



Collaboration and multi-stakeholder dialogue

A review of the literature

Version 1.1
March 2012



IUCN Photo Library © IUCN / Christian Laufenberg

© 2011, 2012 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources

The designation of geographical entities in this report, and the presentation of the material, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IUCN concerning the legal status of any country, territory, or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of IUCN or DGIS.

Reproduction of this publication for educational or other non-commercial purposes is authorized without prior written permission from the copyright holder provided the source is fully acknowledged. Reproduction of this publication for resale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without prior written permission of the copyright holder.

THE PAST FEW DECADES have seen the rise of collaborative approaches to public policy and management that bring state and non-state stakeholders together in collective forums to engage in consensus-based decision making (Ansell and Gash 2008). Collaboration has emerged primarily as a response to the limitations and failures of expert administration, an approach heavily influenced by managerialist values such as economic efficiency, a faith in specialist skills and knowledge, and an emphasis on control through hierarchy (Edwards 1998). This has struggled to cope with certain kinds of policy problems that are complex, involve interdependent actors, and require cooperation with non-state actors (Collins and Ison 2006; Dietz and Stern 2008; Fung 2006). Such problems, described variously as “wicked”, “messy”, “turbulent” or “meta-problems”, are especially common in environmental policy (Dietz and Stern 2008).

Another, related reason for the rise of collaboration has been growing public demand for transparency, accountability and participation (OECD 2001). Changing social conditions, including changing expectations about citizens’ roles in policy making, have led to greater public participation and greater understanding of what constitutes effective participation (Koontz and Thomas 2006; Senecah 2004). People no longer trust government agencies to act in their interests unless they can play an active role in policy and decision making. Recognising this, governments are putting greater emphasis on procedural values such as participation and dialogue – Bäckstrand *et al.* (2010) call this “the deliberative turn” in governance – as a way of shoring up their legitimacy and strengthening public accountability.

The strengths and benefits of collaboration

Collaboration, it is argued, has several advantages over administrative approaches to decision making. At root these draw on two main rationales for public participation in general: a substantive, or instrumental, rationale; and a process rationale (Ananda 2004; Holder and Lee 2007; Richardson and Razzaque 2006).

In essence, the instrumental rationale for participation argues that it can improve the outcomes of the decision-making process. This may happen in several ways. At its simplest, participation can increase the information available to decision makers, allowing access to dispersed knowledge, expertise and ideas (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011; Holder and Lee 2007). Technical capacity alone, however, cannot resolve the many risks, uncertainties and variables in decision making on complex environmental problems. This constraint leads to a second benefit of participation, namely, its ability to provide different perspectives on the risks and uncertainties which should be considered in reaching a decision, to evaluate how the

risks should be weighed against the benefits, and to consider whether the possible benefits outweigh the remaining uncertainty (Steele 2001). Stirling (2010) suggests that participation has a particular role to play in cases of policy ambiguity, where actors disagree over the framing of possible options, outcomes, benefits or dangers, and where the choices available cannot be reduced to simple risk analysis. Thirdly, participation can lead to better compliance and implementation, not just to better decisions, by creating a sense of ownership and responsibility for the chosen course of action, by increasing acceptance for a difficult decision, or by increasing operational efficiency and available resources (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011). In other words, participation can enhance the effectiveness of the pursued policy (Newig 2007).

In contrast to this instrumental view of participation, the process rationale sees participation as valuable in itself and necessary to the procedural or democratic legitimacy of decision making (Holder and Lee 2007). It is widely assumed that people have certain procedural rights to be consulted and heard in decision making, and that exercising those rights can strengthen the legitimacy and public acceptability not only of policy decisions, but also of the underlying system of governance (Bäckstrand *et al.* 2010; Oughton 2008; Richardson and Razzaque 2006). Here, as Newig (2007) points out, the instrumental and process aspects of participation overlap. A legitimate decision may be accepted more easily and so implemented more easily. An effective decision may also be considered more legitimate.¹

¹ Another way of looking at the interrelationship between the instrumental and process aspects of participation is the concept of input and output legitimacy (Scharpf, cited by Bäckstrand 2006). Input legitimacy concerns the participatory quality of the decision-making process, that is, whether it conforms to procedural demands. Output legitimacy concerns the effectiveness or problem-solving capacity of the governance system as a whole (Bäckstrand 2006).

AUTHORS

This review was researched and written by Matthew Markopoulos, with inputs from Guido Broekhoven and Bob Fisher. It is one product of a wider programme of work on collaboration and multi-stakeholder dialogue in forest conservation under IUCN’s Livelihoods and Landscapes Strategy (LLS), financed by the Netherlands Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS).

Participation can also have a transformative effect on people's attitudes, priorities and capacities, and on their relationships with government agencies and other policy actors (Buchy and Hoverman 2000). It can enhance trust and understanding, mediate conflicting interests, and improve environmental awareness (Dietz and Stern 2008; Newig 2007). Ultimately it can build people's ability to engage in policy issues in more productive ways that strengthen civil society and improve the overall quality of civic experience (Senecah 2004).

In one way or another, most of the claimed benefits from collaboration, and from different collaborative approaches, can be traced to these two rationales for participation. Yaffee and Wondolleck (2000), for example, claim that collaboration can produce better decisions because it promotes information sharing and creative solutions, and can improve the chances that decisions are implemented because participants commit themselves to shared goals and actions. In terms of process, they believe that collaboration can build relationships between isolated or alienated groups and individuals. Innes and Booher (2003) view collaboration above all as a way to establish new networks among actors and increase the distribution of knowledge among them. They also see it as a way of solving problems when there is conflict in the policy system.

The effectiveness of collaboration

Despite the overlap between its instrumental and process aspects, the focus of public participation in the environment is usually on improving the effectiveness of policy and management (Coenen 2009; Coenen, Huitema and O'Toole 1998; Fritsch and Newig 2007). As Holder and Lee (2007) point out, if participation is justified by instrumental criteria, its effectiveness should be susceptible to testing by outcome. Yet, for various reasons, evidence for the effectiveness of collaboration in improving outcomes is still limited. The existing literature on collaboration focuses on process rather than impact (Koontz and Thomas 2006; Thomas 2008). Frameworks for examining both the effectiveness of the collaborative process and its outcomes are poorly developed or lacking altogether (Muñoz-Erickson *et al.* 2010). Tied to this is some uncertainty about what outcomes should be assessed to give a full picture of effectiveness. It is not certain that improved policy and management outcomes alone are adequate, given the innovative, cross-sectoral and process-oriented nature of collaboration (Rogers and Weber 2010). Even so, Koontz and Thomas (2006) argue that the success of collaboration should be measured primarily in terms of its environmental outcomes.

Holder and Lee (2007) identify a number of general constraints to assessing environmental outcomes. First, testing the quality of a decision assumes a consensus on its objectives, and so on what constitutes a good outcome. Even if the aim of the decision is benign, actors may legitimately disagree about the required policy solution. Trade-offs are common in environmental policy, and different priorities lead to different assessments of a good decision. Nor does hindsight make judgement of objectives any easier: a bad outcome does not necessarily mean that a decision was wrong or that an unacceptable risk was taken. Moreover, a good decision will inevitably incorporate other aspects of public interest besides environmental ones. Holder and Lee conclude that "the quality of any particular decision is a normative question, rather than a simple empirical inquiry ... revisiting and reassessing decisions ... is likely to be contentious."

To these general constraints may be added some specific methodological ones. Koontz and Thomas (2006) argue that linking decision-making and management processes of any kind to environmental outcomes faces three main challenges: 1. Gathering data that measures environmental outcomes as opposed to outputs (such as plans or policies); 2. Allowing for the long time horizons between the implementation of collaborative outputs and any environmental change; and 3. Designing research protocols that untangle the effects of the multiple interacting variables shaping environmental change. The challenges of long time horizons and disentangling causal factors are echoed by Lund, Balooni and Casse (2009) in their review of 60 studies of the impact of public participation on forest conservation outcomes. Conley and Moote (2003) note that similar challenges apply to evaluating socio-economic outcomes such as community well-being or economic sustainability.

Some researchers have assessed environmental outcomes through indirect measures such as people's perceptions of environmental improvements, but perceptions can be unreliable or biased (Dietz and Stern 2008; Koontz and Thomas 2006; Lund *et al.* 2009). Leach and Sabatier (2005) found that the trust formed through a collaborative process can create a "halo effect" which leads participants to rate their impact on environmental conditions as higher than it actually is.

For these reasons, what is known about the impacts of collaboration centres on process outcomes and social outcomes. Successful collaborative efforts have been shown to improve

information sharing and communication among participants, and to increase trust and social capital (Innes and Booher 2003; Koontz and Thomas 2006; Rogers and Weber 2010; Thomas 2008; Yaffee and Wondollock 2000). Over time, these changes can lead to shared identities and understanding, new ways of learning and problem solving, and more innovative solutions (Innes and Booher 2003; Poncelet 2001a). Recent research has identified three further process outcomes: improved problem-solving capacity in government agencies; development and transfer of “soft” technology (standards, processes and so on); and expanded problem solving in areas outside the immediate focus of collaboration (Rogers and Weber 2010).

Multi-stakeholder dialogue (MSD) as a form of collaboration

Considerations of the rationale and impacts of collaboration are relevant to MSD since it can be classed as a collaborative approach. Characterising MSD is not easy, however. Definitions vary and, as Warner (2005) points out, they tend to reflect a theoretical ideal rather than actual practice. Wide variations in terminology also complicate the picture, with some writers referring to MSD and others to multi-stakeholder “platforms”, “processes”, “partnerships”, “committees”, “roundtables”, “forums”, “initiatives”, “deliberation” or “negotiation” (Bäckstrand 2006; Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Faysse 2006; Hemmati 2002, 2007; Koechlin and Calland 2009; Steins and Edwards 1999a; Turcotte and Pasquero 2001; Tyler 2009; Warner 2005). Yet several common features bind these different ideas of MSD together and link them to collaboration: participation of multiple state and non-state stakeholders; a forum or space where participants can physically interact; a specific issue or problem that concerns all participants and supplies the pretext for convening a dialogue; and a process of collective learning, problem solving and (potentially) decision making based on consensus or negotiated compromise.

Each of these elements is present in an MSD and, by extension, any approach lacking one or more cannot be considered a “true” MSD. So, as Susskind *et al.* (2003) and Warner (2007) argue, both state and non-state interests must be represented, preferably from different administrative and geographical levels. And, though Hemmati (2002) describes many MSDs as one-off events, it is more usual to see MSD as an open-ended or bounded process where discussions are linked to decision and action (Faysse 2006). Opinions differ, however, on whether and to what extent an MSD should have decision-making powers. For

some writers, an MSD does not exist simply to inform, advise or recommend; it must also have some degree of formal decision-making power (Faysse 2006; Tyler 2009). For others, decision making may be one possible purpose of an MSD, but others such as consultation and social learning are just as valid (Hemmati 2002, 2007; Luttrell 2008).

Multi-stakeholder dialogue: power and consensus

The question of decision-making power reflects a widespread concern with evaluating and categorising models of participation according to how much power they exert. Following Arnstein’s influential conception of public participation as a ladder with citizen control at the top and manipulation at the bottom (Arnstein 1969), researchers such as Creighton (cited in Ananda 2004) and Ast and Boot (2003) have developed typologies of participation and participatory techniques based on levels of citizen involvement and power-sharing. Using similar criteria, Warner (2005, 2006) presents a typology of MSDs in the water sector.

The emphasis on power in MSD is a response to social, political and economic inequalities in environmental policy and management, as well as the perceived idealism of some MSD proponents who believe these inequalities can be managed or eliminated (Faysse 2006). Power is a complex phenomenon with both surface and deep-structure aspects (Everett and Jamal 2004). The MSD literature tends to focus on surface power, that is, who has control over the decision-making process.² For Warner (2006), surface power is critical because the sector he discusses – water policy – is in most countries dominated by government, so all participation is essentially a form of power-sharing. The same could be said of forests and other natural resource sectors, where policy likewise is mainly in the hands of government.

Warner and others (for example Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Everett and Jamal 2004; Leroy 2002) also argue that the mechanisms and outcomes of decision making in an MSD will invariably be influenced by the power relations of participants. Hence the search for negotiated agreements based on consensus is not just unrealistic but also undesirable, since an apparent consensus may mask co-optation, manipulation or some other pressure to quell dissenting views (Coglianese 1999; Daniels and Walker 1999;

² Deep-structure power refers to the values, traditions, ways of thinking and forms of language that shape and maintain a society’s conventional wisdom or dominant ideology (Everett and Jamal 2004).

Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). If the resulting agreement skates over inequality and conflict, it will lack legitimacy in some quarters and is unlikely to be either durable or effective. For Edmunds and Wollenberg, the answer to this problem is not to insist that all participants come to agreement but to build alliances among select stakeholders.

Power is undoubtedly important, but its centrality in conceptualising and constraining approaches such as MSD has been questioned. Collins and Ison (2006), for example, argue that the focus on power of Arnstein's ladder and related typologies has several conceptual and practical weaknesses. First, although it assumes participation to be hierarchical with citizen control as the goal, participants may have other reasons for engaging, and may not necessarily view a lack of full control as a failure. Second, the linear relationship between non-participation and control implies that policy problems remain constant while the approach varies, whereas problems vary and require different levels and types of participation depending on context. Third, the suggestion that participants' roles and responsibilities change only in relation to changing levels of power is unempirical. Relations can be complex, with roles vague and responsibilities emerging during and as a result of participation.

Collins and Ison, and Innes (2004), suggest that participants may define their roles not in relation to their power, but in relation to their stake in solving a problem. Innes refers to the BATNA, or Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, a concept from negotiation theory. In essence, the BATNA is the results that can be obtained without negotiating (Fisher, Ury and Patton 2011). Notwithstanding someone's sense of power, a poor BATNA will bring them into the dialogue and give them an incentive to work collaboratively towards a solution (Innes 2004). Conversely, a good one may make some other course of action besides collaboration more preferable. Innes argues that if all stakeholders have incentives to cooperate, as well as some reciprocal interests, a process of genuine consensus-building becomes possible. Nevertheless, certain design and process criteria must hold if a consensus is to be reached, for example inclusivity, mutual respect and understanding, and an open and informed dialogue unconstrained in either time or content (Innes 2004).

Uptake and institutionalisation of multi-stakeholder dialogue

Several threads can be traced in the development of MSD worldwide in environmental and developmental decision making. *Our Common Future*, the

report of the World Commission on Environment and Development submitted to the UN General Assembly in 1987, called on governments to embrace multi-stakeholder participation as a way of building understanding and support for public policies (WCED 1987). Responding to this challenge, Canada established a National Task Force on Environment and Economy, whose recommendations included setting up multi-stakeholder round tables on sustainable development at national, provincial and local levels (CCREM 1987). Several such round tables were formed in the 1980s and 1990s, including the still-active National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy.

Formally, a requirement for involving multiple stakeholder groups in policy was stated in Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration (Oughton 2008). Agenda 21, the action plan adopted to implement the Rio Declaration, has given rise to numerous MSD initiatives at the local government level (Warner 2005). The requirement for multi-stakeholder participation was restated in Article 26 of the Johannesburg Declaration, an outcome of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Multi-stakeholder partnerships were heavily promoted at the World Summit, where they became known as "Type 2" outcomes, along with the intergovernmental "Type 1" outcomes of the Johannesburg Declaration and associated Plan of Implementation (Biermann *et al.* 2007). Over 300 such partnerships are now registered with the United Nations.³

At the regional level, the UNECE Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters came into force in 2001. The European Union is a party to the Convention (as are over 40 European and Central Asian states) and has begun incorporating its requirements in its legislation, for example the 2000 Water Framework Directive and 2003 Public Participation Directive (Kremlis 2005). The Water Framework Directive calls for public participation in formulating, implementing and monitoring river basin management plans, and has been influential in promoting collaboration and MSD in European water governance (Warner 2007).

At the national level, collaboration and MSD are increasingly common features of public policy and management, especially in Western Europe and North America. In the United States, for example,

³ http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/dsd_aofw_par/par_csdregipart.shtml. Some, but not all, of these partnerships can be considered MSDs (Warner 2006).

participation has been mandated in nearly every federal environmental and land management statute since the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969 (Dietz and Stern 2008). In Europe, participatory approaches are expanding not just with the implementation of regional treaties or European Union legislation, but also with national programmes of experimentation with public participation. Parkinson (2006), for example, discusses three MSD initiatives in the British health sector, where participatory approaches burgeoned after a Labour government was elected in 1997.⁴

Outside of formal policy and legislation, collaboration and MSD figure heavily in the work of a wide range of UN agencies, multilateral organisations, donors and non-governmental organisations (Susskind *et al.* 2003). They have been instrumental in promoting MSD in less-developed countries, where space for public participation can be limited but donor-funded projects provide the resources and impetus to experiment with new approaches. MSDs can now be found across a wide range of policy sectors in developing countries, including water and sanitation, dams, agriculture and food security, mining and other extractive industries, fisheries and forests (Dore, Robinson and Smith 2010; Evans, Raschid-Sally and Cofie 2010; Gilmour, Durst and Shono 2007; Hamann *et al.* 2011; Hemmati 2002; Koechlin and Calland 2009; Moore, Dore and Gyawali 2010; Smits *et al.* 2007a; Warner 2005, 2006; WWF 2010).

The forest sector has produced a rich variety of MSDs and a modest critical literature on their strengths and weaknesses (see for example Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Wollenberg, Anderson and López 2005). Examples of regional and international initiatives with MSD elements include National Forest Programmes (NFPs); the Model Forests programme; The Forests Dialogue; Forest Governance and Learning Groups; Forest Stewardship Council; Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil; the Congo Basin Forest Partnership; the European Union's Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) action plan; and the REDD-plus preparatory processes supported by the United Nations, World Bank and others (Bond *et al.* 2009; Daviet 2011; du Preez 2010; Elbakidze *et al.* 2010; Gilmour *et al.* 2007; Saunders, Ebeling and Nussbaum 2008; WWF 2010).

⁴ The move towards greater consultation and participation in Europe has not been without its setbacks. The Dutch Crisis and Recovery Act of 2010, for example, which aims to speed up decision making on a range of development projects, has been criticised for curtailing citizens' procedural rights and contravening, in spirit if not in word, the UNECE Aarhus Convention (Verschuuren 2011).

National and sub-national multi-stakeholder initiatives include Regional Forest Agreements in Australia; Indonesia's Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme; the Liberia Forestry Initiative; District Forest Coordination Committees in Nepal; Multi-stakeholder Forest Protection Committees in the Philippines; the Honduran Forestry Agenda; National Forest planning in the United States; and Canada's National Forest Round Table on Sustainable Development⁵ (Ananda 2004, 2007; Brotem and Unruh 2009; Cruz and Pulhin 2006; Dietz and Stern 2008; Driscoll 1996; Fahmi *et al.* 2003; FAO 2005; Gilmour *et al.* 2007; Rana *et al.* 2009; World Bank 2010).

The Eliasch review of the economics of climate change highlighted the NFP and FLEGT processes as two good models of MSD in support of forest governance reforms, because they "can contribute to higher levels of trust between governments, the private sector, NGOs and community groups" (Eliasch 2008). NFPs are based on the principles of participation and partnership (Reeb 2004). These can be implemented in several ways, including by creating national and sub-national multi-stakeholder bodies to guide forest policy planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (FAO 2009). Examples of MSDs established or being developed in support of NFPs include regional forest policy roundtables (*mesas de concertación forestal*) in Guatemala (Oliva Hurtarte, Sales Hernández and Bustos García 2006); a national stakeholder forum in Uganda (Sepp and Mansur 2006); and national and county forest forums in Liberia (FAO 2011).

As part of the FLEGT process, the European Union requires that negotiations for a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) – a bilateral treaty with a trading partner aimed at ensuring the legality of its wood exports to Europe – be based on "wide consultation with all interested parties" (European Commission 2007). The governments of VPA partner countries have established multi-stakeholder negotiating delegations and technical working groups to meet this demand, and to provide broad input into the design of policy solutions (Saunders *et al.* 2008). In Ghana, the first country to sign a VPA, the multi-stakeholder negotiation process has reportedly led to "positive" shifts in rules and power relations in the forest sector, although their permanence is an open question (Beeko and Arts 2010).

⁵ This round table was one of several multi-stakeholder dialogues on sustainable development in resource sectors organised under Canada's National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (Thompson and Webb 1994) (see beginning of this section).

Impacts of multi-stakeholder dialogue

As a species of collaboration, MSD suffers from a familial lack of evidence for its ability to improve policy and management outcomes, or its advantages over other forms of stakeholder communication or decision-making processes for tackling difficult policy problems (Payne and Calton 2004). Both descriptive and comparative studies of MSD tend to show the same concern for process outcomes seen in other literature on collaboration. For example, Hemmati (2002), in a widely cited book on MSD, discusses its procedural and structural aspects in detail but offers little information on its effectiveness. In a study of MSDs convened by the United Nations' Commission on Sustainable Development, Ferez (2002) uses five indicators of success, only one of which addresses policy formulation and implementation. Another comparative study by Retolaza and Diez Pinto (2007) focuses almost exclusively on the societal learning and change due to three MSDs in Argentina, Colombia and Jamaica, though to be fair they are all heavily process-oriented.

Some studies of MSD have sought evidence of effectiveness, but have been hindered by design and process limitations in the dialogue itself. Bäckstrand (2006), for example, assesses the potential outcomes of the Type 2 multi-stakeholder partnerships formed to implement the agreements of the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development. Although noting that a review of environmental effectiveness would be premature, Bäckstrand finds that the majority of partnerships fail to provide concrete and quantifiable environmental and developmental targets. Many are also only weakly linked to existing institutions and multilateral agreements, and lack systematic review, reporting and monitoring. These weaknesses constitute a major barrier to assessing their effectiveness.

In general, MSD has been shown to have a range of positive, process-related impacts. The dialogues evaluated by Ferez (2002) had few tangible outputs but did help to create networks among participants, enhance trust and disseminate knowledge to support learning and build capacity. They also led to renewed commitments to promote sustainability from many of the participating groups. Retolaza and Diez Pinto (2007) found that MSD stimulated social learning and change along three axes: the individual, the organisational, and the social. Its impacts on the individual axis included changed attitudes, improved listening skills, greater tolerance for differences of opinion, and enhanced social networking. On the organisational they included the

creation of post-dialogue monitoring and support structures. On the social axis, MSD expanded space for further dialogue and participation, gave rise to new stakeholder partnerships, and in one case led to concrete changes in policy.

The impact on individuals highlighted by Retolaza and Diez Pinto (2007) has been noted by others as a consequence of social learning in MSD. Poncelet (2001a), for example, discusses the "personal transformation" wrought through dialogue by changes to participants' mutual understanding, the development of new relationships, the adoption of new ways of approaching environmental problem solving, and the formation of altered identities. Varma *et al.* (2009) point out that this process is a gradual one: MSDs can provide space for sharing information and raising awareness, but need time to evolve to bring about changes in participants' attitudes and actions. The strength of these effects, and their significance in terms of the effectiveness of dialogue, also vary. Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) argue that the diversity of opinions in MSD can limit the problem-solving benefits of social learning to incremental innovation: "small wins" rather than clearly defined problems and solutions. And Newig and Fritsch (2009) provide evidence that social learning does not necessarily lead to more ecologically rational (that is, stringent) decisions than top-down decision making – an important consideration in assessing the relative impact of collaboration on environmental quality.

The documented impacts of MSDs in the forest sector are similar to those elsewhere, emphasising changes such as enhanced trust and understanding, greater knowledge sharing and learning, and stronger social networks (Fahmi *et al.* 2003; Gilmour *et al.* 2007; Oliva Hurtarte *et al.* 2006; Rana *et al.* 2009). Outcomes are not uniformly positive, however. Various studies of Regional Forest Agreements (RFAs) in Australia have shown how these large-scale multi-stakeholder assessments largely failed either to incorporate public values into decision making or to resolve conflicts (Ananda 2004; Brown 2002; Lane 1999, 2003). Lane (1999, 2003) has argued that, far from being an inclusive process of negotiation among key stakeholders, the RFA was a highly centralised, technical process that provided no opportunities for dialogue, and served to manage political conflict rather than deal with underlying policy conflicts.

In a study of five MSDs in Indonesia's forest sector, Fahmi *et al.* (2003) found that changes in individual attitudes were not necessarily matched by changes in institutional ones because of frequent

transfers of officials. Fahmi *et al.* also highlight a number of other failings, including unclear boundaries of dialogue, the absence of certain relevant stakeholders, and a lack of commitment to follow-up and action.

Beyond social and process outcomes, the evidence from the forest sector is sketchier. At the national level, one of the few studies to identify concrete improvements in forest governance as a result of MSD is an assessment of Nepal's District Forest Coordination Committees (DFCCs) by Rana *et al.* (2009). The authors report that DFCC processes have "significantly improved" key forest governance indicators such as transparency, accountability and effectiveness. Their methodology depends heavily on the feedback and perceptions of DFCC stakeholders, however, so the influence of a halo effect (see above) cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, there seems no reason to doubt their finding that DFCC processes have broadened citizen participation in forest-related decision making, and enhanced the political acceptability and implementation of decisions (Rana *et al.* 2009).

Challenges of multi-stakeholder dialogue

These results point to a number of challenges in ensuring that MSD is successful, at least from the point of view of a collaborative process, if not a way to improve policy and management outcomes. Although they vary in their relevance and impact depending on the nature of the dialogue (Margerum 2008), several broad groups of process-related challenges can be identified: stakeholder composition and representation; participation capacity; structure of interaction; facilitation; external support and linkages; and resource needs (Bäckstrand 2006; Booher 2004; Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Faysse 2006; Parkinson 2006; Senecah 2004; Steins and Edwards 1999b; Susskind *et al.* 2003; Tyler 2009; Warner 2007; Wollenberg *et al.* 2005).

Who participates in an MSD, and whom or what they represent, are crucial questions. They relate to, and to some extent depend on, the salience of the issue being addressed, the opportunity costs and perceived benefits of taking part, and the barriers to participation created by procedural requirements, social structures, beliefs, prejudices and so on (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Parkinson 2006; Steins and Edwards 1999b; Warner 2006). How these questions are answered has important implications for the legitimacy and accountability of the MSD, both to participants and to non-participants.

As noted, the representation of multiple state and non-state interests is a defining feature of MSD. Yet identifying stakeholders can be problematic when they are not already organised or when they are unable to voice their interests (Faysse 2006; Maarleveld and Dangbégnon, cited by Steins and Edwards 1999b). Gauging the relative importance of different groups' interests or claims can be hard in complex stakeholder environments such as forested landscapes (Colfer 1999). Without active efforts to balance participation, the composition of an MSD can end up reflecting the dominant social classes and norms of the society or sector in which it operates (Koehler and Koontz 2008; Reed 2010; Retolaza 2008). Timing is also important when involving stakeholders: if they are all included at once, it may be difficult to build the trust necessary for shared dialogue; if inclusion is too slow, momentum may be lost, resources wasted and the legitimacy of the dialogue called into question (Johnston *et al.* 2011). Representation itself can also be a difficult and contentious function if constituents have unclear, unstable or divergent interests, if representatives are designated by outsiders or are accountable to them, or if representatives are co-opted within the process and fail to pursue their constituents' interests (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Steins and Edwards 1999b; Susskind *et al.* 2003; Warner 2006).

Representation is an important aspect of legitimacy and accountability in MSD. Elsasser (2007) identifies a potential legitimacy deficit in MSD caused by a lack of formal bonds between participants and non-participants. In the case examined by Elsasser, Germany's NFP process, the problem is that even though participants are deciding on national forest policy aims, they are neither democratically authorised nor accountable to the wider population. Similarly, in the context of health sector MSDs in Britain, Parkinson (2006) notes that decisions appear to be illegitimate for those left out of the dialogue, and there is no obvious reason why non-participants should assent to its outcomes.⁶

With all but the most localised issues, participation by everyone affected by the outcomes of MSD is impractical, so some way is needed to decide who can speak for, and decide for, oth-

⁶ Although valid, the legitimacy argument is sometimes misused to impugn rather than strengthen MSD. For example the multi-stakeholder World Commission on Dams (WCD) and some other MSDs, particularly ones led by civil society, have been accused by state actors of being undemocratic and even subversive, apparently because they have taken policy positions in opposition to the dominant state-led policy processes (Dore 2007; Dore and Lebel 2010).

ers. Parkinson (2006) sees the problem of legitimacy as acutest at the decision-making end of dialogue, where binding collective decisions are made. Here, formal bonds of accountability and authorisation are needed between representatives and their constituents, and representatives ideally should be elected, not appointed. Yet tight bonds between representatives and constituents can cause problems if representatives are expected to take part in a process of dialogue and learning leading to common positions, but have been instructed to take particular positions on issues.⁷ Here Parkinson recommends that representatives perform “representation as relationship”, that is, carry on a two-way process of communication with their constituents in which non-participants’ points of view are taken to the dialogue, and the reasons for and against them transmitted back.

Where the purpose of dialogue is not to take binding decisions but to consult, advise or recommend, the bonds between representatives and constituents need not be as strong. In some cases, links between participants and non-participants may be created through communication and publicity rather than formal representation (Parkinson 2006). Yet this approach has several drawbacks: a) it lacks an effective sanction on participants’ behaviour; b) issues have to be salient to generate attention; c) communication tends to be one-way, particularly media coverage, so outsiders cannot respond or signal their preferences; and d) it creates an audience and encourages those inside the dialogue to speak to the audience rather than other participants (Parkinson 2006).

Being able to nominate a suitable representative, and to carry on a transparent and accountable relationship with them, is an important aspect of participation capacity in MSD. Other aspects concern the ability of representatives to join the dialogue and play a full and effective role in the discussion. Some representatives may lack the time or resources to attend meetings. Once there, they may lack the information, technical capacity, relationship-building skills and negotiating skills needed to participate fully in the discussion and represent their constituents’ interests effectively (Fahmi *et al.* 2003; Faysse 2006; Wollenberg *et al.* 2005).

The quality and effectiveness of participation notwithstanding, if any MSD is to perform properly

⁷ These contradictory and competing demands stem from an historical conception of representatives as either delegates or trustees. Delegates simply follow the expressed preferences of their constituents; trustees follow their own judgement about the best course of action to pursue (Dovi 2008).

the nature and scope of the dialogue must be clearly defined, and appropriate mechanisms put in place to structure the process of decision making – if that is the dialogue’s purpose. One of the indicators of success used by Fahmi *et al.* (2003) in their study in Indonesia was whether the boundaries of dialogue had been clearly defined early on in the process. In most cases they had not, because of conflicting views on problem definition and the purpose and goals of the dialogue. Difficulties in setting boundaries can arise because, as Warner (2006) points out, an MSD is a “contrived situation” in which the rules, topics and participants may to some extent be dictated by the convenor. The convenor will have certain views on what issues are important, relevant or permissible, and not all participants will necessarily share these (Wollenberg *et al.* 2005). Some, for example disadvantaged or marginalised groups, may find it hard to table certain concerns; equally, they may not want some topics opened to discussion, for example fundamental issues or rights related to their livelihoods, identity or security (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001).

Setting boundaries can also be complicated by competing views of how a problem should be tackled or by competing institutional cultures. Writing about public participation in Australia, Eversole (2011) notes that government efforts to engage communities often result in confusion and tension because of differing expectations, values and ways of working. When governments try to engage communities, it is invariably on their own terms. However well intentioned, these efforts oblige participants to adapt to bureaucratic constraints, inadvertently marginalising those who cannot bear the cost or meet the requirements of engaging with government.

As discussed, many writers see MSD as an inherently political process where power relations strongly condition outputs. In this view, interaction within MSDs must be carefully structured with checks, balances and accountability measures to minimise the influence of existing power structures. For example, weaker groups can be empowered through alliances, sharing information and capacity building (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Wollenberg *et al.* 2005). Other mechanisms can be used to counter abuses of power, such as providing for legal appeals to decisions, separating and balancing decision-making power across several groups, third-party monitoring, public meetings and reporting, and fostering civic education and social movements (Wollenberg *et al.* 2005). Even so, group decisions may result in some stakeholders’ interests prevailing over oth-

ers, making it necessary to create mechanisms of compensation or reciprocity to help those who benefit least (Wollenberg *et al.* 2005).

Much hinges on the rules and principles adopted by participants to help them discuss and decide. Equally important are the processes for devising rules and opportunities for participants to revise the rules (Wollenberg *et al.* 2005). Convenors usually play a major role in driving how rules are selected, as do facilitators. Good process facilitation is widely seen as crucial to the success of MSD (Hemmati 2002, 2007; Smits *et al.* 2007b; Steins and Edwards 1999a, 1999b; Susskind *et al.* 2003; Tyler 2009; Warner 2006). Facilitation is a multifaceted role, covering guidance and continuity for the process, fostering participation and empowerment of stakeholders, managing conflict and, if necessary, process documentation and sharing (Smits *et al.* 2007b). Facilitators are sometimes expected to be neutral (Laban *et al.* 2005; Moriarty *et al.* 2007; Upreti and Shahbaz 2011), but it is unlikely that anyone can be completely neutral (Smits *et al.* 2007b; Woodhill 2004). Moreover, if facilitators try to be neutral they may unwittingly reproduce existing biases and inequities (Steins and Edwards 1999b). On the other hand, actions such as helping weaker groups may be judged by other participants as conflicting with a facilitating role (Faysse 2006). What seems most important is that facilitators have legitimacy in the eyes of other actors, even when it is recognised that they are not completely neutral (Smits *et al.* 2007b).

Beyond issues of composition, representation and interaction, MSD faces various challenges related to how it fits into and links to wider decision-making and implementation processes. MSDs do not take place in a void. Some are an integral part of the normal legal and institutional environment, for example those set up under laws or policies which mandate public participation. Many are voluntary or external initiatives which operate outside existing frameworks but seek links with formal institutions or processes to influence, advise, inform and so on. Such MSDs can create an artificial context for themselves with its own rules and conventions, but still have to move back and forth between this “constructed world” (Wollenberg *et al.* 2005) and the real world. Rights and recognition given in an MSD, for example to the claims of a marginalised group, may yet be denied nationally, although in time the MSD could succeed in changing policy (Wollenberg *et al.* 2005).

In general, the more closely an MSD is linked to existing higher-level institutions, agreements or

processes, the more effective it is likely to be in influencing its external context (Bäckstrand 2006; Evans *et al.* 2010; Stein and Edwards 1999a). A balance has to be struck between attachment and independence, however. MSDs formally attached to official decision-making processes can be constrained by the more formal rules of the official bodies involved, undermining the point of using MSD to escape the limitations of official decision making (Susskind *et al.* 2003). They can also be seen as supporting existing power structures, which may influence the willingness of certain stakeholders to participate (Evans *et al.* 2010). Up-scaling is a special form of attachment, in the sense that a local MSD is extended and linked to a higher regional or national MSD. Here, the benefits of collaboration and dialogue at the local level can be lost unless there is an intermediary structure to facilitate communication and collaboration between bodies at different levels (Prager 2010).

Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001) draw attention to the often neglected issue of how an MSD stands in relation to other strategies used by stakeholders to pursue their aims. A common assumption is that an MSD can be considered separately from these strategies, or at best one of a sequence of steps. Yet stakeholders may try to link it to other actions, for example to provide political cover for more confrontational tactics, or to complement parallel moves to seek formal agreements. Setting an MSD within this wider context may not only make it more effective, but also lessen any pressure on stakeholders to restrict their activities to the MSD, particularly as some of these activities may be intended to strengthen their voice and place in the dialogue (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). This assumes, however, that the MSD does not undermine other strategies, or deter stakeholders who may want to use them from participating. This may happen if the dialogue takes a nonconfrontational approach, whether for cultural or ideological reasons (Poncelet 2001b). Avoiding conflict may help to attract certain stakeholders and facilitate a wider dialogue, but it also may suppress discussion of inherently contentious yet nonetheless important issues. It may also delegitimize confrontational approaches and alienate the stakeholders who use such approaches in other contexts (Poncelet 2001b).

Lastly, establishing an MSD and addressing the challenges that can arise is costly in terms of time and money (Faysse 2006; Sijbesma, Smits and Moriarty 2007; Susskind *et al.* 2003; Tyler 2009; Warner 2006; Wollenberg *et al.* 2005). Stakeholders and their representatives need to be identified, meetings scheduled and organised, skilled

facilitators engaged, documents prepared, and communications among organisers, participants and constituencies managed. When some participants lack adequate resources, MSDs may also be called upon to cover their preparation and travel expenses. A lack of funds for this purpose – particularly funds from independent sources – may weaken the ability of the process to deliver credible, legitimate results (Susskind *et al.* 2003).

MSDs can also require intensive effort from participants, including preparation before meetings and follow-up activities afterwards. Not all participants will be willing or able to devote this time, particularly if they need to consult intensively with constituents to explore their interests and points

of view (Susskind *et al.* 2003).

Providing and justifying resources is easier for donor-funded MSDs or MSDs that are part of the legal decision-making process than it is for voluntary or citizen-led ones. Even so, open-ended MSDs that depend on external support face questions over their long-term sustainability, and budgetary constraints or a lack of commitment in government agencies can cause problems such as intermittent funding or uneven funding for different groups (Dietz and Stern 2008; Warner 2006; Wollenberg *et al.* 2005). Yet, as Dietz and Stern (2008) note, creating expectations that cannot be met may be a bigger problem than a lack of resources *per se*.

References

- Ananda, J. (2004) Implementing participatory approaches in formulating regional forest policy. *International Journal of Sustainable Development* **7** (4): 398–409.
- Ananda, J. (2007) Implementing Participatory Decision Making in Forest Planning. *Environmental Management* **39** (4): 534–544.
- Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2008) Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* **18** (4): 543–571.
- Arnstein, S. R. (1969) A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of American Institute of Planners* **35** (4): 216–244.
- Ast, J. A. v. and Boot, S. (2003) Participation in European Water Policy. *Physics and Chemistry of the Earth* **28**: 555–562.
- Bäckstrand, K. (2006) Democratizing Global Environmental Governance? Stakeholder Democracy after the World Summit on Sustainable Development. *European Journal of International Relations* **12** (4): 467–498.
- Bäckstrand, K., Khan, J., Kronsell, A. and Lövbrand, E. (2010) The promise of new modes of environmental governance. In: Bäckstrand, K., Khan, J., Kronsell, A. and Lövbrand, E. eds, *Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
- Beeko, C. and Arts, B. (2010) The EU-Ghana VPA: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis of its Design. *International Forestry Review* **12** (3): 221–230.
- Biermann, F., Chan, S., Mert, A. and Pattberg, P. (2007) Multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development: does the promise hold? In: Glasbergen, P., Biermann, F. and Mol, A. eds, *Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable Development: Reflections on Theory and Practice*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
- Bond, I., Grieg-Gran, M., Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S., Hazlewood, P., Wunder, S. and Angelsen, A. (2009) *Incentives to sustain forest ecosystem services: A review and lessons for REDD*. Natural Resource Issues 16, International Institute for Environment and Development, London.
- Booher, D. E. (2004) Collaborative governance practices and democracy. *National Civic Review* **93** (4): 32–46.
- Brown, A. J. (2002) Collaborative governance versus constitutional politics: decision rules for sustainability from Australia's South East Queensland forest agreement. *Environmental Science & Policy* **5** (1): 19–32.
- Buchy, M. and Hoverman, S. (2000) Understanding public participation in forest planning: a review. *Forest Policy and Economics* **1**: 15–25.
- CCREM (1987) *Report of the National Task Force on Environment and Economy*. Canadian Council of Resource and Environment Ministers, Ottawa.
- Coenen, F. H. J. M. (2009b) Conclusions. In: Coenen, F. H. J. M. ed., *Public Participation and Better Environmental Decisions: The Promise and Limits of Participatory Processes for the Quality of Environmentally Related Decision-making*. Springer, Dordrecht.
- Coenen, F. H. J. M., Huitema, D. and O'Toole, L. J. (1998) Participation and Environmental Decision Quality: An Assessment. In: Coenen, F. H. J. M., Huitema, D. and O'Toole, L. J. eds, *Participation and the Quality of Environmental Decision-Making*. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
- Coglianesi, C. (1999) The Limits of Consensus: The Environmental Protection System in Transition: Toward a More Desirable Future. *Envi-*

- ronment: *Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* **41** (3): 28–33.
- Colfer, C. J. P. (1999) *Who Counts Most? Assessing Human Well-Being in Sustainable Forest Management*. Criteria and Indicators Toolbox Series 8, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor.
- Collins, K. and Ison, R. (2006) *Dare we jump off Arnstein's ladder? Social learning as a new policy paradigm*. In: Proceedings of PATH (Participatory Approaches in Science and Technology) Conference, 4–7 June 2006, Edinburgh.
- Conley, A. and Moote, M. A. (2003) Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management. *Society and Natural Resources* **16**: 371–386.
- Cruz, R. V. O. and Pulhin, J. M. (2006) *Review of Multisectoral Forest Protection Committees in the Philippines*. Verifor Country Case Study 7, Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Daniels, S. E. and Walker, G. B. (1999) Rethinking public participation in natural resource management: concepts from pluralism and five emerging approaches. In: FAO, *Pluralism and Sustainable Forestry and Rural Development: Proceedings of an international workshop, Rome, 9–12 December 1997*. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), Rome.
- Daviet, F. (2011) *A Draft Framework for Sharing Approaches for Better Multi-Stakeholder Participation Practices*. UN-REDD Programme and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Washington, DC.
- Dietz, T. and Stern, P. C. eds (2008) *Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision Making*. The National Academies Press, Washington, DC.
- Donahue, J. D. and Zeckhauser, R. J. (2011) *Collaborative Governance: Private Roles for Public Goals in Turbulent Times*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Dore, J. (2007) Mekong Region Water-Related MSPs – Unfulfilled Potential. In: Warner, J. ed., *Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management*. Ashgate, Aldershot.
- Dore, J. and Lebel, L. (2010) Gaining Public Acceptance: A Critical Strategic Priority of the World Commission on Dams. *Water Alternatives* **3** (2): 124–141.
- Dore, J., Robinson, J. and Smith, M., eds (2010) *Negotiate – Reaching agreements over water*. International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Gland.
- Dovi, S. (2008) Political Representation. In: Zalta, E. N. ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition)*. Available online at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/political-representation/>.
- Driscoll, C. (1996) Fostering Constructive Conflict Management in a Multistakeholder Context: The Case of the Forest Round Table on Sustainable Development. *International Journal of Conflict Management* **7** (2): 156–172.
- du Preez, M.-L. (2010) Whose forest is it anyway? A critical exploration of the network governance model and the Congo Basin Forest Partnership. *South African Journal of International Affairs* **17** (2): 167–187.
- Edmunds, D. and Wollenberg, E. (2001) A Strategic Approach to Multistakeholder Negotiations. *Development and Change* **32** (2): 231–253.
- Edwards, J. D. (1998) Managerial Influences in Public Administration. *International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior* **1** (4): 553–583.
- Elbakidze, M., Angelstam, P. K., Sandström, C. and Axelsson, R. (2010) Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration in Russian and Swedish Model Forest Initiatives: Adaptive Governance Toward Sustainable Forest Management? *Ecology and Society* **15** (2): 1–20.
- Eliasch, J. (2008) *Climate Change: Financing Global Forests: The Eliasch Review*. Earthscan Publications, London.
- Elsasser, P. (2007) Do “stakeholders” represent citizen interests? An empirical inquiry into assessments of policy aims in the National Forest Programme for Germany. *Forest Policy and Economics* **9** (8): 1018–1030.
- European Commission (2007) *What is legal timber?* FLEGT Briefing Note No. 2, European Commission, Brussels.
- Evans, A. E. V., Raschid-Sally, L. and Cofie, O. O. (2010) Multi-Stakeholder Processes for Managing Wastewater Use in Agriculture. In: Drechsel, P., Scott, C. A., Raschid-Sally, L., Redwood, M. and Bahri, A., *Wastewater Irrigation and Health: Assessing and Mitigating Risk in Low-Income Countries*. Earthscan Publications with IDRC and IWMI, London.
- Everett, J. and Jamal, T. B. (2004) Multistakeholder Collaboration as Symbolic Marketplace and Pedagogic Practice. *Journal of Management Inquiry* **13** (1): 57–78.
- Eversole, R. (2011) Community Agency and Community Engagement: Re-theorising Participation in Governance. *Journal of Public Policy* **31** (01): 51–71.
- Fahmi, E., Zakaria, R. Y., Kartodihardjo, H. and Wahono, F. (2003) *Minus Malum: Analysis of Multistakeholder Processes in Indonesia*. Report commissioned by DFID Multistakeholder Forestry Program (MFP) and GTZ Strengthening the Management Capacities in the Ministry of Forestry Project (SMCP), INSIST and Partners, Yogyakarta.

- FAO (2005) *Best practices for improving law compliance in the forestry sector*. Forestry Paper 145, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), Rome.
- FAO (2009) *Enhancing Stakeholder Participation in National Forest Programmes*. Forest Policy Brief, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), Rome.
- FAO (2011) *NFP Facility Newsletter, January 2011*. Available online at: <http://www.npfacility.org/68384/en/>.
- Faysse, N. (2006) Troubles on the way: An analysis of the challenges faced by multi-stakeholder platforms. *Natural Resources Forum* **30** (3): 219–229.
- Ferenz, M. N. (2002) *Multi-stakeholder Dialogues: Learning from the UNCSD Experience*. Background Paper No. 4 for the Third Preparatory Session, 24 March–15 April, Commission on Sustainable Development, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York.
- Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (2011) *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. 3rd ed. Penguin Books, New York.
- Fritsch, O. and Newig, J. (2007) *Under Which Conditions Does Public Participation Really Advance Sustainability Goals? Findings of a Meta-Analysis of Stakeholder Involvement in Environmental Decision-making*. Prepared for 'Earth System Governance: Theories and Strategies for Sustainability': 2007 Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 24–26 May 2007, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.
- Fung, A. (2006) Democratizing the Policy Process. In: Moran, M., Rein, M. and Goodin, R. E. eds, *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Gilmour, D. A., Durst, P. B. and Shono, K. (2007) *Reaching Consensus: Multi-stakeholder processes in forestry: experiences from the Asia-Pacific region*. RAP Publication, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok.
- Hamann, R., Giamporcaro, S., Johnston, D. and Yachkaschi, S. (2011) The role of business and cross-sector collaboration in addressing the 'wicked problem' of food insecurity. *Development Southern Africa* **28** (4): 579–594.
- Hemmati, M. (2002) *Multi-stakeholder Processes for Governance and Sustainability: Beyond Deadlock and Conflict*. Earthscan Publications, London.
- Hemmati, M. (2007) Multistakeholder Partnerships. In: Scherr, S. J. and McNeely, J. A. eds, *Farming With Nature: The Science and Practice of Ecoagriculture*. Island Press, Washington, DC.
- Holder, J. and Lee, M. (2007) *Environmental Protection, Law and Policy: Text and Materials*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Innes, J. E. (2004) Consensus Building: Clarifications for the Critics. *Planning Theory* **3** (1): 5–20.
- Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (2003) Collaborative policymaking: governance through dialogue. In: Hajer, M. A. and Wagenaar, H. eds, *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Johnston, E. W., Hicks, D., Nan, N. and Auer, J. C. (2011) Managing the Inclusion Process in Collaborative Governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* **21** (4): 699–721.
- Koechlin, L. and Calland, R. (2009) Standard setting at the cutting edge: an evidence-based typology for multi-stakeholder initiatives. In: Peters, A., Koechlin, L., Förster, T. and Zinner-nagel, G. F. eds, *Non-State Actors as Standard Setters*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Koehler, B. and Koontz, T. (2008) Citizen Participation in Collaborative Watershed Partnerships. *Environmental Management* **41** (2): 143–154.
- Koontz, T. M. and Thomas, C. W. (2006) What Do We Know and Need to Know about the Environmental Outcomes of Collaborative Management? *Public Administration Review* **66**: 111–121.
- Kremlis, G.-S. (2005) *The Aarhus Convention and its Implementation in the European Community*. Prepared for Seventh International Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 9–15 April 2005, Marrakech, Morocco.
- Laban, P., Barghout, M., Moriarty, P. and Sarsour, S. (2005) *Stakeholder Dialogue and Concerted Action for Integrated Water Resource Management*. Working Paper No. 6 (Version 2), EMPOWERS Partnership, Amman.
- Lane, M. B. (1999) Regional Forest Agreements: Resolving Resource Conflicts or Managing Resource Politics? *Australian Geographical Studies* **37** (2): 142–153.
- Lane, M. B. (2003) Decentralization or privatization of environmental governance? Forest conflict and bioregional assessment in Australia. *Journal of Rural Studies* **19** (3): 283–294.
- Leach, W. D. and Sabatier, P. A. (2005) Are Trust and Social Capital the Keys to Success? Watershed Partnerships in California and Washington. In: Sabatier, P. A., Focht, W., Lubell, M. et al. eds, *Swimming Upstream: Collaborative*

- Approaches to Watershed Management*. MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Leroy, P. (2002) Environmental politics, participation and political inequality. *Europaea* **8** (1–2): 153–167.
- Lund, J. F., Balooni, K. and Casse, T. (2009) Change We can Believe in? Reviewing Studies on the Conservation Impact of Popular Participation in Forest Management. *Conservation & Society* **7** (2): 71–82.
- Luttrell, C. (2008) *Multi-Stakeholder Processes: Lessons for the Process of Timber Verification*. Verifor Briefing Paper 8, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London.
- Margerum, R. (2008) A Typology of Collaboration Efforts in Environmental Management. *Environmental Management* **41** (4): 487–500.
- Moore, D., Dore, J. and Gyawali, D. (2010) The World Commission on Dams + 10: Revisiting the Large Dam Controversy. *Water Alternatives* **3** (2): 3–13.
- Moriarty, P., Laban, P., Batchelor, C., Shraideh, F., Fahmy, H. and Rifai, S. (2007) Learning alliances for local water resource management in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine: Lessons from the EMPOWERS project. In: Smits, S., Moriarty, P. and Sijbesma, C. eds, *Learning alliances: Scaling up innovations in water, sanitation and hygiene*. Technical Paper Series 47, IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre, Delft.
- Muñoz-Erickson, T. A., Aguilar-González, B., Loeser, M. R. R. and Sisk, T. D. (2010) A Framework to Evaluate Ecological and Social Outcomes of Collaborative Management: Lessons from Implementation with a Northern Arizona Collaborative Group. *Environmental Management* **45** (1): 132–144.
- Newig, J. (2007) Does Public Participation in Environmental Decisions Lead to Improved Environmental Quality? Towards an analytical framework. *International Journal of Sustainability Communication* **1**: 51–71.
- Newig, J. and Fritsch, O. (2009) Environmental governance: participatory, multi-level – and effective? *Environmental Policy and Governance* **19** (3): 197–214.
- OECD (2001) *Citizens as Partners: Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-Making*. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris.
- Oliva Hurtarte, E., Sales Hernández, E. and Bustos García, I. (2006) Guatemala's national forest programme – integrating agendas from the country's diverse forest regions. *Unasylva* **57** (225): 34–39.
- Oughton, D. (2008) Public Participation – Potential and Pitfalls. *Energy & Environment* **19** (3–4): 485–496.
- Parkinson, J. (2006) *Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Payne, S. L. and Calton, J. M. (2004) Exploring Research Potentials and Applications for Multi-stakeholder Learning Dialogues. *Journal of Business Ethics* **55** (1): 71–78.
- Poncelet, E. C. (2001a) Personal transformation in multistakeholder environmental partnerships. *Policy Sciences* **34** (3–4): 273–301.
- Poncelet, E. C. (2001b) “A Kiss Here and a Kiss There”: Conflict and Collaboration in Environmental Partnerships. *Environmental Management* **27** (1): 13–25.
- Prager, K. (2010) Local and Regional Partnerships in Natural Resource Management: The Challenge of Bridging Institutional Levels. *Environmental Management* **46** (5): 711–724.
- Rana, B., Khanal, K. P., Kotru, R. and Jamarkattel, B. (2009) Tackling the Terai Forest Governance Impasse: Can District-level Multi-stakeholder Processes Help? *Journal of Forest and Livelihood* **8** (2): 16–26.
- Reeb, D. (2004) Towards the Development of Criteria and Indicators to Assess the Level of Participation in NFP Processes. In: Buttoud, G., Solberg, B., Tikkanen, I. and Pajari, B. eds, *The Evaluation of Forest Policies and Programmes*. EFI Proceedings, European Forest Institute, Joensuu.
- Reed, M. G. (2010) Guess who's (not) coming for dinner: Expanding the terms of public involvement in sustainable forest management. *Scandinavian Journal of Forest Research* **25** (Suppl 9): 45–54.
- Retolaza, I. (2008) Moving up and down the ladder: community-based participation in public dialogue and deliberation in Bolivia and Guatemala. *Community Development Journal* **43** (3): 312–328.
- Retolaza, I. and Díez Pinto, E. (2007) *Evaluating Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues: A Comparative Analysis*. Background paper prepared for the Generative Reflection Workshop: Assessing the Impact of Democratic Dialogues, 24–25 January 2007, Carter Center, Atlanta.
- Richardson, B. J. and Razzaque, J. (2006) Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making. In: Richardson, B. J. and Wood, S. eds, *Environmental Law for Sustainability: A Reader*. Hart Publishing, Oxford.
- Rogers, E. and Weber, E. P. (2010) Thinking Harder About Outcomes for Collaborative Governance Arrangements. *The American Review of Public Administration* **40** (5): 546–567.
- Saunders, J., Ebeling, J. and Nussbaum, R. (2008) *Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): Lessons*

- from a forest governance perspective. ProForest, Oxford.
- Senecah, S. L. (2004) The Trinity of Voice: The Role of Practical Theory in Planning and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Environmental Participatory Processes. In: Depoe, S. P., Delicath, J. W. and Elsenbeer, M.-F. A. eds, *Communication and Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making*. State University of New York Press, Albany.
- Sepp, C. and Mansur, E. (2006) National forest programmes – a comprehensive framework for participatory planning. *Unasylva* **57** (225): 6–12.
- Sijbesma, C., Smits, S. and Moriarty, P. (2007) Learning about learning alliances – reflections on findings and future. In: Smits, S., Moriarty, P. and Sijbesma, C. eds, *Learning alliances: Scaling up innovations in water, sanitation and hygiene*. Technical Paper Series 47, IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre, Delft.
- Smits, S., García, M., Moriarty, P. and Laban, P. (2007b) Building learning alliances – some initial findings. In: Smits, S., Moriarty, P. and Sijbesma, C. eds, *Learning alliances: Scaling up innovations in water, sanitation and hygiene*. Technical Paper Series 47, IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre, Delft.
- Smits, S., Moriarty, P., Fonseca, C. and Schouten, C. (2007a) Scaling up innovations through learning alliances: An introduction to the approach. In: Smits, S., Moriarty, P. and Sijbesma, C. eds, *Learning alliances: Scaling up innovations in water, sanitation and hygiene*. Technical Paper Series 47, IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre, Delft.
- Steele, J. (2001) Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-solving Approach. *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* **21** (3): 415–442.
- Steins, N. A. and Edwards, V. M. (1999a) Platforms for collective action in multiple-use common-pool resources. *Agriculture and Human Values* **16** (3): 241–255.
- Steins, N. A. and Edwards, V. M. (1999b) Synthesis: Platforms for collective action in multiple-use common-pool resources. *Agriculture and Human Values* **16** (3): 309–315.
- Stirling, A. (2010) Keep it complex. *Nature* **468** (7327): 1029–1031.
- Susskind, L. E., Fuller, B. W., Ferenz, M. and Fairman, D. (2003) Multistakeholder Dialogue at the Global Scale. *International Negotiation* **8** (2): 235–266.
- Thomas, C. W. (2008) *Evaluating the Performance of Collaborative Environmental Governance*. Prepared for Consortium on Collaborative Governance Mini-Conference, 10–12 April 2008, Santa Monica.
- Thompson, S. and Webb, A. eds (1994) *Forest Round Table on Sustainable Development: Final Report, April 1994*. National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Ottawa.
- Turcotte, M.-F. and Pasquero, J. (2001) The Paradox of Multistakeholder Collaborative Roundtables. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* **37** (4): 447–464.
- Tyler, S. (2009) Multi-stakeholder deliberation. In: Swanson, D. and Bhadwal, S. eds, *Creating Adaptive Policies: A Guide for Policy-making in an Uncertain World*. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks.
- Upreti, B. R. and Shahbaz, B. (2011) *Mediated policy dialogues to address conflict over natural resource governance*. Evidence for Policy 2, NCCR North-South, Kathmandu.
- Varma, S., Evans, A., da Silva Wells, C. and Jinapala, K. (2009) Attitudes and actions of participants in multi-stakeholder processes and platforms. *Knowledge Management for Development Journal* **5** (3): 201–214.
- Verschuuren, J. (2011) *The Dutch Crisis and Recovery Act: Economic Recovery and Legal Crisis?* Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series 04/2011, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
- Warner, J. (2005) Multi-stakeholder platforms: integrating society in water resource management? *Ambiente & Sociedade* **8** (2): 17–28.
- Warner, J. (2006) More Sustainable Participation? Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management. *International Journal of Water Resources Development* **22** (1): 15–35.
- Warner, J. (2007) The Beauty of the Beast: Multi-Stakeholder Participation for Integrated Catchment Management. In: Warner, J. ed., *Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management*. Ashgate, Aldershot.
- WCED (1987) *Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future*. Available online at: <http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm>.
- Wollenberg, E., Anderson, J. and López, C. (2005) *Though all things differ: Pluralism as a basis for cooperation in forests*. Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor.
- Woodhill, J. (2004) *Facilitating Complex Multi-Stakeholder Processes: A Social Learning Perspective*. Working document, International Agricultural Centre, Wageningen.
- World Bank (2010) *Mainstreaming Social and Environmental Considerations into the Liberian National Forestry Reform Process: A Strategic*

Environmental Assessment for Implementation of the 3Cs of the Forest Reform Law 2006.
World Bank, Washington, DC.

WWF (2010) *Certification and roundtables: do they work? WWF review of multi-stakeholder sustainability initiatives.* World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Gland.

Yaffee, S. L. and Wondolleck, J. M. (2000) Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from a comprehensive assessment of over 200 wide-ranging cases of collaboration in environmental management. *Conservation in Practice* **1** (1): 17–24.



INTERNATIONAL UNION
FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE

FOREST CONSERVATION PROGRAMME
Rue Mauverney 28
CH-1196 Gland
Switzerland
forests@iucn.org
Tel +41 (22) 999-0261/3
Fax +41 (22) 364-9720
www.iucn.org/forest/fleg



Photo © IUCN