）”架构下，提供各种领域的技术培训。例如：“国合会”与美洲国家组织（OAS）协作在伯利兹推进“妇女赋权职业训练计划”；⁴⁶与美澳日携手为图瓦卢援建海底电缆等。⁴⁷

45 “亚太硕专班菁英来台面授 危地马拉外长也是淡江新鲜人”，淡江时报，<https://tkutimes.tku.edu.tw/dtl.aspx?no=56774>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

46 “国合会与美洲国家组织（OAS）携手推动妇女赋权”，财团法人国际合作发展基金会，<https://www.icdf.org.tw/wSite/ct?xItem=70769&ctNode=31381&mp=1>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

47 “台湾首度参与美日澳 助图瓦卢建海底电缆”，经济日报，<https://money.udn.com/money/story/7307/7891255>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

从台“财团法人国际合作发展基金会（以下简称‘国合会’）”来看，一是在科教文卫领域延续与“邦交国”的“互惠互利”。对应的业务类型主要是技术合作和投融资业务，并以所谓“就（创）业技术协助”“金融信保”“国际倡议”三大主轴协助“邦交国”经济，此外，不时因应天灾人祸等对“邦交国”施以其它直接援助，也是其重要组成部分。二是利用“邦交国”政商资源打通岛内与域外和区域组织资源对接，提升区域和国际存在感。产业投融资是民进党当局意图重点发展的领域，即着力协同中美洲银行、美洲开发银行，针对伯利兹和巴拉圭等“友邦”的能源、制造业类项目进行共同融资，促进台湾私有部门、金融业参与中美洲银行的融资计划。

（二）谋求参与国际组织

截至 2024 年第一季度，台湾方面在 45 个政府间国际组织中拥有正式会员身份，在 29 个政府间国际组织中拥有准会员或观察员身份。⁴⁸ 基于联大“2758 号决议”精神，以联合国为代表的绝大多数国际组织取消了台湾方面的正式成员资格。但由于复杂的历史原因，以及通过两岸协商和国际组织的协调，台湾方面也得以在一些国际组织内以不违背“一中原则”的适当形式保留活动空间，例如：以“中国台北”（Taipei, China）名称参与亚洲开发银行（ADB）、美洲开发银行（IDB）；以“中华台北”（Chinese Taipei）参与亚太经合组织（APEC）、经济合作发展组织（OCED）；以“台澎金马单独关税区”（The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu）参与世界贸易组织（WTO），等等。

台湾参与国际组织活动问题必须按照一个中国原则处理。但蔡英文上台后，台湾当局拒不承认“九二共识”，妄图“从世界走向中国”，以“拓展国际空间”议

48 参与国际组织，<https://subsite.mofa.gov.tw/igo/cp.aspx?n=5955>，最后访问时间：2024 年 8 月 21 日。

题对外深化与美西方和“邦交国”之间的集体行动，对内寻求激起岛内和国际社会对于大陆“打压台湾国际活动空间”的情绪，以维护自身执政地位。⁴⁹

一是极力“倚美抗中”，形塑“2758号决议不涉台湾地位”论。台湾当局不断游说美国国会，国会2019年通过的《台北法案》（Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019）、2020年通过的《台湾保证法》（Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020）为美国行政当局推动台湾参与联合国体系内的国际组织提供了所谓的法律依据。

二是倡导台湾在国际组织中身份的“去中化”。前外事部门负责人吴钊燮声称，中国大陆把“Chinese Taipei”翻译成“中国台北”，对台湾造成很大困扰。对外应使用“中华民国”，如果有弹性的话，可以使用“中华民国（台湾）”“台湾”。⁵⁰蔡英文当局提出两岸“互不隶属”，妄图将两岸在国际组织中的模糊表述变得清晰化。

三是寻求与美西方“另行炉灶”，在联合国体系之外拓展建构“排中体系”。除了进一步拓展“全球合作暨训练架构”（GCTF）的成员国家和活动模式之外，台湾当局还和美日韩共同组建了“芯片四方联盟”，并签署《原住民族经济贸易合作协议》（IPETCA），与新西兰、加拿大及澳大利亚共同成为该协议的创始成员。

（三）对美方向：倚美靠美，寻求“信赖”

博取美国信任是赖清德对外政策的第一诉求。赖清德在竞选期间就试图对美释放“蔡规赖随”信号，传递将继续“倚美靠美”的政策路线，从而达到消除美国“疑赖”的目的。其就任后对美方向的具体行动如下：

49 张亚中：《统合论》，中国评论学术出版社，2014年，第325页。

50 “使用‘中华台北’对台湾外交关系造成很大困扰”，美国之音，<https://www.voachinese.com/a/use-of-term-chinese-taipei-harmful-to-taiwans-international-relations-20181217/4704025.html>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

一是推动美台经贸合作机制化，完成“21 世纪贸易倡议”后续谈判。2023 年，“21 世纪贸易倡议”（U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade）首批协议达成。⁵¹ 对赖清德当局来说，完成并签署“21 世纪贸易倡议”全部谈判既有象征意义，又有实际价值，是赖清德加速“经济台独”布局，弱化两岸经贸联结的重要手段。

二是推动美台政治互动“重大突破”。2022 年 8 月，美国众议长佩洛西（Nancy Patricia Pelosi）不顾中方坚决反对窜访中国台湾地区。蔡英文在任期间数次“过境”美国。台外事部门、经济部门、防务部门等官员也多次赴美活动。赖清德上台后，将会在美台政治互动的层级和行程上继续寻求提升和突破。

三是推动美国国会继续引导美国对台政策方向。在民进党当局竭力游说下，美国国会形成了所谓“挺台跨党派共识”，出台了数量庞大的涉台法案，议题涵盖加强台美实质关系、台湾参与国际组织、台美军事关系、对台军售、台美经济合作等各方面。赖清德当局将继续强化针对美国国会的游说，以寻求国会对台“法案突破”，从而施压美行政当局推行更“亲台”的政策。四是推动美国强化“全球合作暨训练架构”（GCTF）展开“国际合作”。蔡英文执政以来，民进党当局各类涉外的研习营、研讨会和海外活动都冠以 GCTF 之名，台方自称，GCTF 已经举办 70 场国际工作坊，共邀请 127 个国家、超过 7500 位官员及专家参加。⁵² 美国的盟友日本、澳大利亚先后成为 GCTF “正式伙伴”。赖清德上台后，将会继续运作 GCTF 为台湾展开所谓“国际合作”的重要工具，提升其所谓“全球议题影响力”、拉拢合作伙伴，突破“国际空间”，挑战一个中国原则。

五是推动美国歪曲联大第 2758 号决议，支持台湾参与国际组织。蔡英文时期，美国从国会立法、歪曲 2758 号决议、发表新闻稿等方面公开表态支持台湾“有意

51 “台美 21 世纪贸易倡议”，行政院经贸谈判办公室，<https://www.ey.gov.tw/otn/D4BECA8C62559293/8c8802f0-58c5-432d-b958-7552d44fb8e7>，最后访问时间：2024 年 8 月 21 日。

52 “2023 年‘全球合作暨训练架构’联合委员会会议并发布联合声明”，https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=96&s=116085，最后访问时间：2024 年 8 月 21 日。

义地参与国际组织”。预期赖清德当局将继续把论证台湾国际活动“正当性”的“主攻方向”定为歪曲联大第 2758 号决议及推动所谓“台湾地位未定论”。

（四）对欧方向：强化游说议会，寻求复制“立陶宛模式”

一是推动欧洲议会强化“友台”立场。蔡英文执政以来，欧洲议会涉台决议或议案数量急剧增加。2022 年 9 月，欧洲议会通过“台海情势决议案”，称欧洲将“保障台海安全”。⁵³2024 年 2 月，欧洲议会各以 62%、65% 得票数，通过欧盟“共同外交暨安全政策”（CFSP）及“共同安全暨防御政策”（CSDP）两项年度执行报告决议案，该报告宣称所谓“中国与台湾互不隶属”。⁵⁴欧洲议会已经连续三年派出正式团组访台。赖清德当局将会继续加大对欧洲议会的游说，使之在“台独”国际化中扮演重要角色。

二是推动中东欧地区改变对台政策。2021 年，立陶宛同意台湾当局在其首都设立“驻立陶宛台湾办事处”，台湾当局试图促使中东欧国家复制“立陶宛模式”。赖清德上台后，必然加大游说力度，从经贸、议会、价值观等领域入手，以突破交往层级、设立办事处等为目标，以捷克等为重点国家，推动中东欧地区国家改变对台政策。

三是推动欧盟启动对台经贸协议谈判。赖清德上台后，将会延续运用对欧“芯片筹码”的策略，推动启动台欧经贸谈判的，以经“促”政，将台欧经贸议题政治化。

53 “驻欧盟使团发言人就欧洲议会通过涉台决议答记者问”，中华人民共和国驻欧盟使团，http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/chn/zclc/202209/t20220916_10766756.htm，最后访问时间：2024 年 8 月 21 日。

54 “Texts Adopted”，European Parliament，https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0104_EN.pdf，最后访问时间：2024 年 8 月 21 日。

（五）对日方向：寻求坐实“台湾有事就是日本有事”

蔡英文当局在台日双方的争议议题上几乎都持妥协、退让和配合姿态。一是渔业矛盾。尽管台日多次举行“海洋事务合作对话”举行，但双方对于争议议题一再“搁置”。日方态度非常强硬，拒绝针对争议区域的渔业作业进行协商，致使台湾渔民权利受到严重限制和伤害。对此，岛内渔业组织极为愤慨，要求台湾当局“硬起来确实护渔、保护渔民权益”。⁵⁵ 二是日本核废水问题。日本政府一意孤行，强推核污染水排海计划，这一行径受到全球舆论一致声讨，民进党当局却仿佛忘记了其标榜的“反核”立场，称“尊重专业”、“附近海域辐射安全影响属可忽略程度。”⁵⁶ 三是历史文化问题。2016年，台北“故宫”向日本出借唐代颜真卿的《祭侄文稿》行书真迹，在东京国立博物馆公开展出。此话题不断延烧，民进党当局一边“大方”讨好日本，借文物展览拉近与日本的文化互动，一边企图用“新故宫计划”搞“去中国化”，引发两岸舆论极度愤怒。⁵⁷ 民进党当局还不同程度美化日本殖民统治，正面评价日本新安保法案，在钓鱼岛问题和冲之鸟礁问题上试图对日妥协，在日本否认侵略战争与慰安妇等重大问题上态度暧昧，从不公开反对与批驳。

“亲日”是赖清德身上最大的“标签”，几乎可以肯定其对台日争议议题只会更加无底线，会出卖台湾人民的利益。2024年5月8日，赖清德出席了台农水部门筹办的八田与一逝世82周年追思会。八田是日本侵占台湾时期在台南兴修水利的日本工程师，赖清德不仅大谈特谈所谓的“台日友谊”，八田与一是“台湾之父”，喊出了“台湾有事就是日本有事，日本有事也是台湾有事”，⁵⁸ 将台湾问题与日本

55 “台日渔业委员会不谈作业规则渔民要求政府硬起来护渔”，人间福报，<https://www.merit-times.com.tw/NewsPage.aspx?unid=835663>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

56 “福岛核废水排海 台行政院称对台海辐射影响可忽略”，联合早报网，<https://www.zaobao.com/realtime/china/story20230824-1426669>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

57 “影 / 设慰安妇像伤害台日友好！日本民间团体递质问状抗议”，ETtoday 新闻云，<https://www.ettoday.net/news/20180910/1255205.htm>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

58 “赖清德连续第13年赴乌山头水库 出席八田与一追思会”，中时新闻网，www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20240508004019-260407?chdtv，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

安全进行串联，推动日本强化对台安全政治关系。

围绕着坐实“台湾有事就是日本有事”，赖清德当局的做法包括：一是通过窜访加强政治互动。日本国会议员窜访台湾的人数、批次长期居首。2024年5月，日本派出了近40人的“史上规模最大”代表团参加赖清德的“就职”活动。二是鼓动日本政客发表干涉台海言论。近年来，日本官员不断发表涉台错误言论，为其干涉台海局势寻找借口。2021年12月，已故前首相安倍晋三在提出了“台湾有事等同于日本有事和日美同盟有事”。⁵⁹2023年8月，日本执政党自民党副总裁、前首相麻生太郎在台湾举办的“印太安全论坛”上妄称，日美和台湾“随时准备在必要时使用威慑力量”、“台湾要有打仗的心理准备”。⁶⁰三是推动日本掏空一个中国原则。2017年，日本对台窗口“日本公益财团法人交流协会”更名为“日本台湾交流协会”，台“亚东关系协会”更名为“台湾日本关系协会”，“更名”有着加强这一机构政治功能的意味。日方还不时在政府公开出版物及官方网站上将“台湾”与“中国”并列，支持台参加世卫大会等国际组织，谋划出台日本版“与台湾关系法”等。台日所谓的政党“2+2”论坛，以“政党交流”掩盖政治互动。总之，赖清德当局将通过各种手段坐实“台湾有事就是日本有事”，推动日本加大干涉台海形势的力度，强化台日勾连态势，进一步推动“台独国际化”。

面对两岸局势变化、“台独”势力的分裂行径以及美国推动港台联动，中国政府坚持“反独促统”、反对外部势力干预港澳事务，以新时代中央解决台湾问题的总体方略处理两岸变局、以维护国家主权、安全、发展利益作为最高原则维护“一国两制”在香港的实践。新形势下，面对中美战略博弈以及两岸关系的新局面，港澳问题特别是港澳问题中的外部因素和中央对港澳的治理对台湾问题仍将产生重要影响。

59 “台日执政党2+2会谈24日再登场聚焦经贸合作”，台湾“中央社”，<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202112200187.aspx>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

60 “鼓动台湾‘要准备打仗’，岛内舆论痛批日本过气政客”，凤凰网，<https://news.ifeng.com/c/8S7AgTeJ9hD>，最后访问时间：2024年8月21日。

第五章

政策建议

第五章

政策建议

（一）全面辩证地看待台湾问题的外部因素

既要看到台湾问题外部因素所引发的多重严峻挑战，又要看到外部环境中依然存在、甚至在不断增长的有利于我解决台湾问题的条件与优势。如果看不到存在的问题，会引发盲目乐观与政策片面，陷入自我麻醉的境地。同样，假如看不到于我有利的条件与优势，也会陷入焦虑、惶恐甚至不安的境地。

首先，台湾问题外部环境的复杂性、严峻性、不稳定性在上升，需要时刻保持警惕。需强化底线思维、极限思维，提高应对能力，把握战略主动，充分调动各方友我力量，积极塑造于我有利的外部环境与战略态势。

其次，要增加战略自信，只有这样才能增强战略耐心，而不拘泥于一时一域的得失。随着中国大陆综合实力的持续发展，不仅是受到外部环境影响的客体，而且是成为塑造国际战略环境的重要力量。中美战略互动在一定程度上已成为当前全球战略环境最大的塑造力量，这也意味着中方通过自身努力可以在一定程度上对于外部环境产生主动的塑造。

第三，要营造一个更加开放、更加市场化、更加法治化的环境。做好自己的事情最重要，那就是继续全面深化改革开放和法治建设，把科技搞上去，把法治搞上

去，把经济国际化搞上去，这应该是中国在复杂与严峻国际环境下的不二选择。第四，继续巩固与扩大“朋友圈”。继续保持战略清醒和“少树敌，多结伴”的基本方针不动摇。百年大变局的题中之意，就是新旧国际矛盾交织共振，甚至连带爆发，但矛盾一定是“有生有灭”，在矛盾的转化中有“危”、有“机”。要最大限度地斗争矛头精准地集中于极少数具体对象，而不能粗略地放大为所有国家行为体。即便事关国家行为体，也要区分此时与彼时，此领域和彼领域。在管控而非扩大彼此分歧的同时，把握好任何团结合作的机会。

（二）不让台湾问题成为中美关系稳定的主要障碍

首先，积极发挥中美元首会晤与沟通的重要作用。习近平总书记于2023年春节团拜会讲话指出：“我们坚定开展反分裂、反干涉重大斗争，牢牢把握两岸关系主动权”。从中美元首多次会晤可见，拜登政府对于台湾问题在中美关系中的敏感性与重要性的认知在有所上升，这从拜登多次表态的“四不一无意”“五不四无意”，特别是在台湾问题上的“新三不”：不支持“台湾独立”、不支持“两个中国”或“一中一台”，“不寻求利用台湾问题作为工具遏制中国”，可见。固然其存在“言”与“行”的不一致，但应该看到其积极性的一面。特别是美方对于“新三不”表述拉到了前所未有高度。张荣恭认为是50多年来首次美国元首在峰会上对中国元首承诺，这是对标榜“台独”民进党的警讯，也是国民党两岸和平路线的机遇。

其次，积极主动地运筹中美关系。中美关系的发展和稳定与否，固然首先取决于美国政府对华政策，取决于美方是否能正确、理性地看待中国的发展，因为美国毕竟比中国强大。其次，也不应把中美关系的未来完全交给美方，中国也有一定程度发言权。在稳定中美关系中充分发挥中方对美外交工作的主动性，既不能放任美

国少数政客破坏中美关系，又要强化中方塑造中美关系的能力，不能把中美关系未来完全交给美方去塑造。应积极运筹于中国和美国都有利的“和平、协调、稳定”的中美关系。鉴于美国对华战略竞争和遏制政策的长期性，中美战略对抗应非短期态势。因此，中国的战略应对也需着眼长远，从战略层面进行部署，进而在战术上分层施策，重在落实。对美既要敢于斗争，也要善于斗争，以斗争促进合作，需要处理好“提升实力”与“讲好道理”之间关系。拜登承诺“四不一无意”与布林肯多次演讲强调拜登政府对华政策是如何服务于美国利益，意在争取民意，进行社会动员，但也释放出改善中美关系部分积极信号，强调竞争并不必然导致冲突，美国不谋求冲突、努力避免冲突的意愿，主动弱化中美关系中政治对抗色彩，强调“不寻求阻止中国作为大国发挥作用，也不寻求阻止中国发展经济或促进本国人民的利益”、承认中美关系是世界上最复杂和最重要的关系之一。第三，中美管控台海可能的危机符合“和平统一”政策。台湾问题不是美国的核心利益，只是美国“以台制华”的一张“牌”。拜登政府主流意见应是不愿中美因台湾问题发生军事冲突，在台海应不是要“引战”，而是要“避战”。当然需要警惕的是，其主观上可能是想要“避战”，但因为中美陷入“安全困境”，从而实际上可能产生“引战”的结果。拜登政府在台海政策中强化“军事威慑”、甚至是强化“一体化综合威慑”，升级对台售武，提供各种“军援”与“军训”，甚至“全面武装台湾”，实质是要强化台湾的抵抗能力与信心。美国不断派出政治人物窜台，是要表达对台湾当局的支持，以稳定及强化台湾社会内部抗拒大陆统一的心态及信心。对此我坚决反对。需要讲清楚美西方的“希望台海和平稳定”说辞，其实是介入台海事务、干涉中国内政的代名词，实际效果可能适得其反。包括欧洲国家在内的表面上反复声称与强调“台海和平稳定很重要”的时候，实际的作为与所产生的作用，恰恰是让台海地区更加地不稳定。要让台海地区和平稳定持续，各国需真正坚持一个中国政策，因为台湾问题是中国的内政，类似佩洛西之流的窜台、挑衅中国大陆，所造成的结果

是让台海地区更加不稳定，台海地区陷入“安全困境”，有导致“台湾问题乌克兰化”的可能。

第四，敦促美方警惕赖清德当局的“台独”危害性。美国对民进党特别是赖清德的“台独”立场应该是有所警惕的。这从2023年8月赖清德“过境”美国时美方所给予的接待规格比较低调可见；美方要求赖清德上台后“政策没有意外”，加强与美方沟通。但在赖清德执政出现“双少数”（立法机构席次少数与地方执政少数）后，美方对赖清德能否搞成“台独”出现怀疑立场。这样的态度极其危险，需警惕赖清德当局可能借“行政主导”的“窍门”推进“台独”实践，特别是从社会、文化、意识等方面展开的“软台独”政策实践与行为。

（三）正确处理好中美关系中的三对关系

首先，正确处理“管控风险”与“把握机遇”之间关系。既时刻要有危机意识、忧患意识、风险意识，但也要有机遇意识，把握可能出现的难得的机遇，必要时进行两者之间适当切换。在中美关系较大的风险与挑战中，善于发现与运用可能是很小的、短暂的机遇，把握任何可能的机会之窗。一般认为，拜登政府可能是对华相对温和的一届美国政府，2024年美国大选前，中美关系存在一个短暂“窗口期”，已经重启的中美经贸、气候与外交等对话机制，构建相对可控的中美战略竞争与互动框架。应思考中美关系如果不能更好，也要防止其变得更坏，防止出现恶性循环。

其次，正确处理“示强”与“示弱”之间辩证关系。该斗争时斗争，该妥协时妥协，要善斗、巧斗。认清正在走向霸权衰落的美国仍是世界上唯一超级大国的事实，理性、客观、科学地处理中美关系。尽可能减少跟美国的直接冲突，保持较长时间“竞争式共存关系”，尽可能不让中美摊牌或至少是要推迟中美最终摊牌时间。

当然要认清美国对华政策本质在于对抗、遏制、威慑与打压，以“革命的两手政策”对付美国对华名为“竞争”、实为对抗与遏制本质的两手。要看到美国对华政策在战略目标与战略实力之间存在的矛盾。“印太战略”和“北约东扩”这两大战略间事实上是相互牵制的，要看到美国之所以“拉帮结派”，其实也是其自身战略实力不足，且俄乌冲突的结束似乎是遥遥无期。

第三，正确处理台湾问题上“捍卫主权”与“维护稳定”之间关系。既坚定捍卫国家核心利益，在原则性问题上，根本没有讨价还价的空间，坚决斗争，决不妥协。但维护台海地区和平稳定既是我战略需要，也符合各方利益。特别高度警惕与防止周边的台海、东海、南海的“三海”联动，稳定台海，稳住东海，稳住南海。

（四）坚持以发展自身、提升实力为根本

台湾问题最终的解决还是要靠中国大陆自己的实力。在于把自己的事情办好，做大、做强、做好自身各方面的工作，让自身更有实力与吸引力。首先，坚持以经济建设为中心。坚持把经济发展和科技进步作为各项工作的中心，始终坚持“发展为先”的理念与发展路线不动摇。继续改革开放、勇于创新。改革就是要在新形势下继续按照以经济建设为中心、坚持以走出中等国家陷阱、实现人均 GDP 达到 3 万美元以上为中期目标，围绕这个中心和目标发奋努力。

其次，坚持推进改革与开放事业向纵深发展。坚定不移地推进真正的对外开放，秉持“人类命运共同体”理念，积极营造相对有利外部国际环境。需克服两种“盲目性情绪”：一是对两岸关系的外部环境极度悲观与失望情绪，片面地认为现在是“四面受敌”“四面楚歌”。二是对中国自身发展情况与前景盲目乐观情绪，片面认为如今世界只有“中国这边的风景独好”，从而“唯我独尊”。这两种片面与盲

目情绪都会导致类似扭曲的看法，就是不再需要争取和平的外部环境了。新时代的开放是“以我为主、面向全球”的开放，坚持对内改革的政治路线不动摇，坚持融入世界的坚定方向不动摇，既促进经济发展，更促进自身改革。目前最为急迫的就是实实在在推动国内统一大市场建设、实实在在改善营商环境、实实在在为民营企业、外资企业做好政策和具体服务。

第三，坚持推进中国经济与全球经济的深度融合。全力防止与避免全球经济出现“二元化”。推动建立联通全球的贸易体系，形成开放的、互利的、包容的、共享的“全球贸易共同体”。

第四，坚持以科技经济为核心，强化科技引领经济发展之路。需思考中美关系和未来世界形势下中国经济问题，谋划好在比较困难情况下怎么能够让中国经济“抗打”、“经打”与“耐打”？怎么能够在不断的冲击中依然站立、向前走？怎么使得中国经济社会发展之路真正地越走越实、越稳、越好？坚持发展是基础、安全是底线的思维，平衡发展与安全的动态关系，使之相得益彰，实现高质量发展与高水平安全的有机统一。

关于上海国际问题研究院

上海国际问题研究院成立于1960年，是隶属于上海市人民政府的高级研究机构和知名智库。我院的主要任务是：以服务党和政府决策为宗旨，以政策咨询为方向，通过对当代国际政治、经济、外交、安全的全方位研究，为党和政府决策提供有力的智力支持；通过与国内外研究机构和专家学者的合作交流，增强我国的国际影响力和国际话语权，提升国家的软实力。多年来，我院一直被国内外权威机构评为中国最重要的国际问题和中国外交智库之一。

上海国际问题研究院下设六个研究所和八个研究中心，分别是：全球治理研究所、外交政策研究所、世界经济研究所、国际战略与安全研究所、比较政治和公共政策研究所、台港澳研究所；美洲研究中心、东北亚研究中心、东南亚研究中心、南亚研究中心、俄罗斯中亚研究中心、西亚非洲研究中心、欧洲研究中心、海洋与极地研究中心，为进一步加强对外影响力，我院专门成立了国际传播中心。此外，我院还是上海国际战略研究会和上海国际关系学会的机构会员。

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New Changes in Influencing Factors of Taiwan Question – From the Perspective of Two Elections

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
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
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Abstract

In 2024, it is a global “election year”. Undoubtedly, the most eye-catching ones are the Taiwan regional leadership election that ended in January and the U.S. general election to be held in November. Against the background of an increasingly turbulent world situation, weak economic growth, and increased challenges in global governance, this year's elections will have a profound impact on the global pattern in the coming years. Therefore, this report starts from the perspective of the Taiwan elections and the U.S. general election, focuses on the Taiwan Question, and analyzes the new changes in the influencing factors of the Taiwan Question under these two elections.

The report first analyzes the influence of U.S. factor on the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations. On the U.S. side, the top priority of the Biden administration's Taiwan Strait policy is to “maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and prevent China-U.S. relations from “derailing”. At the same time, it uses the Taiwan election to strengthen the political narrative of “democracy against autocracy” and tries to seek “permanent division” between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait by supporting the Taiwan authorities' “gradual Taiwan independence” policy. The report believes that the Biden administration will continue to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation, which can not only strengthen military deterrence against China but also avoid pressure and criticism from the Republican Party; the Biden administration “balances” the impact of the Taiwan region election on cross-strait relations. This is not only to prevent the escalation of cross-strait tensions from affecting the Democratic Party's election prospects, but also to take the opportunity to strengthen U.S. interests in the Taiwan Strait. Trump's remarks on Taiwan have greatly discounted the “credibility” of U.S. policy on the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, in the Republican Party's policy debate on China, some people continue to raise the so-called “risk of reunification through force” and look for a basis for promoting U.S.-Taiwan military collusion, which paves the way for the possible next Republican government to implement a more militarized Taiwan Strait policy.

The second part analyzes the assessment of the election results in the Taiwan region by other major external forces and the direction of their policies towards Taiwan. On the Japanese side, in recent years, with the evolution of the international situation and the political situation in Taiwan, Japan's policy towards Taiwan has undergone major changes. Japan is more actively promoting the development of Japan-Taiwan relations in an all-round way. On the one hand, Japan's policy towards Taiwan still does

not cross the red line. On the other hand, Japan closely links Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait region with Japan's fundamental interests. In the security field, it constantly emphasizes that “a contingency in Taiwan is a contingency for Japan” and continuously strengthens exchanges and connections in the economic and social fields between the two sides. On the South Korean side, after the results of the Taiwan’s “two-in-one” election were released, South Korea cautiously stated its position. After President Yoon Suk-yeol took office, although South Korea's policy towards Taiwan still emphasizes that its one-China position has not changed, it is gradually tilting towards the United States and Japan. On the European side, major European countries are relatively cautious in their statements on the Taiwan election, but some governments of Central and Eastern European countries and “pro-Taiwan” parliamentarians have made extremely provocative remarks. Based on reasons such as values, economic and trade interests, and U.S. factors, it is expected that European countries (the European Union) will continue to increase their attention to the Taiwan Question, and the policies of European (EU) countries towards Taiwan will maintain the trend and inertia of “deepening” and “strengthening”.

The third part focuses on exploring the impact of Hong Kong and Macao factors on cross-strait relations under the new situation. The report believes that the Taiwan region's Democratic Progressive Party authorities smear “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems” with Hong Kong and Macao issues, create an atmosphere of “fear of communism” on the island, cater to the narrative framework of “democracy against autocracy” in the international community, and create an excuse for it to promote the “Taiwan independence” agenda; secondly, the “Taiwan independence” and “Hong Kong independence” forces converge in the international community, worsening the external environment for the practice of “one country, two systems” and the normal development of cross-strait relations; again, the United States smears the practice of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong. The U.S. authorities link their policies towards Taiwan and Hong Kong under the structure of their China strategy; in addition, based on the deterioration of China-U.S. relations and the need for geopolitical games, the United States will continue to adopt a Hong Kong policy of “containing China through Hong Kong”; finally, the Taiwan region's Democratic Progressive Party authorities distort Hong Kong and Macao's legislative actions to safeguard national security and promote the policy of “de-Sinicization” with the help of Hong Kong and Macao.

The fourth part mainly analyzes the Taiwan authorities' policy of promoting “Taiwan independence” internationalization. This policy includes: Retaining the so-called “diplomatic allies”, continuing to seek participation in international organizations, and targeted measures with the United States, Europe, and Japan as the focus. In the direction of the United States, gaining the trust of the United States and making the United States no longer “doubt Lai” is the first demand of the Taiwan authorities' policy towards the United States; in the direction of Europe, promoting the European Parliament to strengthen its “pro-Taiwan” stance, promoting Central and Eastern European regions to change their policies towards Taiwan, and promoting the European Union to start negotiations on economic and trade agreements with Taiwan are the priorities of the Taiwan authorities; in the direction of Japan, the Taiwan authorities will continue to promote the narrative of “a contingency in Taiwan is a contingency for Japan”, strengthen political interaction through mutual visits, encourage Japanese politicians to make remarks interfering in the Taiwan Strait, and promote Japan to hollow out the one-China principle.

The last part of the report puts forward policy suggestions to deal with the above new changes. First, the

Chinese mainland should not only see the multiple severe challenges in the external environment of the Taiwan Question, but also see the conditions and advantages that still exist and are even growing in the external environment that are conducive to our solution of the Taiwan Question. Second, strengthen management and control to try not to let the Taiwan Question become a major obstacle to the stability of China-U.S. relations. Third, attach importance to correctly handling the three pairs of relations in China-U.S. relations. Fourth, continue to take adhering to one's own development and enhancing strength as the fundamental strategy.

Preface

Currently turmoil and changes are intertwined in the world. The great changes unseen in a century are showing an accelerated evolution trend in an all-round, multi-dimensional, and deep-seated manner. Cross-strait relations are being severely impacted by these new changes in the external environment and influencing factors.

The U.S. strategy of suppressing China and the U.S. general election are the biggest external factors. The U.S. strategy of containment against China and the influence of U.S. elections will affect the future trajectory of cross-strait relations, leading to obvious characteristics of "internationalization", "militarization" and "alliance" of the Taiwan Question. The results of the 2024 U.S. general election "relate to the fate of American liberal democracy itself and determine the direction of the international order."¹ If Trump is elected, "the biggest aftershock may be reflected in the diplomatic field" and "enter a chaotic 'post-American era'",² directly affecting U.S. policy on the Taiwan Strait.

As for the external international environment of cross-strait relations, multiple variables affecting the international situation are superimposed and mutating rapidly. The prevention and control of a series of "gray rhinos" and "black swans" have become extremely difficult. The concept of national security is being generalized, protectionism and unilateralism are on the rise, populism is on the rise, and economic de-globalization, regionalization and fragmentation of industrial and supply chains are becoming more obvious. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has made the relationship between the United States, the West and Russia even more tense, further deteriorating the global security environment. The global economic recovery is difficult, inflation is intensifying, and the supply and prices of food, energy and bulk commodities are being impacted. The fragmentation and alignment of the global economy are becoming more obvious. The Israel-Palestine conflict has further intensified the color of geopolitical confrontation.

The report believes that the Hong Kong and Macau issues, especially the external factors within these

1 "The U.S. general election will determine the future of the international order." Sohu.com. https://www.sohu.com/a/756844126_114911, last access time: August 21, 2024

2 Max Boot; "If Trump wins the election, he will destroy the world order dominated by the United States." Website of The Washington Post on January 31. Reprinted from References. Issue 33, 2024, page 13.

issues and the central government's governance over Hong Kong and Macau, will still have an important impact on the Taiwan Question.

As for the influencing factors within Taiwan in cross-strait relations, after the Democratic Progressive Party starts its third four-year term in office, Lai Ching-te refuses to recognize the one-China principle and endorse the "1992 Consensus". His "inaugural speech" not only did not give up promoting "de-Sinicization" on the island and promoting the "internationalization of 'Taiwan independence'" in the international community. Moreover, he continues to position cross-strait political relations as "one country on each side of Taiwan and China", strengthen the claim of "mutual non-subordination", and depict cross-strait relations as "relations between two countries"; Lai proposed to further strengthen and practice the "four pillars" of "comprehensively strengthening deterrence", "enhancing economic security", "initiating democratic partnership cooperation", and "maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait"; through "cognitive warfare", strengthen cross-strait confrontation and opposition, oppose "peaceful reunification", and continuously reject and oppose "one country, two systems". Since Lai Ching-te only received the support of more than 40% of the votes in the election, it cannot be ruled out that to consolidate domestic support, strengthen the "legitimacy" of his administration and seek re-election, he will adopt an aggressive and extremely provocative "extreme Taiwan independence" policy line that seriously challenges the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. In other words, Lai Ching-te is more dangerous than Chen Shui-bian's "instrumental Taiwan independence" and Tsai Ing-wen's "gradual Taiwan independence".

Under the impact of internal and external factors, the development of cross-strait relations is severely tested. Fortunately, the strength and ability of the Chinese government to dominate cross-strait relations are constantly increasing. The determination and will to continuously promote peaceful stability in cross-strait relations and the policy of national peaceful reunification are unwavering. It holds the strategic initiative in the development of cross-strait relations, and the one-China framework in the international community is constantly being consolidated. In the next four years, cross-strait relations should be able to move forward in the face of various risks and challenges, and national reunification will always be on the right path.

CHAPTER I

**The influence of U.S. factor on
the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait
relations**

Chapter I

The influence of U.S. factor on the Taiwan Strait and cross-strait relations

The "China" issue and even the entire U.S. foreign policy are not the main issues in this U.S. presidential election. Therefore, this election has no clearly visible direct impact on U.S. policy towards the Taiwan Strait, but the potential impact is important, mainly manifested in the following aspects: First, the Biden administration continues to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation, which not only strengthens military deterrence against China but also avoids pressure and criticism from the Republican Party; second, carefully handle the impact of Taiwan elections on cross-strait relations to prevent the escalation of cross-strait tensions from affecting the Democratic Party's election prospects; third, Trump's remarks on Taiwan have greatly discounted the "credibility" of U.S. policy on the Taiwan Strait; fourth, in the Republican Party's policy debate on China, some people continuously raise the so-called "risk of reunification through force" and look for a basis for promoting U.S.-Taiwan military collusion, which paves the way for the possible next Republican government to implement a more militarized Taiwan Strait policy.

(1) Assessment of Taiwan election results by the U.s. and the direction of its policy towards Taiwan

U.S. scholars on Taiwan-related issues predicted before the election that Lai Ching-te would be elected with about 42% of the vote, and the Democratic Progressive Party would not hold a majority in the Taiwan region's legislature. The seats held by the Kuomintang may be a majority. The biggest variable affecting the election results is the voting situation of Ko Wen-je's supporters. Judging from the results, this prediction is basically accurate. The U.S. assessment of the election results in the

Taiwan region mainly includes the following contents: First, there are no surprises in the election results, and the situation after the election is generally stable. Second, Lai Ching-te is a weak leader and is unlikely to promote the "national normalization" process on the island. Third, the game among the Kuomintang, the Democratic Progressive Party and the Taiwan People's Party in the Taiwan region's legislature is worthy of attention.

After the election, on January 13, U.S. Eastern Time, when President Biden left the White House for vacation in Camp David, he was asked by reporters about the election results in the Taiwan region. He said, "We do not support Taiwan independence." The website of the U.S. State Department issued a written statement by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, "congratulating Lai Ching-te on winning the election", "also congratulating the people of Taiwan for once again demonstrating the strength of its sound democratic system and electoral process", "The United States is committed to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait", "The United States looks forward to working with Lai Ching-te and leaders of all political parties in Taiwan to promote unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations." On January 14, an unofficial U.S. delegation composed of Stephen Hadley, a former national security adviser of the Republican Party, and James Steinberg, a former deputy secretary of state of the Democratic Party, arrived in Taiwan to convey the message of the U.S. government to the Taiwan authorities and Lai Ching-te in a "conventional" way. From January 26 to 27, Jake Sullivan, the U.S. national security adviser, met with Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs, in Thailand. Sullivan emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.¹

The above arrangements convey two major considerations of the Biden administration on the election results in the Taiwan region and their impact. First, "maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" is the top priority of the Biden administration's Taiwan Strait policy. On the one hand, the Biden administration continuously requires Lai Ching-te and his team to continue Tsai Ing-wen's policy and "maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait" to prevent China-U.S. relations from "derailing" due to the Taiwan Question; on the one hand, President Biden himself comes forward to reassure the mainland again that "the United States does not support Taiwan independence" to prevent the so-called "overreaction" from the Chinese side, so that the Taiwan Question becomes a hot topic in the U.S. election year, and the Democratic Party is criticized by the Republican Party as a result.

Second, use the election in the Taiwan region to strengthen the political narrative of "democracy against autocracy". On May 19, on the website of the State Department, Blinken's congratulatory message on Lai Ching-te's "inauguration" was released. The opening sentence is to congratulate Lai Ching-te on becoming the "fifth democratically elected president" of Taiwan.² The Taiwan Question

1 "Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's Meeting with Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi", The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/27/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-meeting-with-chinese-communist-party-politburo-member-director-of-the-office-of-the-foreign-affairs-commission-and-foreign-minister-wang-2/>, last access time: August 21, 2024

2 "Taiwan's Presidential Inauguration", Taiwan's Presidential Inauguration - United States Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/taiwans-presidential-inauguration/>, last access time: August 21, 2024

concerns China's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and is not an ideological issue at all. However, in the case of implementing the major country competition strategy against China, the U.S. government deliberately confuses the nature of the Taiwan Question and continuously uses the narrative of "democracy against autocracy" to seek "legitimacy" for the Taiwan authorities.

(2) The Biden administration continues to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation

On February 21, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced that the U.S. State Department approved the sale of an advanced tactical data system upgrade plan and related equipment to Taiwan, with an estimated value of 75 million U.S. dollars. It is expected that 200 U.S. government personnel and contractor representatives will go to Taiwan to provide technical assistance and services. This is the 13th arms sale to Taiwan during Biden's tenure and the first arms sale by the U.S. government to Taiwan after the Taiwan elections. In June, the Biden administration announced two more arms sales to Taiwan. One is the sale of weapons worth about 360.2 million U.S. dollars to Taiwan, including 720 Switchblade 300 Anti-Personnel and Anti-Armor Loitering Missile Systems. The second is 291 Altius 600M-V attack drone systems to help Taiwan improve its defense capabilities to "deal with current and future threats."

On April 20, U.S. Eastern Time, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "2024 Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act" (H.R.8036) with 385 votes in favor, 34 votes against, and 1 abstention, providing 8.1 billion U.S. dollars in assistance to "Indo-Pacific partners." On the 23rd, the bill was signed into law by President Biden. This bill was passed together with the "21st Century Peace through Strength Act" (H.R. 8038), the "Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act" (H.R.8035), and the "Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act" (H.R. 8034), showing the strategic centrality of the Taiwan Question in U.S. global defense. The bill totals 8.1 billion U.S. dollars. The main purpose is to respond to China's actions in the "Indo-Pacific" region. Of this, 3.3 billion U.S. dollars is used to develop U.S. submarine infrastructure, 2 billion U.S. dollars is "foreign military financing" (FMF) provided to Taiwan and other major U.S. allies, and 1.9 billion U.S. dollars is used to supplement the military services, military education and training provided by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to Taiwan, as well as defense items and services provided by the U.S. Department of Defense to regional partners.³

Since taking office, President Biden has publicly stated four times that he will "defend Taiwan," which is supported by a group of people within the Republican Party who believe that the U.S. should change its "strategic ambiguity" to "strategic clarity" in its Taiwan Strait policy. However, his overall China policy still receives criticism from the Republican Party. Matt Pottinger, former deputy national security adviser in the Trump administration, said that the Biden administration's China policy was initially correct, but it was wrong since the "balloon incident" in 2023. "Sending cabinet-level officials to visit China one after another can only be interpreted by the Chinese side as showing

³ Shao Yuqun: "The 'Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act' harbors the malicious intentions of the US' Taiwan strategy." *World Affairs*, Issue 10, 2024.

weakness." Moreover, it should not "manage competition" but "win competition."⁴ In the situation where being tough on China has become the consensus of both parties and between the government and Congress in Washington, during the election period, what the Biden administration attaches the most importance to is showing that its military deterrence against China in its Taiwan Strait policy is powerful and effective, so as to resist criticism and challenges from the Republican Party.

(3) The Biden administration “balances” in responding to the impact of Taiwan elections on cross-strait relations

Before the Taiwan elections, senior officials of the National Security Council of the Biden administration explained the U.S. policy on the Taiwan Strait to the media. After the elections, the "balanced" response to the results highlights its consideration of preventing the escalation of cross-strait tensions from affecting the election prospects of the Democratic Party.

On January 11, senior officials of the National Security Council (NSC) of the United States briefed the media on the Taiwan elections and fully expounded on the Biden administration's policy on the Taiwan Strait in it, including "The United States opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, does not support 'Taiwan independence', supports cross-strait dialogue, and expects cross-strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait. The United States does not take a position on the ultimate resolution of cross-strait differences, provided they are resolved peacefully."⁵

On January 13, U.S. Eastern Time, when President Biden was leaving Camp David and responding to a reporter's question about the Taiwan elections, he said, "We do not support (Taiwan) independence."⁶ The U.S. government's policy on the Taiwan Strait consists of many elements. In his response after the Taiwan elections, President Biden emphasized the content of "not supporting 'Taiwan independence'," which shows his concern about the "Taiwan independence" stance of the elected leader of Taiwan. Lai Ching-te went to the United States for an "exam" before the election and made a promise of "following Tsai Ing-wen's path." But apparently, he failed to dispel the doubts of the U.S. government and the strategic policy community. After the Taiwan elections, President Biden quickly sent a clear signal of "not supporting 'Taiwan independence'," and his purpose of preventing Lai Ching-te from provoking cross-strait relations and harming U.S. interests is very clear.

On January 13, the website of the U.S. State Department issued a statement in the name of the "secretary of state" congratulating Lai Ching-te on winning the election and at the same time

4 "Taiwan defense strategic ambiguity needs clarifying: U.S. analyst", Nikkei Asia, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Taiwan-defense-strategic-ambiguity-needs-clarifying-U.S.-analyst>, Last access time: August 21, 2024

5 "Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official on Taiwan Elections", The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/01/11/background-press-call-by-a-senior-administration-official-on-taiwan-elections/>, last access time: August 21, 2024

6 "Biden: 'We do not support independence' for Taiwan", Politico, <https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/13/biden-taiwan-independence-lai-00135445>, last access time: August 21, 2024

reiterating the U.S. government's policy on the Taiwan Strait. Different from the statement issued by the U.S. government four years ago after Tsai Ing-wen was re-elected, this statement specifically emphasized that "the United States is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait."⁷

On January 14, a delegation led by Stephen Hadley, a former national security adviser of the Republican Party, and James Steinberg, a deputy secretary of state of the Democratic Party, sent by the Biden administration arrived in Taiwan to convey the policy signal of the U.S. government to the elected leader of Taiwan region. This is the "traditional" practice of the U.S. side to control the future policy of the Taiwan side.

On January 27, Sullivan, the national security adviser of the United States, and Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, met in Bangkok, Thailand. In the introduction of the meeting situation, the U.S. side said that "Sullivan emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait."⁸ This shows that after the Taiwan elections, what the Biden administration is most concerned about is the "peace and stability" in the Taiwan Strait, and what it is most worried about is the intensification of cross-strait tensions, which may evolve into an impact on the election prospects of the Democratic Party in the U.S. presidential election.

In addition to the above concerns, the Biden administration also attempts to take advantage of the adjustment of the leader of Taiwan region to further strengthen and consolidate U.S. interests in the Taiwan Strait. First, continue to highlight the role of Taiwan in the discourse framework of "democracy against autocracy." On May 19, the website of the U.S. State Department issued a statement in the name of "Secretary of State Blinken," congratulating Lai Ching-te on taking office as the "fifth democratically elected president of Taiwan" and trying to highlight the "resilience of Taiwan's democratic system."⁹ Second, stigmatize China's military actions to counter "Taiwan independence" forces and external interfering forces, and accuse China of undermining peace in the Taiwan Strait. On May 20, Lai Ching-te delivered his "inaugural speech." The speech was full of strong provocation and hostility towards the Chinese mainland. From May 23 to 24, the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army carried out the "Joint Sharp Sword - 2024A" joint exercise around the northern, southern, eastern parts of Taiwan Island and around Jinmen Island, Mazu Island, Wuqiu Island and Dongyin Island to punish the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces' acts

7 "Statement by secretary of state michael r. pompeo on taiwan's election", American Institute in Taiwan, <https://www.ait.org.tw/statement-by-secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-on-taiwans-election/>, last access time: August 21, 2024

8 "Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's Meeting with Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi", The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/27/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-meeting-with-chinese-communist-party-politburo-member-director-of-the-office-of-the-foreign-affairs-commission-and-foreign-minister-wang-2/>, last access time: August 21, 2024

9 "Taiwan's Presidential Inauguration", United States Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/taiwans-presidential-inauguration/>, last access time: August 21, 2024

of seeking "independence" and warn external forces against interference and provocation.¹⁰ Matthew Miller, spokesperson for the U.S. State Department, issued a statement saying that the United States is seriously concerned about the military exercises of the Chinese People's Liberation Army around Taiwan Island and accused China of using Taiwan's elections to carry out military provocations, eroding the norms that have maintained peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades.¹¹

(4) Trump's remarks on Taiwan have greatly discounted the "credibility" of U.S. policy on the Taiwan Strait

During the election campaign, when Trump was asked the question "Will the United States send troops to protect Taiwan?", his answer changed as follows: In September 2023, at this time Trump had not yet become the official presidential candidate of the Republican Party, but the media highly focused on his stance on the Taiwan Question. In an interview program, a reporter from NBC repeatedly asked Trump (Donald Trump) whether he would send troops to protect Taiwan. Trump's answer was "I won't say, I won't say."¹² In July 2024, Trump had already become the Republican presidential candidate. In an interview with Bloomberg BusinessWeek, he said, "Taiwan has almost taken all of America's chip business."; "Taiwan should pay the United States for protection."; "Taiwan is 9,500 miles away from the United States and only 68 miles away from China."¹³

Trump's answer is in sharp contrast to President Biden's repeated statements that he will "defend Taiwan." Some American media directly interpreted Trump's statement that "Taiwan should pay the United States for protection" as "hinting that the United States will not send troops." This has greatly discounted the "credibility" of U.S. policy on the Taiwan Strait. First, if Trump's reluctance to state whether "the United States will send troops" in 2023 can be understood as maintaining "strategic ambiguity", then his statement in July 2024 shows wavering and uncertainty in his stance. Second, it provides the latest argument for the "suspicion of the United States" theory on Taiwan Island, especially showing that the "abandoning Taiwan" theory and the "hollowing out" theory are indeed valid.¹⁴ Third, Trump's approach of collecting "protection fees" from Taiwan is the same as his approach of extorting allies such as Japan and South Korea. This approach makes even Japan and South Korea, which have bilateral agreements with the United States, very nervous, let alone the Taiwan authorities?

10 "The Eastern Theater Command conducts the 'Joint Sword - 2024A' exercise around Taiwan Island." Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/bmst/202405/t20240523_12622178.htm, last access time: August 21, 2024

11 "PRC Military Drills near Taiwan", United States Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/prc-military-drills-near-taiwan/>, last access time: August 21, 2024

12 "Meet the Press - September 17, 2023", NBC News, <https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-september-17-2023-n1307173>, last access time: August 21, 2024

13 "The Donald Trump Interview Transcript", Bloomberg Businessweek, <https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-trump-interview-transcript/>, last access time: August 21, 2024

14 Wang Shushen: "The 'doubt about the United States' in Taiwan society shows a new trend." [huanqiu.com. https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/4GP4Cgikvha?imageView2/2/w/228](https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/4GP4Cgikvha?imageView2/2/w/228), last access time: August 21, 2024

(5) Some Republicans attempt to implement a more militarized policy on the Taiwan Strait

In the Republican Party's policy debate on China, some people continuously raise the so-called "risk of reunification through force" and look for a basis for promoting U.S.-Taiwan military collusion, which paves the way for the possible next Republican government to implement a more militarized Taiwan Strait policy. During the presidential election, there was a fierce policy debate on China within the Republican Party, and a very important part of it was the debate on U.S. policy on the Taiwan Strait. Some people, such as Matt Pottinger, former deputy national security adviser in the Trump administration, continuously raise the so-called risk of China's "reunification through force"¹⁵ and look for a basis for promoting U.S.-Taiwan military collusion. Although such views are not the same as those of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) faction within the Republican Party, and if Trump wins the election, Pottinger himself may not be able to re-enter the government, but his and some other people's views may have an impact on the Taiwan Strait policy of the next Republican government and make it continue to develop in a more militarized direction.

15 Boiling Moat: 《Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan The Boiling Moat》, Hoover Press, 2024.

CHAPTER II

**Assessment of Taiwan election results
by other major external forces and
the direction of their policies towards
Taiwan**

Chapter II

Assessment of Taiwan election results by other major external forces and the direction of their policies towards Taiwan

(1) Assessment of Taiwan election results by Japan and the direction of its policy towards Taiwan

Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa issued a statement after the election congratulating Lai Ching-te on his election. The statement said, "For Japan, Taiwan is an extremely important partner and important friend. The two sides share common basic values and have close economic relations and people-to-people and cultural exchanges." It also said, "The Japanese government will be committed to further deepening cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Taiwan."¹⁶ Later, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said on a Tokyo TV program: "I think that in terms of economic relations and interpersonal exchanges that share basic values, Taiwan is a very important partner." "Peacefully resolving various issues related to Taiwan through dialogue and realizing a form that is conducive to peace and stability in this region is our country's basic policy, and this policy will not change in the future."¹⁷ Japanese scholars on Taiwan-related issues Yasuhiro Matsuda and Yukiyo Ogasawara believe that "Taiwan consciousness has taken shape. Even if the local forces are divided, the Democratic Progressive Party can still be elected in the end. It is expected that the possibility of the Democratic Progressive Party's long-term governance will increase, while the long-term decline trend of the Kuomintang is obvious."¹⁸ "Continuing Tsai Ing-wen's policy is beneficial to

¹⁶ "The Conclusion of Taiwan's Presidential Election and Reactions from Countries around the World", Voice of America, <https://www.voachinese.com/a/world-reactions-to-taiwan-election-20240114/7439239.html>, last access time: August 21, 2024

¹⁷ "Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Mentions the Results of Taiwan's Presidential Election for the First Time", Central News Agency of Taiwan, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202401160314.aspx>, last access time: August 21, 2024

¹⁸ "Japanese scholars analyze Taiwan's presidential election: The local faction is strong enough", Central News Agency of Taiwan, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202401270163.aspx>, last access time: August 21, 2024

the international community."¹⁹

In recent years, with the evolution of the international situation and the political situation in Taiwan, Japan's policy towards Taiwan has undergone major changes, that is, it has been more actively promoting the all-round development of Japan-Taiwan relations. First, under the restriction of the "1972 Setup", Japan actively promotes the institutionalization and functionalization of "parliamentary diplomacy" with Taiwan. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party have held "2+2" parliamentary conferences for three consecutive years to discuss cooperation in major fields. Secondly, Japan actively promotes cooperation with Taiwan in major economic fields. In February 2024, the opening ceremony of TSMC's Kumamoto plant in Japan was held. Experts analyzed that "TSMC's establishment of a factory in Japan has become a new starting point for Taiwan-Japan economic security."²⁰ Thirdly, Japan, in line with the US Indo-Pacific strategy, has wantonly intervened in the situation in the Taiwan Strait. At the US-Japan summit held in March, the two sides announced about 70 defense cooperation agreements. The US-Japan alliance will carry out the largest upgrade in 64 years to form the so-called deterrence against China.²¹ In addition, Japan's diplomatic blue book for 2024 pointed out that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are extremely important for Japan's security. For this reason, Japan has significantly increased its defense budget and is preparing for war in the surrounding areas of the Taiwan Strait.

On the one hand, Japan's policy towards Taiwan has not crossed the red line yet and still restricts Japan-Taiwan relations to the unofficial field. But on the other hand, Japan constantly emphasizes that "a contingency in Taiwan is a contingency for Japan", amplifying the so-called risk of a cross-strait conflict, and creating legitimacy for it to increase its defense budget and become a "normal country". At the same time, Japan actively cooperates with the US policy on the Taiwan Strait, echoes on the issue of "reinterpreting" UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, and attempts to promote the "internationalization" of the Taiwan Question. These trends deserve high vigilance.

(2) South Korea's assessment of Taiwan election results and the direction of its policy towards Taiwan

After the results of the election in the Taiwan region were released, the South Korean government's stance was relatively cautious. According to Yonhap News Agency, a South Korean foreign ministry official stated about the results of the Taiwan election that South Korea's "basic stance towards Taiwan

19 "Continuing Tsai Ing-wen's policies is beneficial to the international community." Central News Agency of Taiwan, <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aip/202401140092.aspx>, last access time: August 21, 2024

20 "TSMC setting up factories in Japan promotes the 'Taiwan-Japan comrades country' and strengthens economic security guarantees." Voice of America, <https://www.voachinese.com/a/taiwan-chip-companies-decouple-from-china-and-flock-to-japan-to-set-up-factories-20240229/7508965.html>, last access time: August 21, 2024

21 "The biggest upgrade in the history of US-Japan security cooperation. Experts: Ensure sufficient deterrence against China." Voice of America, <https://www.voachinese.com/a/us-japan-security-alliance-undergoes-largest-upgrade-amid-taiwan-strait-tension-20240329/7548845.html>, last access time: August 21, 2024

remains unchanged and is willing to continue to strengthen substantive cooperation in various fields with Taiwan."²² The official emphasized that South Korea hopes that the Taiwan Strait will maintain stability and peaceful development. Yonhap News Agency's report did not use the words "president and vice president", but commented on it as "the election in the Taiwan region" and "leaders and deputy leaders".

After taking office, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has actively strengthened the alliance with the United States and continuously made remarks on the Taiwan Strait issue, showing that South Korea's policy towards Taiwan is undergoing subtle changes. On the one hand, South Korea still emphasizes that its one-China position has not changed. When South Korean Ambassador to China Jung Jae-ho met with South Korean journalists at the South Korean Embassy in Beijing, he stated, "South Korea's stance of adhering to respecting the one-China principle has never changed. South Korea hopes to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations."²³ On the other hand, South Korea has strengthened coordination and cooperation with the United States and Japan on Taiwan-related issues, implying that China may unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and undermine regional peace and stability. In August 2023, the United States, South Korea and Japan held a summit in Camp David. The joint statement of the three countries stated, "We reaffirm that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are an indispensable and important factor for the security and prosperity of the international community."²⁴ In June this year, during the Shangri-La Dialogue, South Korea's defense minister met with the defense ministers of the United States and Japan and once again said that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is very important. In August, a spokesperson for the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "South Korea, the United States and Japan are working hard to institutionalize trilateral cooperation through last year's Camp David agreement," and "strengthen the rule-based international order."²⁵

Yoon Suk-yeol's government's pro-U.S. and pro-Japan stance on Taiwan-related issues has been criticized by other domestic political parties. Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Korea, publicly questioned the necessity of the Yoon government's intervention in cross-strait relations and criticized Yoon Suk-yeol's tough stance towards China. Lee Jae-myung pointed out that "in the past two years, South Korea has fallen into a great crisis in all three fields of economy, diplomacy and security. Originally, China was South Korea's largest export country and a country with a trade surplus. Now it has instead become South Korea's largest import

22 "The South Korean government makes a statement on the results of Taiwan's election." Yonhap News Agency, <https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20240114000300881>, last access time: August 21, 2024

23 "South Korea's Ambassador to China Chung Jae-ho reiterates respect for the one-China principle." Baidu. <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1790107666996800780&wfr=spider&for=pc>, last access time: August 21, 2024

24 The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, The Republic of Korea, and the United States, The White House, Aug. 18, 2023. The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States | The White House

25 "South Korea is cautiously optimistic about the military upgrade of the United States and Japan." Voice of America. <https://www.voachinese.com/a/south-korea-cautious-about-us-japan-alliance-20240416/7573171.html>, last access time: August 21, 2024

country."²⁶ Joon Hyung Kim, the interim leader and lawmaker of the Reconstruction of Korea Party, publicly stated that in response to remarks by some military generals and congressmen in Washington who believe that Japan and South Korea should intervene in the Taiwan Strait conflict, the party will cooperate with the Democratic Party of Korea to promote proposals in the National Assembly to ensure that South Korea's military forces are only used to deal with the threat from North Korea and that South Korea will not be militarily involved in the Taiwan Strait conflict.²⁷

(3) Assessment of Taiwan election results by European countries (the European Union) and the direction of their policies towards Taiwan

Overall, the European Union and major European countries have been relatively cautious in their statements on the elections in the Taiwan region and did not mention Lai Ching-te's name. However, some Central and Eastern European countries and "pro-Taiwan" parliamentarians in various countries have made extremely provocative remarks that even violate the one-China principle. The European External Action Service (EEAS) said, "We welcome the holding of elections in Taiwan and congratulate all voters who participated in this democratic process." The French Foreign Ministry and the German Foreign Ministry both said, "We congratulate all voters, candidates and the elected who participated in this democratic activity."²⁸ The governments of Central and Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Poland all expressed "congratulations." The statement of Czech President Petr Pavel was touted by Taiwanese media as a "breakthrough." British Foreign Secretary David Cameron said in a statement that "he hopes that both sides of the Taiwan Strait will make renewed efforts to resolve differences peacefully through constructive dialogue."

European scholars and media believe that the weak position of the Democratic Progressive Party in the "Legislative Yuan" and the resulting offensive and defensive battles between the blue camp, the green camp and the white camp will be a major challenge for Lai Ching-te's governance. Matej Šimalčík, executive director of the Central European Institute for Asian Studies (CEIAS), said that the opposition party's review of Taiwan's assistance to Ukraine through Czech non-governmental organizations reflects the unfavorable situation caused by the "small ruling party and large opposition" to Lai Ching-te's administration.

European scholars assess that Lai Ching-te will continue Tsai Ing-wen's policy towards Europe. This will help the continuity of European countries' policies towards Taiwan and help continue the warming trend of Taiwan-Europe relations. Lai Ching-te faces greater challenges in cross-strait relations than Tsai Ing-wen, and there is a greater possibility of "escalation and misjudgment"

26 "In the South Korean parliamentary elections, the ruling and opposition parties engage in the first offensive and defensive on cross-strait issues." China Times News Network. <https://www.chinatimes.com/opinion/20240329001600-262110?chdtv>, last access time: August 21, 2024

27 "South Korea opposition aims to stop military's Taiwan entanglement", South China Morning Post, Exclusive | South Korea opposition aims to stop military's Taiwan entanglement | South China Morning Post (scmp.com), last access time: August 21, 2024

28 Klaus Bardenhagen, a German journalist who has been paying close attention to Taiwan for a long time, pointed out that this is the first time since 2012 that the German Foreign Ministry has congratulated the elections in Taiwan region.

in the Taiwan Strait. In the long term, the situation in the Taiwan Strait is not optimistic, but it is controllable in the short term.

Under the background of relatively tense China-Europe relations, Europe's adoption of a "de-risking" policy towards China, and Taiwan-Europe's strengthening of resilient cooperation in the semiconductor supply chain, the relationship between Taiwan region and Europe has made great "progress" during Tsai Ing-wen's tenure. Although there are differences in Taiwan policies among different institutions of the European Union and different European countries, generally speaking, for reasons such as values, economic and trade interests, and U.S. factors, the attention of European countries (the European Union) to the Taiwan Question will continue to rise, and the policies of European (EU) countries towards Taiwan will maintain the trend and inertia of "deepening" and "strengthening".

First, under the pretext of "not violating the one-China principle", at the implementation level, the one-China policy of European (EU) countries is blurred and regressed. Incidents like the establishment of the "Taiwan Representative Office in Lithuania" will continuously break the "unofficial" boundaries in exchanges with Taiwan.

Second, join the U.S. "using Taiwan to contain China" alliance and cooperate with and support the Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party in promoting the "internationalization of the Taiwan Question." Under the support, encouragement and leadership of the United States, many European (EU) countries have formed an interference model of incorporating Taiwan Strait content into the "Indo-Pacific strategy + joint statement" and strengthening the perception of "Ukrainization of the Taiwan Question."

Third, the European Parliament shows an extreme trend of "supporting Taiwan." The European Parliament has long played a negative role on the Taiwan Question. Its "support for Taiwan" has formed an all-round and three-dimensional "breakthrough" in terms of bills, visits and issues. The number of visits to Taiwan by "pro-Taiwan" parliamentarians has reached a new high. The European Parliament's resolutions on Taiwan not only continue to rise in number, but their contents are also more targeted, including strengthening political, economic and military relations with the Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party, promoting the upgrading of substantive relations with the Taiwan authorities, and helping Taiwan strive for "international space", etc., continuously raising the tone of supporting the Taiwan authorities and continuously escalating the degree of provocation.

(4) India's assessment of Taiwan election results and the direction of its policy towards Taiwan

Indian media and public opinion believe that the success of Lai Ching-te's governance will largely depend on the extent to which he can use Taiwan-U.S. relations to strengthen Taiwan's security and

create new economic opportunities.²⁹ Unlike the United States and Europe, the Indian official has not sent a formal congratulatory message to Lai Ching-te. However, interactions between India and Taiwan are "quietly" increasing. In June 2024, Narendra Modi was re-elected as the prime minister of India.

Baushuan Ger, Taiwan's "representative" in India, immediately congratulated Modi and conveyed Lai Ching-te's congratulatory message to Modi.³⁰ Lai Ching-te said on social media X that he "hopes to strengthen the rapidly developing Taiwan-India relationship", and Modi responded that he "looks forward to establishing closer relations with Taiwan." The interaction between the Indian Modi government and the Taiwan authorities shows the possibility of both sides promoting the further development of India-Taiwan relations.

Since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014, he has upgraded India's "Look East Policy" that has been implemented for more than twenty years to the "Act East Policy", and Taiwan has become one of the implementation objects of this policy. At the same time, the Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party also take India as the main target of Taiwan's "New Southbound Policy" and promote the substantive development of bilateral relations. Against the background of the deterioration of the border dispute between China and India and the increasingly sluggish bilateral relations, India's policy towards Taiwan has also undergone subtle adjustments, handling its relations with Taiwan more "flexibly". The main manifestations are as follows:

First, the ambiguous stance of the Indian government on the one-China principle. Since 2008, the Indian government has stopped mentioning the one-China principle in diplomatic communiqués and public statements. According to Indian officials, this is related to the border issue between China and India.

Second, seeking to establish all-round cooperation with Taiwan. In the political field, official exchanges between the two sides have become frequent and high-level official visits have increased. In the economic and trade field, in the process of pursuing economic autonomy and reducing supply chain dependence on the Chinese mainland, India seeks to strengthen economic cooperation with the Taiwan region. Investment and cooperation between the two sides in industries such as electronics, civil aviation, commerce, agriculture, and industry have been increasing year by year, especially in the semiconductor and electronic manufacturing fields. Both India and Taiwan regard promoting economic and trade cooperation between the two sides as a means to reduce supply chain and market dependence on the Chinese mainland, but there are also a series of challenges for the two sides to carry out industrial cooperation. In the social and cultural fields, exchanges between India and Taiwan are becoming more and more frequent. The two sides strengthen personnel exchanges through educational cooperation, religious group activities, tourism cooperation, and labor cooperation.

29 "Taiwan: After-Election Report", Indian Strategic Studies, <https://www.strategicstudyindia.com/2024/01/taiwan-after-election-report.html>, last access time: August 21, 2024

30 "Modi takes oath of office. Ministry of Foreign Affairs congratulates and hopes to strengthen substantive cooperation between the two sides." Economic Daily. <https://money.udn.com/money/story/7307/8020795>, last access time: August 21, 2024

Third, the Indian government may politically bind the China-India border issue and the Taiwan Question more. The Indian government may regard the Taiwan Question as a geopolitical bargaining chip and link the Taiwan Question with the China-India border issue to increase its restraint on China.

(5) Assessment of Taiwan election results by Southeast Asian countries and the direction of their policies towards Taiwan

Southeast Asian countries are highly concerned about the 2024 elections in Taiwan region. After the election, the governments of Indonesia, Cambodia and Vietnam reiterated their firm adherence to the one-China policy; the Burmese government issued a statement supporting the one-China principle; but the Philippine president and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore publicly congratulated Lai Ching-te on his election. Southeast Asian countries are highly concerned about cross-strait relations and the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Their policies towards Taiwan have the following characteristics:

First, most regional countries adhere to the one-China policy and oppose "Taiwan independence." Some commentators once believed that Thailand, Laos, Malaysia and Brunei did not issue public statements after the Taiwan elections, suggesting that these countries need to be cautious on sensitive issues to develop economic and trade relations with both the mainland and Taiwan at the same time.³¹ But in fact, most Southeast Asian countries adhere to the one-China policy and oppose "Taiwan independence." The Malaysian government clearly stated that "Malaysia reaffirms the principles of the joint communiqué signed by the leaders of the two countries on May 31, 1974, firmly adheres to the one-China policy, recognizes that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China, supports China's realization of national reunification, and does not support any 'Taiwan independence' claims."³² The Thai prime minister, the Lao deputy prime minister and the Brunei minister in charge of foreign affairs all stated that their governments will "firmly adhere to the one-China policy."³³ When Singapore's foreign minister met with Foreign Minister Wang Yi in July, he said that Singapore adheres to the one-China policy and firmly opposes "Taiwan independence."³⁴ Even Philippine President Marcos Jr. has publicly stated that "he does not

31 Bunly Ek, How Southeast Asia Responded to Taiwan's Elections, *The Diplomat*, Jan. 30, 2024. How Southeast Asia Responded to Taiwan's Election – *The Diplomat*

32 Full Text: Joint Statement Between the People's Republic of China and Malaysia on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership towards China-Malaysia Community with a Shared Future, June 20, 2024. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202406/content_6958425.htm

33 Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin Meets with Wang Yi, January 29, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202401/t20240129_11234926.shtml; Wang Yi holds talks with Saleumxay Kommasith, Lao deputy prime minister and foreign minister, April 7, 2024. http://www.cidca.gov.cn/2024-04/07/c_1130103627.htm; Wang Yi Holds Talks with Bruneian Foreign Minister II Dato' Erywan Pehin Yusof, May 14, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202405/t20240514_11304561.shtml

34 Wang Yi Meets with Singaporean Foreign Minister Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan, July 28, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202407/t20240728_11461746.shtml

support Taiwan independence, and the one-China policy has not changed."³⁵

Secondly, attach importance to developing economic and trade relations with Taiwan. For a long time, Taiwan's investment in Southeast Asia has been highly concentrated in labor-intensive industries such as textiles and footwear manufacturing. Against the background of the end of the COVID-19 epidemic and the expectation of rapid economic recovery of Southeast Asian economies, countries highly pay attention to attracting investment from Taiwan region. For example, in 2023, Taiwan region's investment in Vietnam was 2.2 billion US dollars, ranking fourth among 105 countries and regions investing in Vietnam. There are a total of 3,200 investment projects in Vietnam with a registered total amount of 39.5 billion US dollars. The Vietnamese government clearly stated that it looks forward to developing and expanding economic, trade and investment cooperation relations with Taiwan region.³⁶

Thirdly, attach importance to protecting the personal safety and rights and interests of their migrant workers in Taiwan. According to statistics, there are currently about 700,000 migrant workers from Southeast Asia in Taiwan, including 256,000 from Indonesia, 257,000 from Vietnam and 154,000 from the Philippines.³⁷ During the eight years of the Democratic Progressive Party's governance, many migrant workers have fallen into a vicious circle of poverty,³⁸ and their living conditions have been widely criticized. Therefore, Southeast Asian countries are highly concerned about whether the Lai authorities can improve the situation of migrant workers and safeguard their rights and interests at the institutional and policy levels.

Fourthly, the Philippines is "indecisive" in its policy on Taiwan-related issues and strengthens military cooperation with the United States. After Marcos Jr. came to power, he fully cooperated with the US strategy towards China to gain more benefits in the South China Sea issue. Therefore, the Philippines is "indecisive" in its policy on Taiwan-related issues. On the one hand, it plays small tricks in its stance after the Taiwan elections, but later it states that it still adheres to the one-China policy. On the other hand, it strengthens military cooperation with the United States. One of the new military bases in the Philippines that open usage rights to the US military is located in northern Luzon. One of them is only about 400 kilometers away from Taiwan Island.³⁹ The intention of cooperating with the US regional military strategy is obvious.

35 Philippine President Marcos says he does not support Taiwan independence and claims that the "one China policy" remains unchanged. Voice of America, January 24, 2024. <https://www.voachinese.com/a/philippines-marcos-says-does-not-endorse-taiwan-independence-seeks-to-avoid-conflict-20240123/7451753.html>

36 Vietnam becomes an investment destination for enterprises from Taiwan region of China. April 10, 2024. 越南成为中国台湾企业投资目的地 (baochinphu.vn)

37 The 2024 "Annual Labor Statistics Report" of Taiwan's "Ministry of Labor": <https://www.mol.gov.tw/1607/2458/2464/2468/statisticalReportList>

38 "Take you to see the three major dilemmas of migrant workers in Taiwan: How to solve the problems of policies, regulations and discrimination?" by Jian Yuwen and Su Xinyi. One-Forty website: <https://one-forty.org/tw/blog/migrant-issues>

39 "Philippines announces locations of four new US military bases. One of them is only 400 kilometers away from Taiwan Island of China." Guancha. cn, April 4, 2023. https://www.guancha.cn/internation/2023_04_04_686876.shtml?s=zwyzxw

CHAPTER III

**The influence of Hong Kong and
Macao factors on cross-strait relations
under the new situation**

Chapter III

The influence of Hong Kong and Macao factors on cross-strait relations under the new situation

Facing the changes in the cross-strait situation, the separatist acts of "Taiwan independence" forces, and the United States' promotion of the linkage between Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Chinese government adheres to "opposing 'Taiwan independence' and promoting reunification" and opposes external forces' interference in Hong Kong and Macao affairs. It handles cross-strait changes with the overall strategy of the central government for resolving the Taiwan Question in the new era and takes safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests as the highest principle to safeguard the implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong. Under the new situation, in the face of the strategic game between China and the United States and the new situation in cross-strait relations, Hong Kong and Macao issues, especially the external factors in Hong Kong and Macao issues and the central government's governance of Hong Kong and Macao, will still have an important impact on the Taiwan Question.

(1) The Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party stigmatize "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems" by using Hong Kong and Macao issues

The Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party stigmatize "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems" by using Hong Kong and Macao issues, creating an atmosphere of "fear of communism" on the island and catering to the narrative framework of "democracy against autocracy" internationally, creating excuses for promoting its "Taiwan independence" agenda. Since the proposal of "one country, two systems," some political forces in Taiwan have misinterpreted and misled. The Democratic Progressive Party and its authorities have spared no effort in spreading rumors

and smearing, hyping up Hong Kong issues to oppose "one country, two systems," resulting in a biased perception among some Taiwanese compatriots.⁴⁰ Since 2019, the Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party have intervened in Hong Kong affairs by taking advantage of the Hong Kong amendment turmoil, national security legislation, and electoral system reform, cooperating with the United States' "containing China through Hong Kong." They use Hong Kong issues for election operations and attack the implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong, becoming one of the main external forces interfering in Hong Kong affairs.⁴¹ The Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party have used the Hong Kong situation to issue a series of malicious remarks attacking "one country, two systems." Through continuous intervention in Hong Kong affairs, the Taiwan authorities distort, uglify, and slander "one country, two systems." By smearing the implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong, they strengthen the fear and rejection of "one country, two systems" among Taiwanese people and stir up opposition and resistance to "one country, two systems" in Taiwanese society, and then attack the mainland. Before and after Lai Ching-te's election campaign and since he took office, the Democratic Progressive Party and its authorities have continued to hype up Hong Kong issues. Lai Ching-te claimed that "Hong Kong was forced to enter Chinese mainland and lost the whole world. Taiwan cannot take the pro-China road back." Lai Ching-te claimed that Hong Kong implements "one country, two systems." After the "Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement," Hong Kong has lost democracy and freedom. Not only are human rights suppressed but the economy has also regressed, and hundreds of thousands of people have left Hong Kong. Wu Zheng, spokesperson of the Democratic Progressive Party, recklessly claimed that the "50-year unchanging commitment of 'one country, two systems'" made by the mainland to Hong Kong in the past is all "lies." After the promulgation of the "Hong Kong National Security Law," the mainland has "weaponized laws" to strengthen economic and political control over Hong Kong and gradually move towards "one country, one system." The so-called "recognition" and "endorsement" of Taiwan's "democratic achievements" and "excellent political development" by the United States internationally is an important part of its strategy of shaping the so-called "democracy against autocracy" globally. Its purpose is to create confrontation across the Taiwan Strait, deprecate the mainland's political development, and obstruct Taiwanese people's identification with the mainland. The Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party cater to this narrative of "democracy against autocracy" of the United States as the basis and excuse for its "seeking independence and rejecting reunification."

(2) The "Taiwan independence" and "Hong Kong independence" forces converge internationally

The possible long-term rule of "Taiwan independence" forces impacts the internal and external environment of "one country, two systems." Since the central government proposed exploring the "two systems" Taiwan plan in January 2019, the Taiwan authorities have increased their opposition

40 The State Council Information Office: "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era", People's Publishing House, 2022, page 24.

41 Zhang Jian and Tang Guangjun: "The DPP authorities' intervention in Hong Kong affairs through the 'amendment turmoil': means, motives and impacts", "Taiwan Studies", Issue 3, 2023.

to "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems" on the grounds that there are problems in the implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong. The interaction and "convergence" trend between "Taiwan independence" and "Hong Kong independence" forces is obvious. The "Hong Kong independence" forces use the policies of the Taiwan authorities to increase their visibility. The practice of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong is more closely related to national reunification and anti-secession, but it also brings more uncertainties. The Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party promotes the convergence of "Hong Kong independence" and "Taiwan independence" and the internationalization of "Taiwan independence" and "Hong Kong independence." The convergence of "Taiwan independence" and "Hong Kong independence" undermines "one country, two systems" and divides the country. Previously, the Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party supported the activities of "Hong Kong independence" forces in Hong Kong to infiltrate and undermine Hong Kong. Since the implementation of the "Hong Kong National Security Law," they have provided a way for "Hong Kong independence" elements to flee to Taiwan. At present, the activities of "Hong Kong independence" elements in the international arena draw on and imitate the "experience" of the internationalization of "Taiwan independence" forces. In particular, they strengthen sanctions against Hong Kong through international lobbying and worsen the international environment of "one country, two systems."

(3) The United States stigmatizes the implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong

The linkage between supporting the Sunflower Student Movement in Taiwan in 2014 and supporting the "Occupy Central" movement in Hong Kong, the interaction between supporting the anti-amendment movement in Hong Kong in 2019 and supporting the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, and in recent years, the linkage between the United States' support for "Taiwan independence" and "Hong Kong independence," and the linkage between supporting the internationalization of "Taiwan independence" and supporting the internationalization of "Hong Kong independence." For a long time, the United States has supported the linkage between Taiwan's democratization and the dissemination of Western democratic values in Hong Kong. Under the framework of U.S. policy towards China, the current overall framework of U.S. policy towards Taiwan and Hong Kong is U.S. policy of strategic competition against China, interspersed with containment and engagement policies. The Taiwan-related and Hong Kong-related narratives under the leadership of the United States are increasingly negative, and even combine the Hong Kong and Taiwan narratives to attack the Chinese government's policies towards Taiwan and Hong Kong. U.S. official policy reports, think tank reports, media reports, etc. stigmatize the implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong and the Chinese government's policy arrangement of resolving the Taiwan Question and achieving complete national reunification with the Taiwan plan of "one country, two systems." In particular, they oppose resolving the Taiwan Question with "one country, two systems" by claiming fallacies such as the "failure" of the implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong and that "one country, two systems" no longer exists. In fact, this negative narrative is an important manifestation of the linkage of U.S. policies towards Hong Kong and Taiwan. The continuous introduction of Hong Kong sanctions bills and bills supporting Taiwan by

the United States also constitutes the differences and linkage effects of U.S. policies towards Hong Kong and Taiwan.

(4) The United States adopts a policy of "containing China through Hong Kong."

The United States passes Hong Kong-related bills to establish its position of interfering in Hong Kong affairs and expand the space for interference in a legal way, and uses Hong Kong-related bills as a tool to pressure the Chinese government and adjust U.S. policies. The game between China and the United States and the ideological conflict between China and the West have fundamentally changed the basic conditions for benign interaction between Hong Kong and the United States and the West. China's rise and the United States' suppression of China have already changed the perception and positioning of Hong Kong by the United States and the West. The United States and the West have turned their positioning of Hong Kong from a platform and frontier for contacting China to a tool and chip for containing China. The United States is de-functionalizing, de-unique-izing, and de-"two systems"-izing Hong Kong to weaken Hong Kong's role in serving the country by hitting Hong Kong's international status. Since Biden came to power, the United States has adopted a policy of de-functionalizing Hong Kong. In essence, it is part of the so-called "de-risking" of China. The Biden administration attempts to weaken Hong Kong by removing Hong Kong's uniqueness, unilaterally canceling Hong Kong's status as a separate customs territory, not recognizing "Made in Hong Kong," issuing negative business environment guidelines, disparaging Hong Kong, and hitting Hong Kong's status as an international financial center, attempting to use Hong Kong as a chip to contain China. The Biden administration's measures to de-functionalize Hong Kong include bills promoted by the U.S. Congress to cancel the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in the United States, bills to cancel Hong Kong's voting rights in international organizations, issuing negative business environment and investment environment guidance, and U.S. officials putting pressure on American-funded enterprises and chambers of commerce in Hong Kong. The Biden administration believes that the Hong Kong issue concerns U.S. interests, and the United States must find ways to make Hong Kong's development conform to U.S. interests. The United States' policy considerations towards Hong Kong are by no means only economic, financial, and trade interests. In the long run, strategic interests are also important considerations. The United States' policy towards Hong Kong has long been incorporated into the framework of its China strategy. Since the founding of New China, the United States' China strategy and policy have gone through three main stages: containment, engagement, and competition. Of course, each stage also includes the other two policies. The United States' policy towards Hong Kong has been changing and adjusting within the U.S. China strategy, especially in these three major strategic stages. Against the background of the strategic game between China and the United States and the U.S. presidential election, it is expected that the Biden administration will introduce a new round of sanctions and measures to pressure Hong Kong before and after the elections in the second half of this year. Looking at the future trend, the United States will continue to use the "United States-Hong Kong Policy Act," the "Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act," the "Hong Kong Autonomy Act," and presidential executive orders to interfere in and impose sanctions on Hong Kong.

(5) The Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party take advantage of the situation to implement a policy of "de-Sinicization."

The Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party are increasingly engaging in cognitive shaping behavior in the international community. Currently, Taiwan's international recognition and favorability have increased to a certain extent. Taiwan is actively playing the "chip card" and the "democracy card," which has won the sympathy and support of Western society to a certain extent and increased the international community's attention to the Taiwan Question. The Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party are constantly promoting "gradual Taiwan independence" and vigorously carrying out "de-Sinicization." In this process, they reduce the connections between Taiwan and Hong Kong and Macao. On June 21, 2024, the central government formulated judicial documents to punish "die-hard Taiwan independence" elements for splitting the country and inciting the crime of splitting the country. On June 27, the Taiwan authorities' Mainland Affairs Council claimed that since 2023, the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao have successively amended and added national security laws and decrees, including the mainland's "National Security Law," "Law on the Administration of Activities of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations within the Territory of China," "Cybersecurity Law," and "Regulations on Anti-Spy Security Prevention Work"; Hong Kong's "Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" and "National Security Ordinance"; Macao has also revised the "Law on Safeguarding National Security." The Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party claimed that the "Opinions on Legally Punishing Die-Hard 'Taiwan Independence' Elements for Splitting the Country and Inciting the Crime of Splitting the Country" issued by the mainland further increases the personal safety risks of Taiwanese people going to the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao.

CHAPTER IV

The Taiwan authorities' policy of promoting the "internationalization of Taiwan independence"

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(1) Retaining "diplomatic allies"

To maintain relations with the remaining 12 "diplomatic allies," the Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party basically continue the external relations framework mainly based on industrial and people's livelihood technical and financial assistance, while increasing the degree of alignment with the U.S. diplomatic strategy. In terms of strategies and means, the Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party have gradually changed from "defending the sovereignty of the Republic of China" in the past to aiming at not avoiding "dual recognition." For non-"diplomatic allies," they focus on developing "substantive relations," reflecting the policy logic of "tactical loss of allies" and "strategic de-Sinicization (of the Republic of China)" behind the Taiwan authorities' strategy of "going international."

The Taiwan authorities' activities to "consolidate allies" are generally carried out through two levels: its external affairs department and the "International Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF)." The former is responsible for political and ideological guidance, while the latter is responsible for "laying a solid material foundation." According to the Taiwan external affairs department, "mutual visits and various exchanges with the top leaders and important officials of friendly countries" and "introducing industrial and market elements in line with the economic and social development needs of friendly countries based on the principle of mutual benefit and assistance" are equally important. The two are complementary to each other and promote each other. Both focus on "exchanges" and promote and amplify the "combined force" with relevant

stakeholders.⁴²

From the perspective of the Taiwan external affairs department:

First, continue the liaison heat with so-called "countries with similar ideals" and cross-party political organizations, including not only the heads of government and officials of "diplomatic allies," but also cross-national and cross-party "pro-Taiwan" organizations represented by the "Formosa Club." The forms of liaison and interaction include both irregular mutual visits and interactions between the two sides and the institutional liaison mechanism between Taiwan and foreign parties during specific periods such as "Double Tenth Festival." It is worth noting that under the influence of major events such as the COVID-19 epidemic, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in the past two years, the level and frequency of liaison between the Taiwan authorities and the top leaders of "diplomatic allies" have decreased.

Second, use various "low-political" issues to organize institutional exchange activities, generally, under the guise of "cultural exchanges" and in the name of popular topics of the times such as "women's empowerment" and "climate change," instill "anti-China" sentiment in foreign government officials, parliamentarians, and professional technicians to enhance Taiwan's "status" and "value." The more representative institutional exchange brands and conferences organized by the Taiwan authorities include the "Diplomatic Friends Spanish Language Class," "International Forum on Women's Empowerment in Latin America and the Caribbean," "Pacific Climate Change Forum," etc. Participants are generally heads of government, professional officials in relevant fields, speakers of parliaments, and parliamentarians of Taiwan's "diplomatic allies." In recent years, some officials, parliamentarians, and civilians from non-"diplomatic allies" have also participated.

Third, attach importance to the so-called "public diplomacy" that combines official and civilian efforts, and uses scholarships such as the "TaiwanICDF Scholarship" and "Taiwan Scholarship" to sponsor students to study in Taiwan. There are both the official-background "class of friends from afar" with military cooperation indications and the more practical "courses" held by and hosted by civil institutions. Their common feature is to teach face-to-face historical and cultural courses with the historical view of "Taiwan independence." Their students include not only high-level "diplomatic ally" officials such as the Guatemalan foreign minister and the press adviser to the Paraguayan presidential palace, but also government officials from other non-"diplomatic ally" countries such as Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, and Mexico.⁴³

Fourth, coordinate and supplement the U.S. global and regional strategies. Mainly under the framework of the "Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF)" between the United States and Taiwan, provide technical training in various fields. For example, the "TaiwanICDF" collaborates

42 <https://ws.mofa.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9VcGxvYWQyNDAYL3JlbGZpbGUvMTE4Lzk5OTIxLzc3YWwNDJhLTBkNDgtNDZiMS1hYzk5LWM1NzFkZDU0YmNlNy5wZGY%3D&n=MTEy5bm05aSW5Lqk6YOo5Zau5L2N6aCQ566XKOazleWumueJiCkucGRm>, last access time: August 21, 2024

43 "Elites of the Asia-Pacific master's program come to Taiwan region for in-person teaching. The foreign minister of Guatemala is also a new student of Tamkang University", Tamkang Times. <https://tkutimes.tku.edu.tw/dtl.aspx?no=56774>, last access time: August 21, 2024

with the Organization of American States (OAS) to promote the "Women's Empowerment Vocational Training Program" in Belize;⁴⁴ work with the United States, Australia, and Japan to build an undersea cable for Tuvalu.⁴⁵

From the perspective of the "International Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF)": First, continue the "mutual benefit" with "diplomatic allies" in the fields of science, education, culture, and health. The corresponding business types are mainly technical cooperation and investment and financing business, and assist the economies of "diplomatic allies" with the three main axes of so-called "employment technology assistance," "financial credit guarantee," and "international initiative." In addition, from time to time, providing other direct assistance to "diplomatic allies" in response to natural disasters and man-made disasters is also an important part. Second, use the political and business resources of "diplomatic allies" to connect resources on the island with those outside the island and regional organizations to enhance regional and international presence. Industrial investment and financing is an area that the Taiwan authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party intend to focus on developing, that is, strive to coordinate with the Central American Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to jointly finance energy and manufacturing projects in "friendly countries" such as Belize and Paraguay, and promote the participation of Taiwan's private sector and financial industry in the financing plans of the Central American Bank.

(2) Seeking to participate in international organizations

As of the first quarter of 2024, Taiwan has full membership in 45 intergovernmental international organizations and associate or observer status in 29 intergovernmental international organizations.⁴⁶ Based on the spirit of General Assembly Resolution 2758, the vast majority of international organizations represented by the United Nations have canceled Taiwan's formal membership. However, due to complex historical reasons and through cross-strait consultations and the coordination of international organizations, Taiwan has also been able to retain activity space in some international organizations in an appropriate form that does not violate the one-China principle. For example, participating in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) under the name of "Taipei, China"; participating in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as "Chinese Taipei"; participating in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as "The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu," and so on.

The issue of Taiwan's participation in international organization activities must be handled in

44 "The International Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF) and the Organization of American States (OAS) jointly promote women's empowerment." International Cooperation and Development Fund. <https://www.icdf.org.tw/wSite/ct?xItem=70769&ctNode=31381&mp=1>, last access time: August 21, 2024

45 "Taiwan participates in the cooperation of the United States, Japan and Australia for the first time to help Tuvalu build an undersea cable." Economic Daily News. <https://money.udn.com/money/story/7307/7891255>, last access time: August 21, 2024

46 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), <https://subsite.mofa.gov.tw/igo/cp.aspx?n=5955>, last access time: August 21, 2024

accordance with the one-China principle. However, after Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the Taiwan authorities refused to recognize the "1992 Consensus" and tried to "go from the world to China," and deepened collective actions with the United States, the West, and "diplomatic allies" on the issue of "expanding international space." Internally, they seek to arouse the emotions of people on the island and the international community about the mainland "suppressing Taiwan's international activity space" to maintain their ruling status.⁴⁷

First, they strive to "rely on the United States to resist China" and shape the argument that "Resolution 2758 does not involve Taiwan's status." The Taiwan authorities continuously lobby the U.S. Congress. The "Taipei Act" (Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019) passed by Congress in 2019 and the "Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020" passed in 2020 provide so-called legal basis for the U.S. administrative authorities to promote Taiwan's participation in international organizations within the United Nations system.

Second, advocate the "de-Sinicization" of Taiwan's identity in international organizations. Former head of the external affairs department Joseph Wu claimed that the mainland's translation of "Chinese Taipei" as "Taipei, China" has caused great trouble for Taiwan. Internationally, "Republic of China" should be used. If there is flexibility, "Republic of China (Taiwan)" or "Taiwan" can be used.⁴⁸ The Tsai Ing-wen authorities proposed that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are "mutually non-subordinate," attempting to clarify the ambiguous expressions of the two sides in international organizations.

Third, seek to "build a new stove" with the United States and the West and expand and construct a "China-excluding system" outside the United Nations system. In addition to further expanding the member countries and activity models of the "Global Cooperation and Training Framework" (GCTF), the Taiwan authorities also jointly established the "Chip 4 Alliance" with the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and signed the "Indigenous Peoples' Economic and Trade Cooperation Agreement" (IPETCA), becoming the founding members of this agreement together with New Zealand, Canada, and Australia.

(3) Toward the United States: Rely on the United States and seek "trust"

Winning the trust of the United States is the first demand of Lai Ching-te's external policy. During the election campaign, Lai Ching-te tried to send a signal to the United States that "Lai will follow Tsai's path," conveying the policy route of continuing to "rely on the United States." Thus, the purpose of eliminating the United States' "suspicion of Lai" is achieved. After taking office, his specific actions toward the United States are as follows:

First, promote the institutionalization of economic and trade cooperation between the United States

47 Zhang Yazhong: "Theory of Integration", China Review Academic Publishers, 2014, page 325.

48 Use of term "Chinese Taipei" is harmful to Taiwan's international relations, Voice of America. <https://www.voachinese.com/a/use-of-term-chinese-taipei-harmful-to-taiwans-international-relations-20181217/4704025.html>, last access time: August 21, 2024

and Taiwan and complete the follow-up negotiations of the "U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade." In 2023, the first batch of agreements of the "U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade" were reached.⁴⁹ For the Lai Ching-te authorities, completing and signing all the negotiations of the "U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade" has both symbolic significance and practical value. It is an important means for Lai Ching-te to accelerate the layout of "economic Taiwan independence" and weaken cross-strait economic and trade ties.

Second, promote a "major breakthrough" in political interaction between the United States and Taiwan. In August 2022, Nancy Patricia Pelosi, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited China's Taiwan region in disregard of China's firm opposition. During Tsai Ing-wen's tenure, she "transited" through the United States several times. Officials from the Taiwan external affairs department, economic department, defense department and other departments have also gone to the United States for activities many times. After Lai Ching-te comes to power, he will continue to seek improvement and breakthroughs in the level and itinerary of political interaction between the United States and Taiwan.

Third, promote the U.S. Congress to continue guiding the direction of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Under the strenuous lobbying of the Democratic Progressive Party authorities, the U.S. Congress has formed so-called "cross-party consensus in supporting Taiwan." A large number of Taiwan-related bills have been introduced, covering various aspects such as strengthening substantive relations between Taiwan and the United States, Taiwan's participation in international organizations, Taiwan-U.S. military relations, arms sales to Taiwan, and Taiwan-U.S. economic cooperation. The Lai Ching-te authorities will continue to strengthen lobbying for the U.S. Congress to seek "bill breakthroughs" for Taiwan, thereby pressuring the U.S. administrative authorities to implement more "pro-Taiwan" policies.

Fourth, promote the United States to strengthen the "Global Cooperation and Training Framework" (GCTF) and carry out "international cooperation." Since Tsai Ing-wen came to power, various study camps, seminars, and overseas activities related to external affairs of the Democratic Progressive Party authorities have been named after GCTF. According to Taiwan, GCTF has held 70 international workshops and invited more than 7,500 officials and experts from 127 countries to participate.⁵⁰ Japan and Australia, allies of the United States, have successively become "official partners" of GCTF. After Lai Ching-te comes to power, he will continue to operate GCTF as an important tool for Taiwan to carry out so-called "international cooperation," enhance its so-called "influence on global issues," win over new partners, break through the "international space," and challenge the one-China principle.

Fifth, promote the United States to distort General Assembly Resolution 2758 and support Taiwan's participation in international organizations. During Tsai Ing-wen's period, the United States publicly

49 "Taiwan-US 21st Century Trade Initiative", Office of Trade Negotiations, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). <https://www.ey.gov.tw/otn/D4BECA8C62559293/8c8802f0-58c5-432d-b958-7552d44fb8e7>, last access time: August 21, 2024

50 In 2023, Taiwan region, the United States, Japan and Australia held the joint committee meeting of the "Global Cooperation and Training Framework" and released a joint statement. https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=96&s=116085, last access time: August 21, 2024

stated its support for Taiwan's "meaningful participation in international organizations" in terms of congressional legislation, distorting Resolution 2758, and issuing press releases. It is expected that the Lai Ching-te authorities will continue to set the "main direction" of demonstrating the "legitimacy" of Taiwan's international activities as distorting General Assembly Resolution 2758 and promoting the so-called "undetermined status of Taiwan."

(4) Toward Europe: Strengthen lobbying of parliaments and seek to replicate the "Lithuania model"

First, promote the European Parliament to strengthen its "pro-Taiwan" stance. Since Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the number of Taiwan-related resolutions or bills in the European Parliament has increased sharply. In September 2022, the European Parliament passed the "Taiwan Strait situation resolution," stating that Europe will "guarantee the security of the Taiwan Strait."⁵¹ In February 2024, the European Parliament passed two annual implementation report resolutions on the EU's "Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP) and "Common Security and Defense Policy" (CSDP) with 62% and 65% of the votes respectively. The report claims that the so-called "China and Taiwan are not subordinate to each other."⁵² The European Parliament has sent official delegations to visit Taiwan for three consecutive years. The Lai Ching-te authorities will continue to increase lobbying of the European Parliament to make it play an important role in the "internationalization of Taiwan independence."

Second, promote Central and Eastern European regions to change their policies towards Taiwan. In 2021, Lithuania agreed to the Taiwan authorities to set up the "Taiwan Office in Lithuania" in its capital. The Taiwan authorities tried to prompt Central and Eastern European countries to replicate the "Lithuania model." After Lai Ching-te comes to power, he will inevitably increase lobbying efforts. Starting from the fields of economy and trade, parliaments, and values, aiming at breaking through interaction levels and setting up offices, and taking the Czech Republic and other countries as key targets, he will promote countries in Central and Eastern European regions to change their policies towards Taiwan.

Third, promote the European Union to start negotiations on economic and trade agreements with Taiwan. After Lai Ching-te comes to power, he will continue to use the strategy of using "chips as bargaining chips" towards Europe and promote the start of economic and trade negotiations between Taiwan and Europe. He will politicize Taiwan-Europe economic and trade issues through economic means to promote political goals.

51 "Spokesperson of Chinese Mission to the EU Speaks on a Question Concerning European Parliament's Resolution on Taiwan", Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union. http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/chn/zclc/202209/t20220916_10766756.htm, last access time: August 21, 2024

52 "Texts Adopted", European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0104_EN.pdf, Last access time: August 21, 2024

(5) Toward Japan: Seek to solidify the statement that "a contingency in Taiwan is a contingency for Japan."

The Tsai Ing-wen authorities have almost always taken a compromising, yielding, and cooperative stance on controversial issues between Taiwan and Japan. First, fishery conflicts. Although Taiwan and Japan have held the "Maritime Affairs Cooperation Dialogue" many times, the two sides have repeatedly "shelved" controversial issues. The Japanese side has a very tough attitude and refuses to conduct consultations on fishing operations in disputed areas, resulting in serious restrictions and harm to the rights of Taiwanese fishermen. In response, fishery organizations on the island are extremely indignant and demand that the Taiwan authorities "be tough and truly protect fishing and the rights and interests of fishermen."⁵³ Second, the issue of Japanese nuclear waste water. The Japanese government is bent on pushing forward the plan to discharge nuclear-contaminated water into the sea. This act has been unanimously condemned by global public opinion. However, the Democratic Progressive Party authorities seem to have forgotten their professed "anti-nuclear" stance and said that they "respect professionalism" and that "the impact on radiation safety in nearby seas is negligible."⁵⁴ Third, historical and cultural issues. In 2016, the Taipei Palace Museum lent the authentic running script of Yan Zhenqing's "An Elegiac Address to Nephew" from the Tang Dynasty to Japan and exhibited it publicly at the Tokyo National Museum. This topic has continued to simmer. The Democratic Progressive Party authorities, on the one hand, "generously" please Japan and use cultural relic exhibitions to draw closer cultural interactions with Japan. On the other hand, they attempt to carry out "de-Sinicization" through the "New National Palace Museum Plan," triggering extreme anger in public opinion on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.⁵⁵ The Democratic Progressive Party authorities also beautify Japanese colonial rule to varying degrees, positively evaluate Japan's new security bills, attempt to compromise with Japan on issues such as the Diaoyu Islands and the Okinotori Reef, and have an ambiguous attitude on major issues such as Japan's denial of the war of aggression and comfort women, and never publicly oppose or criticize them.

"Pro-Japanese" is the biggest "label" on Lai Ching-te. It is almost certain that he will only be more unprincipled on controversial issues between Taiwan and Japan and will sell out the interests of the Taiwanese people. On May 8, 2024, Lai Ching-te attended the 82nd anniversary memorial service for Hatta Yoichi organized by Taiwan's agricultural and water resources department. Hatta was a Japanese engineer who built water conservancy projects in Tainan during Japan's occupation of Taiwan. Lai Ching-te not only talked a lot about the so-called "Taiwan-Japan friendship," but also called Hatta Yoichi "the father of Taiwan." He shouted out that "a contingency in Taiwan is a contingency for Japan, and a contingency for Japan is also a contingency for Taiwan,"⁵⁶ linking the Taiwan Question

53 "Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Commission does not discuss operation rules. Fishermen demand that the government stand firm and protect fishing" , The Merit Times. <https://www.merit-times.com.tw/NewsPage.aspx?unid=835663>, last access time: August 21, 2024

54 "Fukushima nuclear wastewater discharge into the sea. Taiwan's Executive Yuan says the radiation impact on the Taiwan Strait can be ignored" , Lianhe Zaobao Net, <https://www.zaobao.com/realtime/china/story20230824-1426669>, last access time: August 21, 2024

55 "Video/Installing comfort women statues harms Taiwan-Japan friendship! Japanese civil groups submit interrogatory petitions to protest." ETtoday News Cloud. <https://www.ettoday.net/news/20180910/1255205.htm>, last access time: August 21, 2024

56 "Lai Ching-te attended the memorial service for Hatta Yoichi at the Wushantou Reservoir for the 13th consecutive year." China Times News. www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20240508004019-260407?chdtv, last access time: August 21, 2024

with Japan's security and promoting Japan to strengthen its security and political relations with Taiwan.

Centering on solidifying the statement that "a contingency in Taiwan is a contingency for Japan," the actions of the Lai Ching-te authorities include: First, strengthen political interaction through visits. The number and batches of Japanese members of parliament visiting Taiwan have long been the highest. In May 2024, Japan sent a "historically largest" delegation of nearly 40 people to participate in Lai Ching-te's inauguration activities. Second, encourage Japanese politicians to make remarks interfering in the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, Japanese officials have continuously made wrong remarks on Taiwan, looking for excuses for their interference in the situation in the Taiwan Strait. In December 2021, the late former prime minister Shinzo Abe put forward that "a contingency in Taiwan is equivalent to a contingency for Japan and the Japan-U.S. alliance."⁵⁷ In August 2023, Taro Aso, vice president of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party and former prime minister, recklessly claimed at the "Indo-Pacific Security Forum" held in Taiwan that Japan, the United States, and Taiwan "are always ready to use deterrence when necessary" and "Taiwan should be mentally prepared for war."⁵⁸ Third, promote Japan to hollow out the one-China principle. In 2017, the "Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association," a Japanese window for Taiwan affairs, was renamed from the "Japan Interchange Association." Taiwan's "Oriental Association" was renamed the "Taiwan-Japan Relations Association." The "renaming" has the meaning of strengthening the political function of this institution. From time to time, the Japanese side also lists "Taiwan" and "China" side by side in government publications and official websites, supports Taiwan's participation in international organizations such as the World Health Assembly, and plans to introduce a Japanese version of the "Taiwan Relations Act." The so-called "2+2" forum between political parties in Taiwan and Japan covers up political interaction with "party exchanges." In short, the Lai Ching-te authorities will solidify the statement that "a contingency in Taiwan is a contingency for Japan" through various means, promote Japan to increase its interference in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, strengthen the collusion between Taiwan and Japan, and further promote the "internationalization of Taiwan independence."

57 "The 2+2 talks between the ruling parties of Taiwan region and Japan will take place again on the 24th, focusing on economic and trade cooperation." Central News Agency of Taiwan region. <https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202112200187.aspx>, last access time: August 21, 2024

58 "Japan's outdated politician instigates Taiwan region to 'be prepared for war'. The public opinion in Taiwan region severely criticizes" . Ifeng.com. <https://news.ifeng.com/c/8S7AgTeJ9hD>, last access time: August 21, 2024

CHAPTER V

Policy Recommendations

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Policy Recommendations

(1) View the external factors of the Taiwan Question comprehensively and dialectically

We should not only see the multiple severe challenges caused by external factors of the Taiwan Question, but also see the conditions and advantages that still exist and are even constantly growing in the external environment and are conducive to our resolution of the Taiwan Question. If we fail to see the existing problems, it will lead to blind optimism and one-sided policies and fall into a state of self-anesthesia. Similarly, if we fail to see the conditions and advantages in our favor, we will also fall into a state of anxiety, fear, and even uneasiness.

First, the complexity, severity, and instability of the external environment of the Taiwan Question are on the rise, and we need to be vigilant at all times. We need to strengthen bottom-line thinking and extreme thinking, improve response capabilities, seize strategic initiative, fully mobilize friendly forces from all sides, and actively shape an external environment and strategic posture in our favor.

Second, we need to increase strategic confidence. Only in this way can we enhance strategic patience and not be constrained by gains and losses in a certain time and region. With the continuous development of China's comprehensive strength, China is not only an object affected by the external environment but also an important force in shaping the international strategic environment. To a certain extent, China-US strategic interaction has become the greatest shaping force of the current global strategic environment, which also means that through its own efforts, China can actively shape the external environment to a certain extent.

Third, we need to create a more open, market-oriented, and law-based environment. The most

important thing is to do our own things well, that is, continue to comprehensively deepen reform and opening up and the construction of the rule of law, improve science and technology, improve the rule of law, and enhance the internationalization of the economy. This should be the only choice for China in a complex and severe international environment.

Fourth, continue to consolidate and expand the "circle of friends." Continue to maintain strategic sobriety and adhere to the basic principle of "making fewer enemies and making more friends." The meaning of the major changes unseen in a century is that the old and new international contradictions are intertwined and resonate, and even erupt concurrently. But contradictions must be "born and extinguished." There are "dangers" and "opportunities" in the transformation of contradictions. We should focus the spearhead of struggle on a very small number of specific objects to the maximum extent, and not roughly enlarge it to all state actors. Even when it comes to state actors, we should distinguish between this time and that time, and this field and that field. While controlling rather than expanding mutual differences, seize any opportunity for unity and cooperation.

(2) Prevent the Taiwan Question from becoming a major obstacle to the stability of China-US relations

First, actively play the important role of meetings and communications between Chinese and American leaders. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out in his speech at the 2023 Spring Festival gathering: "We have resolutely carried out major struggles against separatism and interference, and firmly grasped the initiative in cross-strait relations." As can be seen from the many meetings between Chinese and American leaders, the Biden administration's understanding of the sensitivity and importance of the Taiwan Question in China-US relations is on the rise. This can be seen from Biden's repeated statements of "four nos and one without intention," "five nos and four without intentions," especially the "new three nos" on the Taiwan Question: not supporting "Taiwan independence," not supporting "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and "not seeking to use the Taiwan Question as a tool to contain China." Although there is inconsistency between words and deeds, we should see the positive side. In particular, the U.S. side has raised the expression of the "new three nos" to an unprecedented height. Chang Jung-kung, former Kuomintang deputy secretary-general believes that this is the first time in more than 50 years that the head of state of the United States has promised the head of state of China at a summit. This is a warning to the Democratic Progressive Party that flaunts "Taiwan independence" and an opportunity for the cross-strait peace route of the Kuomintang (also known as Chinese Nationalist Party).

Second, actively plan and manage China-US relations. The development and stability of China-US relations depend first and foremost on the U.S. government's China policy and on whether the U.S. side can correctly and rationally view China's development. After all, the United States is stronger than China. Secondly, we should not leave the future of China-US relations entirely to the U.S. side. China also has a certain degree of say. In stabilizing China-US relations, we should give full play to the initiative of China's diplomacy towards the United States. We should neither allow a few American politicians to undermine China-US relations nor strengthen China's ability to shape China-

US relations. We cannot leave the future of China-US relations entirely to the U.S. side to shape. We should actively plan and manage a "peaceful, coordinated, and stable" China-US relationship that is beneficial to both China and the United States. In view of the long-term nature of the United States' strategic competition and containment policy towards China, China-US strategic confrontation should not be a short-term situation. Therefore, China's strategic response also needs to be long-term, deployed at the strategic level, and then implemented in different levels tactically, with emphasis on implementation. In dealing with the United States, we should not only dare to struggle but also be good at struggling. Promote cooperation through struggle and handle the relationship between "enhancing strength" and "telling good reasons." Biden's commitment to "four nos and one without intention" and Blinken's repeated speeches emphasizing how the Biden administration's China policy serves American interests are intended to win public opinion and conduct social mobilization. But they also release some positive signals for improving China-US relations, emphasizing that competition does not necessarily lead to conflict. The United States does not seek conflict and tries to avoid conflict. It actively weakens the political confrontation in China-US relations and emphasizes that "it does not seek to prevent China from playing its role as a major country, nor does it seek to prevent China from developing its economy or promoting the interests of its people." It admits that China-US relations are one of the most complex and important relations in the world.

Third, China-US management of possible crises in the Taiwan Strait is in line with the "peaceful reunification" policy. The Taiwan Question is not the core interest of the United States. It is just a "card" for the United States to "use Taiwan to contain China." The mainstream opinion of the Biden administration should be that it is unwilling to have a military conflict between China and the United States over the Taiwan Question. In the Taiwan Strait, it is not to "provoke war" but to "avoid war." Of course, it needs to be vigilant that although it may be subjectively wanting to "avoid war," due to China and the United States falling into a "security dilemma," it may actually produce the result of "provoking war." In its Taiwan Strait policy, the Biden administration strengthens "military deterrence" and even strengthens "integrated comprehensive deterrence," upgrades arms sales to Taiwan, provides various "military aid" and "military training," and even "fully arms Taiwan." In essence, it is to strengthen Taiwan's resistance ability and confidence. The United States continuously sends political figures to visit Taiwan to express support for the Taiwan authorities and stabilize and strengthen the mentality and confidence of the Taiwan society to resist the mainland's reunification. I firmly oppose this. It is necessary to clarify that the rhetoric of the United States and the West that "hope for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" is actually a synonym for intervening in Taiwan Strait affairs and interfering in China's internal affairs. The actual effect may be the opposite. When European countries and others repeatedly claim and emphasize on the surface that "peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is very important," their actual actions and effects are precisely to make the Taiwan Strait region more unstable. To maintain lasting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait region, all countries need to truly adhere to the one-China policy. Because the Taiwan Question is China's internal affair, actions like Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and provoking the Chinese mainland will result in greater instability in the Taiwan Strait region. The Taiwan Strait region falls into a "security dilemma" and there is a possibility of "turning the Taiwan Question into a Ukrainian issue."

Fourth, urge the United States to be vigilant about the "Taiwan independence" harmfulness of the Lai Ching-te authorities. The United States should be vigilant about the "Taiwan independence" stance

of the Democratic Progressive Party, especially Lai Ching-te. This can be seen from the relatively low-key reception standard given by the United States when Lai Ching-te "transited" through the United States in August 2023. The United States requires Lai Ching-te to have "no surprises in policies" after taking office and strengthen communication with the United States. However, after Lai Ching-te's administration appeared as a "double minority" (minority in the legislative seats and minority in local governance), the United States has doubts about whether Lai Ching-te can achieve "Taiwan independence." Such an attitude is extremely dangerous. We need to be vigilant about the possibility that the Lai Ching-te authorities may use the "trick" of "administrative leadership" to advance "Taiwan independence" practices, especially "soft Taiwan independence" policy practices and behaviors carried out in terms of society, culture, and consciousness.

(3) Correctly handle three pairs of relationships in China-US relations

First, correctly handle the relationship between "managing risks" and "seizing opportunities." We should always have a sense of crisis, worry, and risk awareness, but also have an awareness of opportunities. Seize possible rare opportunities and make appropriate switches between the two when necessary. In the greater risks and challenges in China-US relations, be good at discovering and using possible very small and short-lived opportunities and seize any possible window of opportunity. Generally speaking, the Biden administration may be a relatively moderate U.S. government towards China. Before the 2024 U.S. presidential election, there is a short "window period" in China-US relations. The restarted dialogue mechanisms on China-US economy and trade, climate, and diplomacy have constructed a relatively controllable framework for China-US strategic competition and interaction. We should think that if China-US relations cannot be better, we should also prevent them from getting worse and prevent a vicious cycle.

Second, correctly handle the dialectical relationship between "showing strength" and "showing weakness." Struggle when it is time to struggle and compromise when it is time to compromise. We should be good at and skillful in struggling. Recognize the fact that the United States, which is on the path to hegemonic decline, is still the only superpower in the world. Deal with China-US relations rationally, objectively, and scientifically. Minimize direct conflicts with the United States, maintain a relatively long-term "competitive coexistence relationship," and try not to let China and the United States show their cards or at least postpone the time when China and the United States finally show their cards. Of course, we must recognize that the essence of the U.S. policy towards China lies in confrontation, containment, deterrence, and suppression. We should deal with the two-handed policy of the United States towards China, which is nominally "competition" but actually confrontation and containment, with a "revolutionary two-handed policy." We should see the contradiction between the strategic goals and strategic strength of the United States' China policy. In fact, the two major strategies of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and "NATO's eastward expansion" are mutually restraining. We should see that the reason why the United States "gathers allies" is actually due to its own insufficient strategic strength. And the end of the Russia-Ukraine conflict seems to be far away.

Third, correctly handle the relationship between "defending sovereignty" and "maintaining stability" on the Taiwan Question. We should firmly defend national core interests. On matters of principle, there is no room for bargaining at all. We should resolutely struggle and never compromise. But maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait region is not only our strategic need but also in the interests of all parties. We should be especially highly vigilant and prevent the "three seas" around us, namely the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, from being linked. Stabilize the Taiwan Strait, stabilize the East China Sea, and stabilize the South China Sea.

(4) Insist on taking developing oneself and enhancing strength as the fundamental

The ultimate solution to the Taiwan Question still depends on the strength of the Chinese mainland itself. It lies in doing our own things well, making every aspect of our work bigger, stronger, and better, and making ourselves more powerful and attractive.

First, adhere to taking economic construction as the center. Adhere to taking economic development and scientific and technological progress as the center of all work. Always adhere to the concept and development route of "development first" without wavering. Continue reform and opening up and be courageous in innovation. Reform means continuing to adhere to taking economic construction as the center under the new situation, adhering to getting out of the middle-income trap and achieving a medium-term goal of per capita GDP exceeding 30,000 U.S. dollars. Strive hard around this center and goal.

Second, adhere to promoting the in-depth development of reform and opening up. Unswervingly promote true opening up. Adhere to the concept of "a community with a shared future for mankind" and actively create a relatively favorable external international environment. We need to overcome two "blind emotions": one is extreme pessimism and disappointment in the external environment of cross-strait relations. One-sidedly believing that now we are "surrounded by enemies" and "besieged on all sides." The second is blind optimism about China's own development situation and prospects. One-sidedly believing that only "the scenery on China's side is unique" in the world today, thus being "arrogant." These two one-sided and blind emotions will lead to similar distorted views, that is, there is no longer a need to strive for a peaceful external environment. The opening up in the new era is an opening up that is "dominated by us and facing the world." Adhere to the political line of domestic reform without wavering. Adhere to the firm direction of integrating into the world without wavering. Promote economic development and promote our own reform. At present, the most urgent thing is to truly promote the construction of a unified domestic market, truly improve the business environment, and truly provide policies and specific services for private enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises.

Third, adhere to promoting the deep integration of the Chinese economy and the global economy. Do everything possible to prevent and avoid the "dichotomy" of the global economy. Promote the establishment of a global trade system that connects the world and forms an open, mutually beneficial, inclusive, and shared "global trade community."

Fourth, adhere to taking science, technology, and economy as the core and strengthen the path of leading economic development with science and technology. We need to think about China's economic issues under the China-US relationship and the future world situation. Consider how to make the Chinese economy "resilient," "durable," and "tough" in relatively difficult situations? How can we still stand and move forward in the continuous shocks? How can we make the road of China's economic and social development truly more solid, stable, and better? Adhere to the thinking that development is the foundation and security is the bottom line. Balance the dynamic relationship between development and security so that they complement each other and achieve the organic unity of high-quality development and high-level security.

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