TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL XKEYSCORE 25 Feb 2008 xkeyscore@nsa DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52 **DATED: 20070108** TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL **DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108** 

## What is XKEYSCORE?



- 1. DNI Exploitation System/Analytic Framework
- 2. Performs strong (e.g. email) and soft (content) selection
- 3. Provides real-time target activity (tipping)
- 4. "Rolling Buffer" of ~3 days of ALL unfiltered data seen by XKEYSCORE:
  - Stores full-take data at the collection site indexed by meta-data
  - Provides a series of viewers for common data types
- 5. Federated Query system one query scans all sites
  - Performing full-take allows analysts to find targets that were previously unknown by mining the meta-data

## Methodology



- Small, focused team
- Work closely with the analysts
- Evolutionary development cycle (deploy early, deploy often)
- React to mission requirements
- Support staff integrated with developers
- Sometimes a delicate balance of mission and research


## System Details




- Massive distributed Linux cluster
- Over 500 servers distributed around the world
- System can scale linearly simply add a new server to the cluster
- Federated Query Mechanism


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL Query Hierarchy







TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL What is unique about XKEYSCORE? TOP:SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL



## Why do shallow



- Can look at more data
- XKEYSCORE can also be configured to go shallow if the data rate is too high

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
## Why go deep



- Strong Selection itself give us only a very limited capability
- A large amount of time spent on the web is performing actions that are anonymous
- We can use this traffic to detect anomalies which can lead us to intelligence by itself, or strong selectors for traditional tasking

## What XKS does with the Sessions

## Plug-ins extract and index metadata into tables



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## Plug-ins



Plug-in	DESCRIPTION
E-mail Addresses	Indexes every E-mail address seen in a session by both username and domain
Extracted Files	Indexes every file seen in a session by both filename and extension
Full Log	Indexes every DNI session collected. Data is indexed by the standard N-tupple (IP, Port, Casenotation etc.)
HTTP Parser	Indexes the client-side HTTP traffic (examples to follow)
Phone Number	Indexes every phone number seen in a session (e.g. address book entries or signature block)
User Activity	Indexes the Webmail and Chat activity to include username, buddylist, machine specific cookies etc.

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## What Can Be Stored?



- Anything you wish to extract
  - Choose your metadata
  - Customizable storage times
  - Ex: HTTP Parser

```
FM IP 58.

GET /search?hl=en&q=islamabad&meta= HTTP/1.0

Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/vnd.ms-application/msword, application/x-shockwave-flash, */*

Referer: nttp://www.google.com.pk/
Accept-Language.en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)


Host: www.google.com.pl
Cookie: PREF=ID=6/8ToUa34384e2f6:TM=1168503483:LM=1168503483:S=KKzZb3kPcw4vNxGt
Via: 1.0 proxy.
X-Forwarded-For: 58.
Cache-Control. max-age=233200
Connection: keep-alive
```

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## Finding Targets



- How do I find a strong-selector for a known target?
- How do I find a cell of terrorists that has no connection to known strong-selectors?
- Answer: Look for anomalous events
  - E.g. Someone whose language is out of place for the region they are in
  - Someone who is using encryption
  - Someone searching the web for suspicious stuff



## Technology Detection



- Show me all the VPN startups in country X, and give me the data so I can decrypt and discover the users
  - These events are easily browsable in XKEYSCORE
    - No strong-selector
  - XKEYSCORE extracts and stores authoring information for many major document types – can perform a retrospective survey to trace the document origin since metadata is typically kept for up to 30 days
  - No other system performs this on raw unselected bulk traffic, data volumes prohibit forwarding

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## Persona Session Collection

- Traditionally triggered by a strong-selector event, but it doesn't have to be this way
- Reverse PSC from anomalous event back to a strong selector. You cannot perform this kind of analysis when the data has first been strong selected.
- Tie in with Marina allow PSC collection after the event


## Language Tracking




- My target speaks German but is in Pakistan – how can I find him?
  - XKEYSCORE's HTTP Activity plugin extracts and stores all HTML language tags which can then be searched
  - Not possible in any other system but XKEYSCORE, nor could it be -
    - volumes are too great to forward
    - No strong-selector


Google Maps


 My target uses G locations - can I determine his em web-searches - c suspicious?



- XKEYSCORE extra Pointer 35\*30\*50.06\* N 82\*20\*06.81\* E including all web-based searches which can be retrospectively queried
- No strong-selector
- Data volume too high to forward







## TAO



- Show me all the exploitable machines in country X
  - Fingerprints from TAO are loaded into XKEYSCORE's application/fingerprintID engine
  - Data is tagged and databased
  - No strong-selector
  - Complex boolean tasking and regular expressions required

# XKEYSCORE Success Stories

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL Over 300 terrorists captured using intelligence generated from XKEYSCOKE TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## XKEYSCORE and TRAFFICTHIE


- Customer: CounterTerrorism (CT)
- Provides near real-time tips to TRAFFICTHIEF server in operations in coordination with coalition forces in Iraq 24 hours a day
- Currently producing hundreds of confirmed alerts per day on over 3000 user accounts

Afternoon of 2004 – coalition detained individuals below:

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### XKEYSCORE Success





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## Innovation



- High Speed Selection
- Toolbar
- Integration with Marina
- GPRS, WLAN integration
- SSO CRDB
- Workflows
- Multi-level Dictionaries

## Future



- High speeds yet again (algorithmic and Cell Processor (R4))
- Better presentation
- Entity Extraction
- VoIP
- More networking protocols
- Additional metadata
  - Expand on google-earth capability
  - EXIF tags
  - Integration of all CES-AppProcs
- Easier to install/maintain/upgrade